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PREFACE 
In rendering the Qur'anic Text into English I have kept 
close to the English translation by A. Y. Ali. The English 
translation of the iihadZ'th, which is not acknowledged in 
the bibliography, is my own. Amendments to the original 
translations, of both the Qur'ýn and the ahadith, are made 
where it is deemed necessary to ensure accuracy and., Ior to 
avoid possible obscurity. Herewith, if any mistranslation 
Cor misconception) remains, both the responsibility and 
the blame are mine. The transliteration of Arabic words 
and names follows the illustrative-table below. 
Consonants 
b f 
Zj t 
th L. Y" sh 
h d m 
t 
Jkh -L t zi n 
d h 
dh 
Short Vowels 
a 
Long Vowel s 
a 
Dipthongs 
aw 
ay 
Doubl 9 
uwwa 
iyya 
viii 
ABSTRACT 
This study is an endeavour to propose an Islamic 
paradigm of the economics of benevolence. It attempts to 
elicit the behavioural significance of the ubiquity of 
benevolence as an essential, juz-e divino, motive force, 
and the relaxation of the utilitarian assumption of 
egoistic human motivation. Benevolence has been epitomized 
in the development of a benevotent homo IsLamicus as an 
alternative to the conventional sotipsist homo economicus. 
The behavioural norms underlying these assumptions 
constitute the nucleus for a new economic paradigm - an 
ethico-Islamic economics. The introduction puts the study 
in an ethico-economic context. The first chapter is a 
necessary i nvesti gati on of the pros and cons of 
non-selfish behaviour in western thought. The second 
chapter is an exposition on the Islamic ethico-philosophic 
foundations of benevolence both as an innate trait of 
character and a divine imperative. The third chapter is an 
attempt to propose a 'benevolence market' as a unique 
third market in the Islamic Economy. The forth chapter is 
an elucidation on the homo Istamicus' consumption and 
production behaviour under the all-pervasive norm of 
benevolence. The fifth chapter is an an endeavour to infer 
the Islamic philosophy of factor compensation - the fair 
and congenial capital-labour and employer-employee 
relation under the assumption of benevolence. The 
conclusion recapitulates the main issues raised in the 
preceding chapters. 
ix 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Economics; A Philosophicai Framework 
Man'sa intrinsic and instinctivo rolation with tho 
phenomenon of economic activity can hardly be a matter of 
doubt; indeed, Carven C1994) claims "No man comes to 
economics as a traveller to an unknown land" CP. ID. Man is 
subject to biological, cultural and psychological needs; 
the struggle for needs-satisfaction, which involves 
economic activities, is his most salient characteristic. 
The term economic is a compound of two meanings; format 
and substantive. The substantive definition of economics 
denotes "bearing reference to the process of satisfying 
material wants'. The formal, and frequent, definition of 
economics stems from the means-ends relationship; it deals 
with the allocation of scarce means among the competing 
ends. CBecker, 1975, P. 3-4; Polanyi, 1! 977, PP. 19-20). Since 
the allocation of scarce resources is universal, 
I the 
scarcity-choice definition of economics is inadequate. To 
avoid this flaw, Boulding C1970a) defines economics in 
terms of 'exchange' and the 'exchangeables'CP. 17). 
2 
1 The allocation of scarce resources is a property of the 
total social system, not confined to the economy. Besides 
exchange', resources could possibly be allocated through 
threat' or through the integrative system. 
2 Boulding's definition retained the market-prico portrait 
of economics. It excludes the allocation Cor reallocationD 
of resources through both threat and benevoLence. Both 
systems are, so to speak, priceless. Unequivocally, the 
threat system is illegal and immoral under any respected 
paradigm. However, benevolence as an approbrious social 
norm should not, be relegated from economic analysis just 
because it is incompatible with the market Cprice3_sYst9m-_, 
1 
However, economics is perceived as the outcome of human 
activities; it is a human science -a social science. The 
place of 'social' in juxtaposition with 'science' seems 
contradictory; it generates two conceptions of the nature 
and the scope of economics: nozmative economics with its 
emphasis on human values and psycho-ethical consideration, 
and positive economics with its emphasis on propositions 
which are testable against objective evidence. "In the 
battle between mechanism and moralism generally mechanism 
has won hands down"CBoulding, 1! 970a, P. 118). Economics is, 
or claimod to bG?, a wortfroi, possitive scienceý, 
3 
and. 
generally speaking, economists are liberalistic 
positivists "both by self-avowal and 
. 
philosophical 
or i ent ati on "C War d, 1972, P. 24D. 
3 
Positive economics depends heavily on the philosophy of 
logical positivism. It studies problems which pertain to 
matters of 'facts', not 'values'. The distinction between 
facts and values is said to be necessary to distinguish 
between the scientific and unscientific, the quantitative 
and the qualitative methods of assessment. Positive 
economists hold that theories/hypotheses must be tested 
against empirical evidence. Two lines of thinking are 
worth mentioning. Positive economists define testability 
as verifiability C and thus empirical tests become 
empirical verifications). The 'Popperian' positive 
economists define testability as falsifiability Cand thus 
empirical tests become empirical f al si fi cati ons. C see 
Katouzian, 1980, PP. 53-55). Presumably, because it is more 
difficult to verify a statement than to show that it has 
not been falsified, positive economists have learned to 
visualize their own activities through the methodological 
eyeglasses provided by Karl Popper; that is, falsification 
and fallibility. 
a 
The modern, liberalistic economic paradigm emerges in 
the course of the philosophy of utilitarianism and the 
hedonistic psychology CMyrdal, V975, P. 85). The liberal 
psychology, according to Ward C1972, P. 24-25), is based on 
three principles. Firstly, hedonism; which characterizes 
man in terms of drive-reduction or the satisfaction of the 
urgent demands of body and mind. Secondly, rationalism; a 
means-ends orientation; the use of deliberate choice among 
alternatives in seeking the satisfaction of 
drive-reduction. Thirdly, atomism; the assertion of the 
essential separateness and autonomy of each man from every 
other, with consequent stabilization of values by means of 
processes internal to the individual human organism. The 
central assumption of this liberalistic economics is that 
individuals are, ipso facto, 4rational' in maximizing 
their own interest. Presumably, these principles, together 
with the assertion that the scarcity of resources is the 
all-pervasive economic problem, are the foundation of a 
market society -a society perceived as "an agglomeration 
of human atoms "C Pol anyi, 1977, P. 13). The market oriented 
psychology recognizes only material motives as real; all 
other 'ideal' motives are relegated to the "limbo of 
ineffectuality" CPolanyi, 1977, P. 15). 
2. Economics And Social Values 
The positive liberalistic economic paradigm dismisses 
ethical values from economic analysis on the grounds that 
a sciontist, qua sciontist, should concorn hinigolf with 
3 
what is rather that what oueht to be. In the words of 
Knight C1922, PP. 475-6) "Economics deals with the form of 
conduct rather than its substance or content. ----If one 
wishes to study the concrete content of motives and 
conduct he must turn from economic theory to history, 
social psychology and especially culture history". In 
contrast. many economists maintain that the question of 
'values' cannot be underestimated and their relegation 
from economic inquiry is, to say the least, inappropriate. 
As Heilbroner (1973) puts it, "the objects observed by the 
social scientist, all possess an attribute that is lacking 
in the object of the natural universe. This is the 
attribute of consciousness - of cognition, of 
Oscalculation, of vol i ti on"C P. 133). Katouzian C1980) 
asserts that an a priori hypothesis is subjective by 
definition and any scientific theory would be impregnated 
by subjective elements for the simple reason that it is 
the product of the human mind. CP. 139). More over, unlike the 
natural scientist, the social scientist is himself a part 
of the subject-matter of his investigation. Thus, in the 
words of Boulding "Nowhere is the positivistic fiction of 
a dispassionate, objective observer wholly removed from 
the field of his observation more absurd than in the 
social science" C1970b, P. 4) 
It is somewhat fallacious to claim that positive 
economists dismiss the question of value once and for all. 
Any economic paradigm is in some way based an a certain 
4 
value promise, and positive economics is no exception; the 
"Neglect of ethical values in positive, liberalistic 
economics has led to the substitution of such quasi-values 
as quantitative maximization, inefficiency. egalitarianism, 
anti-discrimination, what is normal, etc. "CMcKee, 1982, P. 7: ). 
The rapidly growing concern about sociat economics is a 
reformationist impulse - an impulse to return to the 
social values that have been nullified or obscured by the 
positivists' aberrations. As Boulding CV@70b) has pointed 
out, "For all the attempts to dehumanize the science of 
man [economics], a moral science it remains. Its central 
problem is the problem of value: and value is but a step 
from virtue"CP. 12). 
1.3. Economic Solipsism And The Norm Of Self-Interest 
Economic Sol i psi sm 
4 
advocates the pursuit of 
self-interest as the conceptual core or the basic theorem 
in liberalistic, positive economics. The individualistic 
psychology underlying +-he assumption of solf-interested 
behaviour is as old as the eighteenth century 
4 The term solipsi sm CLatin sotus, alone, plus ipso, self) 
would generally suggest any doctrine that attaches prime 
importance to the self. It is of three kinds; egoism Cthe 
notion of self-seeking); reality solpsism Cthe notion of 
the self as the supposed totality of existence); and 
epistemological solpsism Cthe notion of the self and its 
states as the only object of real knowledge). Ccf. Rollins, 
1957, P. 487). Economic solpsism thus belongs to egoism; the 
notion of self-interest as a universal behavioural norm. 
5 
4naturalization' 5 of the economy which separates the 
economic morality from the societal fabric as well as from 
religious teachingsCTawney, 1980, P. 195; Robertson, 1987, P. 13. 
This view has been epitomized by Adam Smith C1775XI951: ) 
who developed an atomistic view of social life resting 
upon the ubiquity and ever-decisive role of self-interest: 
"It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from 
their regard to their own interest" Cvol. 1-P-18). With the 
i deal i zati on of this individualistic, utilitarian 
paradigm, the whole edifice of economic theory becomes 
thematized on what Jevons C1871/1970, P. 50) has labelled 
the mechanics of utitity and seLf interest. [Emphasis 
supplied3. Whether economics is defined in terms of 
wants-satisfaction or scarcity-induced choice, it 
certainly supports Jevons' connotation. In this amoraL 
economics, every goal that helps an individual "improving 
his lots" is deemed to be attainable pursuant to the 
general proposition that "everything has a price at which 
it may be obtained"CMckenzie and Tullock. 1975, P. 21). 
Naturalism usually signifies "the view that all obJects, 
truths, and facts fall within the scope of scientific 
inquiry, that nothing is in principle insusceptible to 
scientific explanation"CStaut. 1987, P'. 315). Thus the economy 
came to be regarded as operating according to its own 
laws, particularly those issuing from the relationship 
between supply and demand. Through 'naturalization' and 
the diagnosis of secularization (the decline in the 
significance of religion in modern society) the economy 
became fully thematized as a relatively autonomous realm 
of human life. 
B 
The norms of logical positivism and methodological 
individualism have created the 'fictitious' economic man; 
the most authentic representative of economic solipsism. 
Axiologically, individualism advocates a 4solipsist, 
economic man whose universal and fundamental element of 
personality is rational maximization in pursuit of 
self-interest. The most, fatal limitation of the economic 
man is his presumed omniscience CHutchison. 1984, PP. 2-3). 
As perfect competition is an ineradicable scandal of 
economic theory [persumably due to its thoroughly 
unrealistic assumptions] CSimon, 1979, P. 9), the economic 
man's rationality is bounded, not global as it is claimed 
to be. However, no serious alternative has yet been 
proposed as to the economic man's outmoded psychology 
and/or his mechanic character. 
The norm of self-interest is generalized, so much so 
that 'maximization' becomes the dominant economic approach 
and thereby the 'fictitious' economic man becomes homo 
sapiens. Becker C1976, P. 14) insists that human behaviour 
is not compartmentalized; all human behaviour is 
interpretable in terms of the pursuit of self interest 
maxi mi zati on. In Becker's view, marriage, fertility, 
altruistic behaviour and even criminality are 
Ceconomically: ) worth-while acts only if the 'expected 
7 
6 
benefit' of each act outweighs its opportunity Cos -s 
Rohrlich C1977, P. 334: ) has pointed out, many-dimensions of 
life, in which utility may play a subordinate role, have 
been gauged by the utility calculus as if this were their 
raison d'6tro; and self-interest is being misrepresented as 
the lever that governs human conduct in respect of them. 
Even the social virtues grounded in religious belief 
such as truth, trust, acceptance, restraint and obligation 
have not escaped the rigors of self-interest; they are 
conceived as central in the funct-ioning of an 
individualistic, market economy. Religious belief, once 
adopted, performs a secular function; it operates 
conveniently as a private sanction, being seen to provide 
rewards and penalties directly in accordance with the 
individual's performance of his social obligations. As 
such it is an effective inducement for collective action - 
an action necessary for a market economy. The liberalists 
maintain that one might not go to heaven by loving one's 
neighbour as oneself, yet, one will get more wordly goods 
out of the market provided that all neighbours do 
6 Thus killing a person could be economically viable and 
feasible if the opportunity cost Cthe utility derived from 
spending the sameý time doing something else) is less than 
the 'expected benefit' derived therefrom. However, once 
ethics is invited onto the scene, the cost of doing such 
an act would be high enough to be compensated even by the 
Benthamite calculus. 
8 
likewise. More exactly, the earthly pay off does not 
require the neighbourly love to exist, but only action as 
if it exists. 
7 
Likewise, there is no need for genuine, 
positive, altruistic acts. In the words of Hirsch C19783, 
"provided everyone behaves 0-9 if he were really 
altruistic, no one need be: everyone's interest will be 
better served than if I everyone behaves unaltruistically" 
Ci3o. ) S. The non-Marxist social function of religion is that 
religious obligation "helped to reconcile the conflict 
between private and social needs at the individual level 
and did it by internalizing individual norms of behaviour. 
It thereby provided the necessary social binding for an 
individualistic non-altruistic market behaviour"CHirsch, 
7 The liberalists' perception of the 'modern' world is but 
notional and amora'l - "a world in which the economizing of 
Love is, in certain circumstances, morally permissible, 
instead of being morally reprehensible' CKristol, 1981, 
P. 2043. The economization of Love has been identified by 
Robertson C1956, P. 154) who in response to the query; 'What 
do economists economize? ', ambiguously replied: 'Love'. 
8 This view is derived from Sen's C1973. ) solution to the 
prisoners' dilemma - when a contractual solution is not 
Possible. Sen's exposition runs as follows: if each 
prisoner behaves as if he is maximizing the welfare of the 
other, then provided that non-confession is a superior 
strategy, neýther will confess; this will lead to a better 
situation for each in terms of his own welfare as well. 
CP. 252). 
9 
1978, P. 142). Q Collective and cooperative actions are 
impractical and ineffective unless they are internally 
motivated. Without the internalization of social values 
and obligations, collective interest will be neglected. 
Economic solipsism is by no means the only form of 
human motivation; other-directed, nonselfish behaviour has 
long been recognized by philosophers, sociologists, 
anthropologists, etc. Though altruism is recognized as a 
social norm, yet it is perceived as a philosophical 
principle, not a behavioural nor an operational concept. 
Conventional liberalistic economists are enamoured by 
4 exchange' and therefore usually think only in terms of 
4 price'. As altruistic behaviour is priceless, economists 
are forced to reinterpret it as a form of exchanee; a 
disguised self-serving behaviour. However, the same 
tautology can be used to show that the Cseemingly) 
self-serving behaviour is an altruistic one indeed. No 
economist has totally ignored altruism as a possible 
motive-force. Nor has it been successfully incorporated in 
9 For the Marxist religion is an epiphenomenon, it is of a 
peripheral significance. Marx's famous statement "religion 
is the opium of the people" is to be understood in the 
following context, "an ideological cover, either for the 
defense of the social status quo or for protests against 
it" CBellah, 1968, P. 408). As to its function, the Marxists 
maintain that religion is a matter of social need; it will 
become functionlrsýss and wither away with the change of 
social needs through the transformation of the structure 
of the society. Ccf. MacIntyre, 1971, P. 84-85). 
10 
aLny form of basic economic theory. 2conomic theory remains 
the way it was; an account of egoism in action, as 
"ýZtuartCIQ623 puts it, with altruism playing the part of 
more or less a stubborn or a disturbing intruder. 
Ostýc;, nsibly, the connotation of altruism -i. e. the complete 
or perfect regard for others - is in itself an obstacle 
to its incorporation in any form of economic theory. "What 
disturbs one about this concept is precisely its pairing 
as an opposite to self-interest. Thus it is the far end on 
a range that goes from totally self-regarding acts and 
attitudes to predominantly other -regardi ng acts and 
attitude? s"CRohrlich, 1977, PP. 341-23. Even philanthropy, or 
the active effort to further others' welfare, though a 
behavioural concept, has been conceived. due to the notion 
of self-interest, as essentially entailing ulterior 
motives. Furthermore, philanthropy, as it is perceived, is 
neither a univQrsai nor an effective social norm inasmuch 
as it is beset with the'free -rider 
10 
problem -a problem 
whose very presence is pertaining to self-interest. 
10 
This problem arises due to the presumed incompatibility 
between the individual and the collective interest, that 
is, the principle of rational egoism and the principle of 
collective optimization. The free-x-ider problem is the 
basic paradox in public finance. For instance, in the case 
of the non-rival public goods, each individual, given his 
economic solipsism, will attempt to secure the benefit 
from the public good without participating fully in the 
sharing of its cost. 
11 
1.4. Economics And Ethics: An IslanLic Perspective 
As economics is concerned with the intricate and complex 
actions and motives of man, its substantial association 
with ethics can not be passed over sotto voce, but placed 
at the heart of economic inquiry. In the Islamic 
perspective, man - the centrepiece, of economic inquiry - 
is characterized by an ontological commitment to material 
and spiritual satisfaction. Ccf. Qur'an, 15: 28-9)- The 
creation of man is purposive; ibadah Cthe worship of God) 
and hence the longing for spirituality becomes man's 
raison d'dtre. Within this general framework of tbadah 
lies the divine taktif Cobligation) that man must develop 
and husband the earth. Man's economic activities become a 
form of ibadah; an essential part of his or her divine 
taktif; thus man's mundane pursuit becomes spiritualized. 
It is this integrative and holistic view ýof Islam that 
rejects outright any schism between ethics and economics. 
The unification of man's spiritual concern with his or 
her mundane pursuit is to be understood within the context 
of tawhid Cunity of God). Tawhid connotes that man is in 
cosmic 'movement' towards God and accountable for his or 
12 
herdeeds in the aRhirah Cthe Hereafter) CQurlan, 84: 6). 
thus man's motives and actions must be guided by the 
-Z expected approval of God. In the words of Al-FaruqT C198ý!, 
P. 193) "The concept, of tawhTd which implies that God is 
the sole and ultimate value, implies that the purpose of 
man is the actualization of values in space and time". The 
psycho-ethical orientation of the ta&jidic paradigm imbues 
the mind of the Muslim with the notion of falaiý Cmaterial 
and spiritual felicity: ) as the summum bonum of economic 
activities. Albeit, man is ontologically committed to 
material and spiritual concerns, he or sho is, 
axiologically, aware of the supremacy of his spiritual 
concern over mundane pursuit. 
Axiomatically, the Islamic ethical imperatives epitomize 
the socio-economic values of the society, and through their 
induced psychological orientation determine the preference 
structure of the individuals. Thus it could be argued that 
the core of Islamic Economics consists of the over-riding 
concern of ethical considerations. As NaqviC1991b, P. 18) 
puts it "What Islam asserts is that ethics, independent of 
the economic conditions prevailing at any 'Lime or in any 
society, must guide human behaviour for' the attainment of 
social bliss as well as spiritual salvation". One 
hesitates not to negate such claims as "There can be even 
less doubt that our values are influenced by knowledge 
13 
about facts "C Gordon. 1977, P. 544).. Facts and values are not 
of the same ontological status. Those who assign hard 
ontological, and axiological status to *facts' are 
assuming a positivist paradigm whereby 'values' become 
trivial unless they are fact-induced. In the Islamic 
perspective, unless facts are epistemologicýlly divine, 
they enjoy no axiological status. It is true that 
knowledge about facts Csuch as living in extreme affluence 
or poverty. ) may turn the individual away from God by 
inducing him or her to adopt un-Islamic values. Ccf. Qurlan, 
90: 16-6; 06: 6-73. HowovGr, this facts-vatuos effect is 
Islamically undesirable; it connotes that man fails to 
realize the probationary nature of being in a certain 
economic condition. Thus its ontological status should 
enjoy no axiological significance. 
I. S. Thesis And Methodology 
The present study proposes that economic solipsism is, 
categorically, antithetical to the Islamic ethical value 
system whose psycho-ethical orientation imbues the mind of 
the homo IsLamicus Cthe Muslim economic agent) with 
benevolence as an all-pervasive behavioural norm. Islamic 
benevolence is conceived as an attitude of mind wherefrom 
springs a certain pattern of behaviour where one strives 
to further others' welfare besides his own without any 
ulterior motivoCs: ) or external compulsion. It is neither 
14 
&n Passant nor merely approbrious; rather it is 
socio-spiritually essential, and jure (: Jjvjno imperative. 
The unilateral transfer of wealth from the haves to the 
have-nots is essential in uplifting the least privileged 
in the society. However, the norm of benevolence is not 
confined to unilateral transfers, but also permeates the 
whol e edifice of economic activities, through its 
interaction with at'ladt Cjustice, /equilibrium-'). In the 
absence of at4adL benevolence is likely to undermine 
benevolence. In this ethical environment, the homo 
la-Lamicus-'s economic behaviour would be ab intra and 'ab 
extra consistent with the' norm of aL'adL and benevolence. 
Ultimately, the assumption of egoistic human motivation 
would be, Islamically, vacuous. Unlike the Benthamite 
cost-benefit calculus, Muslim economists have to premise 
their views of a generalizable individual action on its 
conformity with the ýtacFith "He has no faith who wishes not 
for his brother what he wishes for himself "CHuslim, 
V01.1'P. 31). The emerging new economic paradigm 
necessarily epitomizes the? ubiquity of benevolent human 
motivation. 
Note that there is every need for at'adt as a 
controlling device which maintain for both the subject and 
the object their due rights and obligations. In accordance 
with aPadt, the subject shall avoid self-abnegation and 
self -absorption, and shall not dishonor the object. 
Likewise, the object shall not decline the subject's 
benevolent impulses nor unnecessarily depend on others" 
benovol Gnce. Without aL'adt it will be practically 
impossible to determine where benevolence ends and 
coGrcion Cor throat: ) bGgins. 
15 
The methodology of this study is basically deductive, 
however, induction is indispensable whenever the 
incorporation of valid historical precedents is deemed to 
be necessary. The deduction is not from arbitrary or 
hypothetical propositions; it is a deduction from the 
Islamic ethical value system as expounded by the Qur'an 
and the sunnah of the prophet. 
12 Since man is neither 
sGlf-sufficiGnt CQur'an, 56: 57-74) nor omniscient CQur , an, 
17: 953, he or she needs hidayah CguidanceD at both 
material and spiritual levels. However, the hidayah 
received by experiential knowledge is reductionist, and 
man's need for divine hidayah becomes essential. Unlike 
the experiential knowledge, "the holistic revelational 
knowledge provides holistic impulse that, results into 
holistic response and the hidayat [as such in the text] 
thus obtained is also holistic" CKirmani, 1984, P-13). As 
a matter of iman Cconviction. ), the divine knowledge is 
regarded as substantially true. Given the fact that "'the 
explanation of mental process is itself a mental process, 
The Ourlan is the word of God revealed unto the Prophet 
Muhammad, as such it is, ontologically, divine. The sunnah 
refers to the norms set by the prophet or deduced from his 
behaviour or authentic ahadith. Defending the prophet, the 
Qur , an states: "Nor doeý he speak of Chis own) desire. 
It is naught save an inspiration that is inspiredC53: 3-4). 
Thus the sunnah of the prophet is virtually divine. Though 
the Qur'an and sunnah are divine, their understanding is 
completely human. For the Muslim, the Qur'iin and the sunnah 
represent the source of normativeness and hidayah Cboth 
wordly and spiritual guidance). Being assigned a hard 
axiological and epistemological status, the Qur'an and the 
sunnah are inseparable from the life of the muslim in the 
sense that they determine his or her world-view. 
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so that any exhaustive explanation would have to explain 
both itself and the expl ai nor "C Knight, 1956, P. 17enIED, 
human perception Cmental process: ) cannot verify and.., 'or 
falsify the divine imperatives. Human reasoning is 
fallible; however, by no means does this fallibility 
connote that human reasoning is epistemologically 
insignificant. "In so far as reason is pulled by desire or 
self interest it is antithetical to revel ati on"C Si ddi qui, 
1983, P. 11). Methodologically, human reasoning, free from 
desires and motives, does not contradict the -Islamic 
ethical system. Thus, Islamic Economics can, without 
apology, borrow valid ideas from conventional economic 
theory provided they are consistent with the Islamic 
ethical system. 
Thematically, apart from the introduction and the 
conclusion, the study is subdivided into five chapters. In 
the first chapter, it is argued that non-selfish behaviour 
is a rGcognized, though scarce, social norm in western 
thought. Yet it is construed as a form of di5gUi5ed 
self-intereest. This is why egoistic human motivation is 
the fundamental premise of conventional economic theory. 
The limited, partial attempts to incorporate altruism in a 
form of economic theory are naive, inconclusive and in one 
form or another retain the ubiquity of self-interest. The 
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incorporation of the norm of altruism, wi-thout seriously 
relaxing self-interest as a value premise, would result 
in such eccentric. behaviour as ruthtessness in the 
marhetpLace-and aLtruism in the batLot box. 
Chapter two is an exposition on the Islamic conception 
of benevolence and its philosophical significance for the 
Islamic Economics. Since man is longing for spirituality, 
the approval of God is the kernel of the Islamic theory of 
motivation. Benevolence is and should be free of all 
forms of ulterior motives. Only through the inculcation of 
this conception should benevolence be an all-pervasive 
norm. Being sacrosanct and, jur& divino, imperative, 
benevolence is placed at the heart of economic inquiry. 
The homo economicus is thus turned into a homo Istamicus 
whose mind is imbued with a benevolent human molLivation. 
This departure from conventional theory forms the nucleus 
of a new economic paradigm - the benevolence economics, or 
the Islamic Economics. 
In chapter three, the all -encompassing concept, of 
benevolence has been used in the proposition of the 
'benevolence market' as a unique "third" market, in the 
Islamic Economy. Unlike the western concept of the 
'charity market' , the 4 benevolence market' functions at 
two interacting levels; the unilateral transfer of wealth 
and establishment of aL*adL Cf ai r ness/j usti, ce). The 
is 
unilateral traLnsf ers is Meant to UP1 if the needy 
Cmaterialistically and spirituallyD though it also helps 
the spiritual ascent of the givers. The norm of al'adl 
ensures the active role of benevolence in ordinary market 
exchange. 
Chapter four is an exposition on the homo IsIc-raicus' 
consumption and production behaviour on the assumption of 
benevolence. Unlike the homo economicus, t he homo 
Islamicus is facing an ethical allowability constraint in 
addition to the traditional feasibility constraint. The 
concept of rationality as the maximization in pursuit of 
self interest becomes empty in the Islamic ethical value 
system where rationality is determined by its conformity 
wi th fatah Cmaterial and spiritual f el i city). The 
fata; ý-determined rationality requires the introduction of 
the concept of maqlaýiah Can Islamic alternative to the 
concept of utilityD as a basis for consumer theory; and 
satisficine, instead of maximizing, as a basis for the 
theory of the firm. The norm of benevolence is effective 
in determining the preference structure of the homo 
Istamicus; both the commodity space and the production 
menu appeared to be 'contracted' and bounded. 
Chapter five is an assertion that the establishment of 
the norms of aPadt and benevolence remove all possible 
impediments to fair factor compensation, thus contributing 
to the establishment of a congenial 'capital -labour' and 
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temployer- employee' relation. It, is shown that riba Cthe 
advance fixation of capital rewardD is antithetical to the 
-Islamic ethical value system, and profit-sharing is the 
'first best' alternative thereto. Profit-sharing and its 
forms Cmuýlarabah and shir)-ýah) are scrutinized and used to 
develop abstracts models. of self-managed firms. These 
firms are not only feasible and viable, but also free 
from many theoretical problems facing the non-Islamic 
self-managed firm, such as the 4Ward-Vanek' self 
extinction forces and the Fur ubotn-Pej ovc h' horizon 
pr obl em. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ALTRUISM, PHILANTHROPY AND ECONOMICS 
1.1 Overyiew 
Economic activities as soci al phenomena are 
inseparable from the individual's norms, ethics and 
behaviour. Of these norms and behaviour, self interest 
attracts the most notice of economists to the extent that 
it represents the fundamental promise of modern economic 
theory. Non-selfish behaviour has been recognized 
throughout history, yet it has an insignificant role in 
economics. The present chapter endeavours to investigate 
the key concepts in nonselfishness viz, altruism and 
philanthropy and their underlying significance for modern 
economics. The chapter is subdivided into fOUr' sections. 
Section two explores the nature of, and the motives 
behind, altruism. Section three analyses the concept of 
philanthropy and its underlying motives. Section four 
discusses altruism and philanthropy vis A vis modern 
economic theory. 
1.2. Altruism 
Human beings instinctively exert, themselves' 'Lo 
safeguard -and promote their own welfare; nonetheless, theY 
often involve themselves with others" pain and appear to 
further others' welfare. Whether these impulses are 
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natural or not depends on how the nature of human beings 
is perceived. Are human beings by nature cooperative or is 
human nature intrinsically competitive? Why do people 
often act so ruthlessly and, at one and the same time, so 
sympathetically? Elucidation on such human behaviour, what 
Cohen C1972) termed the attruistic paradox, and the 
questions posed thereby are central issues in moral 
philosophy. The qGnosis and Gxposition of these issues is 
the product of seventeenth and eighteenth century thought 
CHaclntyre, 1! 967); it was only after Hobbqs C1651) that 
the conflict between self-interested Cogoistic) and 
other-directed Caltruistic) behavi our appears as a 
philosophically disputable issue. 
The term altruism is of recent coinage, though the 
behavioural phenomena to which the term refers have been 
examined since time immemorial CMasters, 1978; Rushton and 
Sorrentino, 1981). It is generally acknowledged that the 
term altruism originates from the French sociologist 
Auguste Comte C1798-1857). who used it to mean 
unselfish regard for others CWisp6,15)79). Since Comte, 
other behavibural scientists have been actively studying 
altruism in both conscious as well as unconscious beings. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines altruism as devotion 
to thi;, u4; kLfaro of oth6ýrs, roeard for othor!; as a princiPLO 
I How Comte came to adopt the term altruism from the 
Italian word for other, attrui, rather than from the French 
autrui or the Latin atter remains a puzzle (Wisp6,1978D. 
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action, where love and duty are the only determinants 
of altruism. However, the definition of altruism has posed 
difficult problems. Behavioural researchers have generally 
avoided the definitional issue which involves establishing 
the intention behind altruism, by employing operational 
definitions CKrebs, 1970: ). Altruism is usually contrasted 
with egoism 
2 the disposition to further one's own 
wel f are. The contrast is between self-regarding and 
other-regarding Cbenevolent and disinterested) tendencies. 
In addition to the definitional problems, the perception 
of altruism Cor Qgoism: ) is beset with motivational 
problems. An attempt will be made hereafter to elucidate 
these issues vis A vis altruistic impulses. 
1.2.1. Altruism and Human Nature 
Since antiquity attention has centered on altruism in 
relation to two basic questions viz, what human nature is# 
and how ought people to live their lives? The former 
investigates whether altruism is inherent and deep-rooted 
in human nature, while the latter maintains that altruism 
is morally virtuous. In regard to what human nature is, 
threP- basic views are worth mentioning C Cohen, 1972; Rushton 
and Sorrentino, 1991). Firstly, human beings are naturally 
qevit' Cindividualistic and selfish). and socialization is 
2 Egoism should not be confused with the moral quality of 
egotism, the latter being confined to the vice of thinking 
too much of one's own self interest. CLillie, 1966). 
However, an egoistic philosophy might lead a person to 
practical ogotism. 
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required to make them social 
14 
. Secondly, human nature 
iS 
essentially "eood' Csocial, cooperative and altruistic) 
Thirdly, human nature is morally *neutraLl, and man's evil 
is the result of evil surroundings However, none of-these 
views can be generalized to all human beings irrespective 
of their culture and environment. To claim that human 
beings are acquainted with this or that innate quality. it 
is necessary to show, using Cohen's C1972) words, that 
they manifest it despite the context in which they develop 
and live. 
As to how ought human beings to live their lives, 
altruism (the regard for others: ) is universally hailed as 
a virtue CTimur, 1955). The most basic tenet of all major 
religions in the world is that "unselfishness is the 
primary virtue and that selfishness lies at the root of 
the world's ills" CBohannan, 1463, P. 336). "Do to others 
as you would have them to do to you" CLuke 6: 31), is a 
famous Christian principle. However, the Christian 
teachings on altruism and love demands a high standard of 
humanity and therefore many doubts arise regarding its 
This pessimistic approach is derived from the Sophists 
C5th-4th century B. C. ) to Machiavelli C1459-1527) to 
Hobbes C1588-1679) to Freud CleW-1939). 
4 An optimistic approach is derived from the Socrates C5th 
century B. C. ) to Aristotle C384-322 B. C. ) to Rousseau 
C1712-1778). 
S The upholders of this view runs in line from Epicurus 
C342-270 B. C. ) to Plato C427-374 B. C. ), Locke C1632-1704) 
and Marx CISIS-Ie933. 
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vi abi Ii ty. The importance of altruism is stressed 
throughout human culture. Rushton and Sorrentino C1981) 
mention two exceptions to the universality of altruism as 
a virtue : one is Machiavelli C15323 who suggests that to 
"maintain the state, a prince is often obliged to act 
against charity, humanity and religion". and Ayn Rand 
C10643 who proposes that "ethical altruism is extremely 
bad in its consequences for our society". Kekes CV987) 
though not directly opposing altruism and benevolence, 
argues that +-he moral claims for them should not be 
inflated. By and large, researchers into human conditions 
are divided as to whether humans are altruistic, but they 
are less so in regard to the principle that 'humans ought 
to behave altruistically'. Whether altruism is natural or 
not, it manifests itself in many real-world examples. 
Neither are all these acts virtue-motivated, nor do all 
virtuous persons always behave altruistically. In other 
words, altruism could be practised for reasons other than 
moral virtue. 
1.2.2. Altruism and Hedonism 
Many attempts have been made to establish a 
hedonistic explanation of altruism. Hedonism is the 
doctrine which maintains that the main object and end of 
life is pleasure CRickaby. S. J. , 1929; Lillie, V966). 
Generally speaking, hedonism denotes that people are 
indifferent to the welfare of others and struggle only 
to promote their own pleasure and minimize their own pain 
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CNowell-Smith, 196! 9: ). As Maclnytre C1967) has argued, 
since pain and pleasure are the names of sensations, then 
the only pleasure whose prospect attracts the individual 
is his pleasure, and the only pain the prospect of which 
repels him is his pain. Being the mere pursuit in all 
things of pleasurable feelings Cfeelings being always 
particular and limited to the self: ), hedonism exhibits 
selfishness; as such it contravenes the norm of altruism. 
However, if hedonism is regarded as a theory which bases 
morality upon pleasure CRickaby, S. 1929), then both egoism 
and altruism are possible, but the pleasure-motivated 
hedonistic altruism could hardly be regarded as genuine 
altruism. If hedonism is maintained; then genuine altruism 
is a logical impossibility CNowell -Smith, 1959D. Hedonism 
is of two forms; psychological and ethical. 
Psychological hedonism suggests that men always do 
those actions which have pleasant consequences and have 
such nature that they can desire nothing but pleasantness 
(Lillie, 1965; Brandt, 1979). Two forms of psychological 
hedonism are worth noting CMilo, 1973); the first 
maintains that selfishness is a universal character trait, 
and people usually make the pursuit of their own interest 
their primary and over-ridding concern, altruism is not 
denied, though the prevalence of selfishness over altruism 
is highly stressed; the second is the view that egoisM is 
a character trait that consists of an exclusive concern 
with one's own interest and that one promotes the interest 
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of othQrz onty so far as this is considered conducivo to 
one's own interest and that one is willing to sacrifice 
the interests of others when this is considered 
instrumontal to promoting or safeguarding one's own 
interest. Hence altruism is either denied outright or 
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regarded as an epiphenomenon a disguised self interest. 
In this manner, as will be discussed later in this 
section, psychological hedonism has been proposed as a 
reinforcement of-altruistic behaviour. 
Ethical hedonism attempts to explain how men ought to 
act and what men ought to desire CLillie, 1966). It 
maintains that a rational man would want, for himself, one 
and only one kind of thing pleasant 
experiences for himself CSrandt, 1979). There are two 
forms of ethical hedonism; egoistic and universalistic. 
Ethical egoism holds that each man ought to seek his own 
maximum ploasuro CLillie, 19683. Ethical ogoists ought tO 
act in such a way as to best promote their own interest 
while subordinating the demands made upon their conduct by 
the interests of others to this primary concern CMilo, 
19733. However, the common sense of morality shows that 
people see directly the rightness of seeking the pleasure 
of other people, but no one in his senses imagines that it 
is his moral. duty to seek his own pleasure. 
The term opiphonomenon means a by-product of a basic 
process which exerts no appreciable influence on the 
subsequent development of the process. 
P- 7 
Universalistic hedonism, more commonly utilitarian 
hedonism, is a theory which makes utility the criterion 
and end of conduct, while utility is to be measured in 
terms of pleasure CHyslop, 1895). Uti. litarian hedonism 
intends to avoid the distinction between egoism and 
altruism and to apprehend the proper aspects of both. 
Emphasis here is not on the good of the individual at the 
expense of others, nor is it on the good of others at the 
expense of the individual, but, "each man ought to seek the 
maximum pleasure of all human beings, or even of all 
bei ngs capabl e of exper i enc i ng pleasantness and 
unpleasantness" CLillie, 1956; P. 1623. Hence the 
Utilitarian slogan 'the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number'. 
However, utilitarian hedonism is not in conformity 
with altruism; if a man feeds the hungry that he may have 
the satisfaction of seeing them eat, then it is himself 
that he finally seeks to gratify. Hence the? hedonist acts 
for his own pleasure even in his benevolence CRickaby, 
S. J. , 1929). By attempting to unite altruism and egoism, 
the utilitarians are no more than attempting the mixture 
of vinegar and oil. How is the egoistic theory of human 
nature reconciled with a moral theory of benevolent 
utilitarianism ? If universal benevolence is a fundamental 
moral rule, then, given the egoistic human nature, what is 
it that motivates a person to obey that fundamental moral 
rule ? As to these questions, the utilitarians' position 
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io &. Q followz CMaclntyro, 10873 : thoological G, 90istic 
utilitarians argue that the happiness of those who obey 
the moral rule will be secured in the long-term Ceternal 
life), that is'a long-term self-interest. Secular 
utilitarians, generally speaking, presuppose that the 
individual's pleasure and the pursuit of the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number will coincide, or at 
least will not conflict. In a skillful but inconclusive 
argument, SmartC1957) suggests that utilitarianism evolves 
a generalized benevolence which is not the same as 
altruism, the former is self regarding and other-regarding 
too. Generalized benevolence and self love or self interest 
are not in conflict. Self love is either compatible with 
generalized benevolence or not. If the former, then self 
love does not contradict universalistic utilitarianism, if 
the latter, then self love will be largely cancelled out. 
However, Smart's hypothesis is no more than a general 
assertion; it neither justifies the proposed compatibility 
of generalized benevolence with self love, nor does he 
explain how self love is cancelled out. 
By and large, hedonism is in error, therefore it is 
an unconvincing explanation of altruism. The mere argument 
that, morally speaking, ' hedonism determines whether a 
human conduct is right or wrong, deprives humans of 
their sense of duty and religion, and seems. to regards 
them as lower pleasure-seeking animals. Human beings 
desire a host of things of which utility or pleasant 
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feeling is only one. Moreover, people desire not the 
pleasant feeling but the object arousing it, that is to 
say, people do not desire things because they give them 
pleasure, on the contrary, they give them pleasure because 
they desire them. As such, the well-being of others may be 
what one desires most and what gives him most pleasure, 
and this is just what Lillie CIQeS: ) means by calling the 
man unselfish. However, one needs only say that Lillie's 
case is no more than disguised self interest. 
Hedonism denotes an egoistic human motivation. Could 
it be argued, therefore, that behind any altruistic act 
there is a strong self interested impulse ? An affirmative 
version of this thesis is offered by Hobbes C1651), whose 
argument is that undisguised, unmodified self seeking 
leads to total war, and that the fear of such war leads to 
the adoption of a regard for others from purely self 
interested motives. This egoistic assumption lays special 
emphasis on the laws of reinforcement or the concept of 
reward as the only or the major human motivation. Rewards 
are often expressed in the form of explicit Cdirect 
reciprocity) or implicit Canticipated return / enlightened 
self interest) return. However, rewards are not only of an 
identifiable material return; they can be of psychic form 
too, such as fear CHobbes 1651), reputation and goodwill 
C(: ollard. 1978: ) and self satisfaction or- self fulfilment 
CIverach, 1909; Grice, 1967). The mere anticipation of any 
roward contradicts altruism - as quid without a pro quo. 
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Is it truo that saolf intorosat isa tha only human 
motivation? Or, are self interest and altruism 
reconcilable? Such reconciliation has been attempted by 
some moralists like Bishop Butler, J. S. Mill, Sidgwick and 
David Hume, who were essentially agreed that there are in 
human nature disinterested benevolence and social 
sympathies as surely genuine as self interest CStuart, 
1-052). The moralists endeavour to reconcile altruism and 
self interest as concrete virtues, however 'the motives 
behind altruism are, nonetheless, egoistic. Iverach C1908) 
agrees that self regard and benevolence, as virtues, are 
concrete facts, but they are realized only when the 
individual finds himself rooted in a society. To him each 
individual strives to come nearer to the ideal self which 
is dawning upon his intelligence. The making of this self 
is only possible by means of social efforts which 
necessitate living in a society. Hence the individual's 
self interest is inseparable from the interest of the 
society. However, Iverach's thesis is a clear-cut 
representation of disguised self interest. Grice C19573 
insists that the altruists are motivated by their own 
fulfilment. He further adds that this fulfilment is not in 
terms of their interest assessed independently of the 
interest of others; it consists in acting in the interest 
of others. Thus, if self-fulfilment is desired most and is 
achiove? d only through acting altruistically towards 
others, then altruism is an epiphenomenon. 
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Hedonism in general and self interest in particular 
cannot, account, for genuine altruism. Many like Maclnytre 
ý19(57) insist that there is no single spring of action 
or single set of aims and goals entitled self interest 
which are the same in every man. A self-interest act is 
that which disregards the legitimate claims of others. As 
such, the notion of self interest has application not, to 
human behaviour in general but to competitive behaviour. 
However, many real-world experiences suggest that genuine 
altruism, not urged an by ulter: ior motiveCs. ), exists. One 
could finally ask whether suffering for others' happiness, 
which may put one's life in jeopardy, is hedonistically 
j usti fi abl e. 
1.2.3 Altruism and Genetic Fitness 
What, is it that accounts for the survival of altruism? 
This quest-ion has been tackled by geneticists and 
biologists whose work has been termed , 50cio-biotoey' by 
Wilson C1975). They use the hypothesis of self gene and 
define altruism as, 
"[The] behaviour that enhances the 
personal genetic fitness of others at 
the cost of genetic fitness on the part 
of the altruist; the altruist either 
reduces its own survival capacity, - 
or curtails its own reproduction or 
both "C Wi 1 son, 1978; P. II 
But what is it- that causes the persistence of the 
seemingly disadvantageous genes ? In other words, what 
9. xpl ai ns the s ur vi val of altruism? Evol ut i onar y 
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biologists mako uso of Darwin's CIGE30.3 concopt of group 
selection. Herbert, Spencer C1972: ) claims that the need for 
altruism decreases with the advance of the society. He 
adopted the 'survival of the fittest' Cthe anti-thesis of 
altruism); but he nonetheless recognized altruism within 
the realm of the family. This is, however, a real 
contradiction; the survival of the fittest, if admitted, 
would negate altruism even within the family. Moreover, 
using the natural or group selection, altruism will be 
directed towards the closest and the most favoured among 
tho family. This viow is at variance with tho obse? rvod 
altruistic impulses towards strangers. Trivers CV971D 
proposes that such altruism will be paid back in future 
and thus contributes to the propagation of one's own 
genes. The acceptance of Trivers' thesis as a good case 
for the biological basis of altruism CHoffman, 1981) 
depends on whether reciprocity is accepted as a form of 
7 
altruism Wilson C1978) proposes a different thesis : the 
beneficiaries are assumed to carry some of the altruistic 
genes, and the benefit they receive permits them to 
multiply those genes to a more than compensating degree. 
Hence, the genes will increase in the population as a 
7 The norms of reciprocity sustain mutual beneficial 
exchange. These norms maintain that the givers usually 
give in QxpGctation of a reward. Somotim;? s it is but 
obligatory for the recipients to give in return either on 
the spot or in a future time. Ccf Malinowski, 1932; Mauss, 
1954; Becker, 1955; and GoudnGr, 1960. ). As such, to regard 
the norms of reciprocity as altruism is either a result of 
operational definitions or a matter of methodological 
inconsistency. 
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whole, and altruistic behaviour will spread. Becker C19765) 
suggests that kin interaction, and not the common genes, 
explains the survival of altruism, so that altruistic 
acts between unrelated neighbours or co-workers are 
possible. 
The hypothesis of self gene is not only too absurd to 
to explain human action, but it also falsifies the 
universality of altruism. It fails to explain altruistic 
acts towards strangors and unconscious beings. Humans are 
distinguished from animals by their individualistic 
Judgements Cconscience) and their external 
non-individualistic judgements Cimposed morals3. Human 
beings sometimes give a stranger preference over their own 
relatives. Failure to realize these human faculties and 
hence failure to distinguish between conscious Chumans: ) 
and unconscious Canimals)beings leadsto catastrophic 
conclusions regarding human behaviour. 
1.2.4. Altruism and Emotions 
The possibility, of explaining altruism through emotional 
feelings has been explored. The primary psychological 
function of emotions is that they intensify attention and 
magnify cognition and generate a certain 
behaviourCRosenhan, 1978). Through the violation of the 
laws of reinforcement, emotion could promote altruism. The' 
ordinary laws of reinforcement seek to maximize rewards to 
the self, and thus technically rule out altruism. When 
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omporioncing somo omotional affocts, pooplo shift from 
maximization of their own rewards and instead find that 
thei r attention, cognition and behaviour are 
-directed, often without regard for the quid pro other quo 
CRosenhan et at, 19813. The psycho-egoistic assumption of 
human motivation Cthat is, man is motivated only by the 
laws of reinforcement) is at variance with observed 
altruistic acts. The psycho-emotional feeling Cand 
sometimes human norms) have been postulated to solve the 
above dilemma as well as to explain altruism. Two 
categories of emotion have been historically established; 
positive and negative affects. 
Positive affects are the positive mood states such as 
success, competence and good luck.. Rosenhan ot at CIQSI: ) 
review many studies' findings and conclude that "evidence 
is accumulating that cognitive processes mediate the 
rol ati onshi p bQtwoon pos iti vo affects and pro-social 
behaviour" CP. 237). These studies attempt to demonstrate 
that good moods and bad moods lead to increases or 
docroascs. in altruism. Indeed, the state of mood affects 
human behaviour, but actions motivated thereby should be 
understood only in that context. A good act springing from 
a good mood is not an altruistic one unless altruism is 
defined operationally and thus becomes a loose concept. 
The amplification of sympathetic feeling is said to 
be the basis of altruism. But what is it that is called 
sympathy ? To Aronfrood C10703, an act is sympa-thotic to 
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the e: -ctent that it is elicited through the actor's 
empathic or vicarious effective response to the actual or 
anticipated distress of another person. Here the empathic 
experience is needed as a prerequisite of sympathy. Wisp6 
C19723 defines sympathy as "the capacity to apprehend the 
pain, suffering or signs of negative emotions in man or 
animals and to respond to these with negative feelings" 
CP. 441). Hence Wisp6 limits the term sympathy to feelings 
and emotions rather than to actions. A completely 
different perception of sympathy is offered by Baston and 
Coke CIQSI: ). To them sympathy could promote altruism 'but 
only as a reaction to others" pain. Behavioural scientists 
are not unanimous as to what sympathy is, but they are 
even less so in limiting the term to the psychological 
feelings towards others' pain or distress. 
How does sympathy promote altruism? The sympathiser 
strives to share the feeling of the sympathised while the 
latter tries to flatten his emotion to harmonize with 
those of the former. This is the view of Adam Smith C1759) 
who therefrom derives two sets of virtue; benevolence and 
self-command. Adam Smith is understood CWiSP6,1972) to 
have argued that men could live without, sympathy and 
benevolence but not without justice. Ward (1883/1925) used 
the concept of sympathy in a manner not dissimilar from 
Smith's; sympathy is "the painful sensation which results 
to high nervous organizations at the sight of suffering in 
others"Cvol. I. P. 395: ). He regards sympathy as the basis' Of 
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mar%'ýa Ynoral nztur-Q, juOtieco, %act- 
Since for Ward society is an association of individuals 
who are by nature UnsociL, his egoistic basis of altruism 
creates a moral paradox. In an attempt, to solve this 
paradox, McDougall C1908: ) suggests that sympathy promotes 
altruism only if it is amalgamated with the tender 
emotions Cemotions that are associated originally with 
parental instincts, but which include any person towards 
whom hostility is felt). Hence those who possess egoistic 
tendencies can also be altruistic. Many psychological 
experiments have shown a somewhat positive relation 
between altruism and sympathy (cf Aronfreed, 1970; 
Ekstein, 1978; Baston and Coke, 19813. Though these 
attempts are said to be promising, their acceptance is 
beset with many conceptual difficulties regarding their 
underlying operational definitions of altruism. 
Is sympathy enough to account for altruism?. Could the 
sympathiser be egoistic too ? The sympathiser is not a 
genuine altruist, on the contrary, he strives to relief the 
pained awareness of his distress CMagel, 1970). This is too 
obvious in the case of the 48uitt-aUruism' relation. If 
one-causes the victim's distress, then one"s self-blaming 
attribution will transform another's pain into one's 
discomfort and makes one feel responsible for the other's 
plight CHoffman, 1981). Guilt or "the pained recognition 
that one is acting or has acted contrary to reason which 
tho chains, rights or int-orost of othors provido" CNagol, 
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1970; P-903, causes unpleasant feelings to the subject and 
motivates him to do what he can to remove it. Many 
psychological experiments Ccf Aronfreed, 1970) confirm 
that in acting to reduce the distress -of others, 
the 
subjects are not necessarily empathically motivated, they 
may be so acting 14to avoid simulation which they 
experience as directly aversive to themselves" CP. 100). On 
the whole, it seems that there is something really 
egoistic in the sympathetic motivation. 
Genuine altruism is likely to be motivated by empathic 
feelings rather than by sympathetic ones. In Aronfreed's 
C19703 use of the term, empathy "denotes an individual's 
affective experience when it is elicited by social cues 
which transmit information about the corr6sponding 
affective experience of another person" CP. 1073. As was 
mentioned earlier, this empathic experience, which is 
presumably caused by others' distress, is a prerequisite 
for sympathy and hence for altruism. By empathy WisP6 
C1972) refers to "the self conscious awareness of the 
consciousness of others "C P. 441). Unlike sympathy, empathy 
denotes an active referrent. The empathiser has the 
capacity. of feeling the pain of others; the sympathiser, 
on the other hand, knows the pain of others but feels only 
his. Drawing on Wisp6's conception of empathy, CohenCI9723 
regards altruism, an act or desire to give something 
gratuitously to others, as solely motivated by empathy and 
by no other motive of reward from the object of the 
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altruistic bohaviour. Batson and Coko CIGGi3 proposso a 
more comprehensive concept-ion of empathy: "an emotional 
response elicited by and congruent with the perceived 
welfare of others" CP. 170). Unlike sympathy which is 
confined to the relief of others distress, empathy 
includes relating to others' pleasure as well as to 
others' pain. Before Baston and Coke,. Boulding C1962) in a 
very expressive way relates genuine altruism to empathy, 
the latter being directed towards others' welfare Cboth 
their pain and pleasure). 
"It is this capacity of empathy for putting 
t he j oys oneself in another's place, for feeling 
and the sorrows of another as one's own - which is 
the source of genuine gift. It is because 'no man 
is an island', because the very realization of our 
identity implies in some sense that there is a 
common identity in humanity, that we are willing 
to 'socialize' our substance and to share with the 
afflicted. This is 'charity' before the word 
became corrupted by vanity and fashion". CP-613 
Is the sympathetic/empathic feeling enough to account 
for altruism? Could 'it explain altruism in the absence 
of norms? Both sympathetic feelings and norms explain 
altruism while not contradicting the laws of reinforcement 
CDarley and Latan6,1970). The empathiser/sympathiser iS 
rolioving his own distress by acting altruistically toward 
others. Likewise those who violate the helping norms are 
subjecting themselves to negative consequences which 
punish them for this failure Cthough these consequences 
may be anticipated and no empathic distress arise 
immediately. Due to this hedonistic paradox altruism is, 
so 
logically speaking, not- in a strong position. Schawrtz and 
HowardC1981) argue that people experience empathic concern 
only towards those whose welfare is relevant to their own 
internalized values. This view is also elaborated by Staub 
C1981: ) who proposes that value orientations, pro-social 
orientation and orientation towards duty or obligation, 
affect the kind of behaviour. To explain altruism 
psychologically, and to neglect the role of human ethical 
norms is a great mistake. The psychological feelings and 
the ethical norms are not incompatible or irreconcilable. 
Human ethical norms, which differ from one person to 
another and from one group to another, are translated into 
actions through a process of psychological experiences. 
Psychologists and behavioural scientists could hardly 
claim that empathy and/or sympathy are the only sources of 
altruism, or that empathic and/or sympathetic emotions 
consequently lead to altruistic behaviour. 
1.2.5. Genuine Altruism 
Hitherto the analysis displays that altruism is, by 
and large, egoistically motivated. Could there be genuine 
altruism? To KantC1924/19653) genuine altruism is the result 
of practical love as distinguished from pathological or 
emotional love. Practical love consists in the disposition 
to exercise practical benevolence which consists in doing 
good for others from duty rather than from inclinations 
towards others. This is genuine altruism - altruism that 
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must be sharply distingui-shed from the one arising from 
sympathy. Nagel C19703 argues that pure attruism is 
attributed neither to self interest nor to general 
sentiments such as benevolence or sympathy. It is a 
rational requirement on action, consisting of "the direct 
influence of one person's interest on the actions of 
another, simply because in itself the interest of the 
former provides the latter with reason to act" CP. 803- 
Therefore, Nagel argues: 
"By altruism I mean not abject self sacrifice, 
but merely a willingness to act in consideration 
of the interest of other persons without the need 
of ultorior motiv-G;, --". CP. Q7: ). 
Culyer C19733 asserts that altruism, Cautistic exchange) 
is a quid without a pro quo, not self advancement, nor 
reflections of charitable warmth. In Culyer's perception 
altruism means that the welfare of others has a positive 
weight in the person's set of preferences, but it does not 
indicate whether he/she will perform good work. 
On the wholz. altruism is a debateable concept; in any 
discipline Cog. economics, psychology. sociabiology etc. ) 
altruism has been perceived differently according to each 
writer's inclination-, however the concept of altruism 
becomes more complicated as we move from one discipline to 
another. Presumably it is because these disciplines, from 
the very moment of their inception, lack the unity and 
do not share a single harmonious goal. Hence they are not 
expected to have a unanimous perception of any phenomenon. 
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1.3. Philanthropy 
Etymologically, philanthropy connotes, according to 
the Oxford English Dictionary, "Love to mankind; practical 
benevolence towards men in general; the disposition or 
active effort to promote the happiness and well-being of 
one's fellow-men". Emphasis here is on the act itself 
rather than on the intention behind it. Rickaby S. J. CI929) 
suggests that the intention behind the act marks the 
distinction between philanthropy and charity; "Charity 
differs from philanthropy in looking beyond the present 
life, and above creatures. A materialist and atheist may 
possess philanthropy but not charity"CP. 239). However, the 
term philanthropy is often used interchangeably with 
charity and voluntarism. both refering to the act of 
choosing to donate funds, services, or goods to other 
individuals, organizations, or to the public weal, without 
direct pro quo. CRoss, 1969; Bolnick. 197M. Economically 
speaking, philanthropy denotes unilateral, one-way voluntary 
transfer of wealth or services. By voluntarism is meant 
the absence of use, or the threat of use, of legal or 
illegal coercive power by the state or illegal coercion by 
other individual or individuals. CJohnson, 1973). 
It is argued CRoss, 1968) that the term 
philanthropy has become widely accepted, instead of 
charity, because of the derogatory connotation of' the 
latter. In the daily usage of the term, charity is not a 
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mynonym for 1 o,. ro aom iti sa uzod to bo; thio iQ 
understandable from popular phrases such as 41 am not 
eivine charity', 'I am not askine charity'. ProudhonCIS! 983 
gave a historic picture of the degradation of the concept 
of charity, 
"To perform an act of benevolence towards 
one's nGighbour is called in HobrGw to do 
justice; in Greek to take compassion or 
pity; in Latin to perform an act of love or 
charity; in FrGnch to gi ve al ms. We can 
trace the degradation of the principle 
through these various expressions; the 'first 
signifies duty, the second only sympathy, the 
third affection, a matter of choice, not an 
obligation. the fourth caprice" CPP. 225n-227n3- 
As such the principle of charity is changed from 
duty to just a passing fancy and thereby loses its 
si gni fi cance. Visualizod from tho tgivGr-rGcipiGnt' 
relation, this degradation intensifies the us-them 
segregation which presumably inculcates the superiority of 
us Cthe givers) and the inferiority of them Cthe 
recipients). However, the mere replacement of charity' by 
philanthropy does not, in itself, vanish the us-them 
discrimination unless the principle is generalized to the 
extent that both the givers and the recipients have a 
relative share therein. 
It is often argued that philanthropic activity is 
more characteristic of the individualistic lais-sez faire 
society, or of 'a class society. than of the communist 
political economy. As Ross C1968) puts it, in countries 
where the rights of the community take precodoncic; p over 
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the rights of the individual, there is less need for 
voluntary philanthropy, because the state takes 
responsibility for most, if not all, of the needs of its 
people. The naivety of this view stems from a restricted 
conceptual i zation of philanthropy. Is helping neighbours 
or the elderly in times of disaster or distress 
incompatible with socialism, or does it undermine the role 
of the state ? Proudhon C1898) rejects the philosophy of 
philanthropy outright, "love, benevolence, pity, sympathy, 
call it what you will, there is nothing in it which 
dGsGrvGs ostGom - nothing which lifts man abovG tho beast" 
CP. 225). To him, giving should not be out of benevolence 
but out of justice by justice he means recognition of 
the equality between another's personality and our own. 
For Marx C1872), philanthropists, humanitarians and 
organizers of charity are placed within the attempts to 
redress social grievances in order to secure the continued 
e., istence of bourgeois society. Marx implicitly associat -es 
philanthropy to the 4us-them" Chere bourgeoisie - 
proletariat-) discrimination, which may not be the case. It 
is this narrow percept-ion of philanthropy Cwhich may be 
observed even today) which makes it a derogatory term and 
hence inculcates the qus-them' segregation. Both the rich 
and the poor can act philanthropically towards each other. 
Presumably, in Proudhon's and Marx's perception, the 
economic problem is solvable by the mere eradication of 
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tho, bour-gooizio. or by th ra nk. Q xtion of communiat, applica 
norms. However, neither communism nor the equality of the 
people mean that each man is an island. 
1.3.1. Philanthropy and the Free-Rider Problem 
Economists are of the view that the charity market 
wherein individuals voluntarily and collectively provide 
public goods is beset with the free-ridor problem. It 
arises from the presumed incompatibility between the 
individual. 's self interest Cthe principle of rational 
Ggoism: ) and the collective interest CthG principle of 
collective optimization). But what is it that is called 
the free-rider problem ? If many persons want something 
done, some 6ood thaý is non-rival in usage Ceg, a public 
good), each person will be motivated to avoid contributing 
to it. Each person has an incentive therefore to become a 
free-rider; to secure the benefits of the public good 
without, participating fully in the sharing of its cost. 
CIreland, 1973; Buchanan, 1975; Tuck, 197! 9). The free-rider 
problem as it is presented, overturns altruism and 
philanthropy altogether. Presumably the problem is to be 
identified as rooted in egoistic human motivation. To 
attempt a free ride is to be selfish. Therefore, the 
argument that the free-rider problem is a basic paradox in 
Public goods, as distinguished from private goods, are 
thoso goods from tho bonofit of which no individual can bo 
excluded and of which an individual's consumption does not 
decrease the amount available to other individuals, like 
dofonco for inatancci. 
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public finance CIreland, 1973) could only be advanced on 
-the assumption of egoistic human motivation. Moreover, 
public goods constitute a minor form of philanthropy, and 
even a disputable one Cphilanthropy, it will be recalled, 
signifies a quid without a pro quoD. 
Is the froge-rider problem circumventable? Altruism 
might be expected to unite the selfish with the collective 
interest, thus overcoming the free-rider problem. In 
addition to the difficulties regarding the determination 
of the motives behind it, altruism, as it is perceived, 
will not solve the problem. To Olson C15D65) the free 
ri ding holds true whether behavi our is selfish or 
unselfish, so long as it is, strictly speaking, rationat; 
even the altruist will not rationally contribute towards 
the provision of any public good since his contribution 
would not be perceptible. Buchanan C1975) argues that 
collective decision requires unanimity which is achieved 
only at a high social cost. Collard C1978) asserts that 
altruism will not solve the problem, particularly if the 
action needed is of a mundane economic nature. The economy 
of altruists is presumably viewed as characterized by 
private egoistic exchange in ordinary commodities and 
voluntary cooperation in public goods. Suffice it to say 
that this duality stems from a narrow perception of 
altruism. However, the free-rider problem is said to be 
circumventable by ways other than altruism. 
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Social pressure has been proposed as a possible 
solution to the free-rider problem. The individual living 
in small community who attempts a free ride on the 
charitable contributions of others, will be confronted 
with more social pressure than one living in a large 
community. Johnson C1073) suggests that people will donate 
to avoid a societal cost, in forms of social pressure, 
religious beliefs and psychic unpleasantness. To avoid the 
free-rider problem a selective cost must be imposed on 
each individual, and the societal cost serves this 
function. Bolnick C1975) asserts that only through the 
transformation of the economic man 
0 into a sociat man 
that decisions which the traditional economic theory would 
consider to be irrationaL might be explained. A sociaL man 
having to contribute to charity will scrutinize the direct 
and indirect social pressure, and base his decision on the 
strength of them, and the utility derived from giving and 
the cost of choosing to contribute. The contribution will 
be made about, a course of action within the limitations of 
10 
man's bounded rationatity . 
Can religious motives help to avoid the free-rider 
problem ? In other words, can religion motivate 
philanthropy ? Most religions influence the taste of the 
As an economic concept, the economic man refers to the 
hypothetical man who behaves rationally. Ccf section 1.4). 
10 Bounded rationality is a constructive 'replacement for the 
notion of maximization under certainty. The term is coined 
and first used by Simon Cig55). 
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individual by teaching him to help the poor and treat 
neighbours as himself, and by providing a selective 
incentive for the individual to contribute. There is no 
free ride to heaven, or as Aldous Huxley, quoted by 
Johnson C19733 said "charity is a peculiar species of fire 
insurance". Hence charity has no drive; it is conducting 
an exchange. The presentation of religious motives in this 
manner makes it difficult to separate them from social 
pressure. Therefore, doubts arise regarding the viability 
of religious motives at least in the manner they are 
presented. For instance, Wright C19713 argues that many 
studies confirm the insignificant relation between 
altruism and religion specially in the Christian world. He 
further adds, 
"It is now a well documented finding that, 
in the United States in particular but 
also in other countries, those who believe 
in Christianity and go to church are on 
average more racially prejudiced than 
atheists and agnostics". CP. 147). 
Could the desire to perform good deeds help to 
overcome the froo-rider problem ? Titmuss C1970) believes 
that those who obtain psychic benefit from the mere act of 
giving blood are the main source of blood donatation in 
Britain. This psychic benefit is referred to as the 
Kantian motive, after the German philosopher Immanuel Kant 
C1924,, '1963). To Kant, the goodness in an act requires that 
the motivation for it must be divorced from all aspects of 
personal gain for the actor. The goal of the psychic or 
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KaLntian motive is act utility, not the utility of the 
result the act brings about, i. e. the individual derives 
utility from the act of doi ng the 6ood deed of 
contributing philanthropically. CollardCI978) emphatically 
asserts that, among all the motives, only the Kantian 
motive based on a sense of duty is strong enough to 
overcome the free-rider problem. 
Individuals might, for political motiv9s, contributG 
voluntarily. Individuals who seek corporaLe advancement,. 
prest-ige or some specific government, action are led to 
compote to gain tho opportunity of providing personal 
support, t-o philanthropic organizations. CIreland, 1973). This 
is primarily dependent- on Kantian motive: both focus on 
tho dosiro to appoar to havo dono a 6ood dood. Tho amount 
of satisfaction derived is a direct function of the 
contributions irrespective of what is finally provided. 
The methods suggested to circumvent the froo -rider 
problem, are incompatible with philanthropy itself, and 
hence they are not strong enough to motivate it. They 
negate the principle of philanthropy as a quid without a 
pro quo. Philanthropy should not be forced by any means, 
it should be done voluntarily without any form of coercion 
or social pressure. To contribute to a cause is to identify 
with it, any reason behind this does the contributor a 
serious disservice, or to use O'Conner's C1987) rhetorical 
expression "when philanthropy undermines philanthropy. 
somothing is soriously amiss" CP. 127: ). 
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Are the motives of private philanthropy equally applied 
to corporate philanthropy'? The foundations, corporations, 
non-profit philanthropic agencies and governments are 
entities which operate within human rules. Therefore, they 
are greatly affected by human impulses and inclinations. 
In their philanthropic activities these institutions might 
be motivated by religious belief, psychic benefits. income 
motives or even guilt feelings. All these motives are easy 
to suggest but, too subtle to prove. However, powerful 
motives, other than these, cannot be overlooked. 
Corporations and firms, for instance, are ruthless profit 
maximizers, nonetheless, they participate in philanthropic 
activities. Presumably, the tax deduction, argued Thorp 
CiQ5523, acts as a multiplier and provides a considerable 
incentive. Thorp noticed that in the United States 
corporate contribution increased substantially during 
years of high corporate excess profit tax. If this is so, 
then the distinction between private and public 
contribution is misleading, since that part of a private 
gift which is offset by a reduced tax should be credited 
to the public or the government. Corporations usually 
receive funds from the donors and then administer them; to 
some extent this is merely a re-channelling of private 
giving. Vickrey C1962) asserts that the establishment of 
Philanthropic Foundations under friendly control may be 
the means of avoiding dissolution or loss of control of a 
family corporate empire. It has been claimed, according to 
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Vickreapy, that this was a, significan+ f actor int he 
establishment of Ford Foundation. Besides love and 
benevolence, Boulding C1973) emphasises an unusual factor-, 
fear. 
"Foundations and charitable endowments may also be 
set up through threat and fear; in earlier times, 
for instance through the fear of hell; in modern 
times through the fear of inheritance tax and a 
preference for private grants over public grants 
enforced through taxation". CP. 23). 
Charitable institutions and governments may act 
philanthropically for political reasons. This is the 
principle of expansionism CBoulding, 1973); the desire of 
one particular community to have more people 2LSSOci2LtOd 
with it; the best example of this is the expansion of 
religious faith. However, expansionism may lead to 
imperialism. Commenting on the United States' aid to build 
a dam in Egypt, Alchian and Allen C1973. ) argue that, 
660f 
courses, government officials of both the 
United States and Egypt understand all this 
[the strings on the use of the aid] and the 
conditional" form of the grant is employed 
primarily to try to induce the Egyptian 
government to behave more in accord with U. S. 
government's view of Egypt's interest". CP. 10) 
In addition, charitable institutions may collectively 
affect the thinking and the behaviour of the recipients; 
the resulting psychological orientation is likely to 
inspire religious, ideological and political expansionism. 
Generally speaking, philanthropy in theory is love 
manifested in a quid without, a pro quo. However, the 
analysis shows that, in practical terms it. is a disguised 
wolf intorowt, a quid pro quo. 
51 
1.4. AltruismPhilanthropyand Economic Theory 
Though many practical examples might- be thought to 
weaken the universality of the egoistic human motivation, 
egoism has been widely' believed to be the foundation 
postulate of economics. Economic theory, argued Stuart 
C1962) is an account of egoism in action, with altruism 
playing the part of more or less stubborn or disturbing 
intruder. Generally speaking, economists have been blamed 
for their negligence of a large area of gift actions as if 
they are of no exchange value CMauss, 1954; Titmuss. 1970) 
and prosumably for thralr undorr.;; stima-tion of altruism and 
hýenevolence. Against this attack Cuyler C1973) claims that 
it "may be that economists have been slow to study such 
aspects of human naturo, but it doos not follow that 
economics is emasculated" CP. 59). However, for economics 
not to be emasculated, economic theory itself should 
incorporate the different aspects of human nature, instead 
of using the conventional theory to investigate it. To use 
the words of Vickrey C1952), the pure competitive economic 
system must provide at least some softening of the corners 
and relaxation of the rigid role of self interest. 
Altruism and philanthropy are of considerable 
importance to economics inasmuch as they affect the 
allocation of resources, the distribution of wealth and 
the flow of resources through both the private and the 
public sector. But why is the importance of altruism and 
philanthropy ignored in economic theory? Many economists 
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r, ogard mankind arm basaically solfish and supposaG, that the 
economic man acts only in his own interest. Cooperative 
behaviour, is, argued MusgraveC1959), unrealistic and 
inconsistent with the premises of all other phases of 
economic analysis. OlsonC1965: ) alleges that only 
altruistic or irrational individuals will forgo their self 
interest to provide for the common good. Closely related 
to this is tho restrictive interpretation of the rational 
man who will not contribute voluntarily because of the 
f. re-q-rideý. r problem CJohnson, 1975). However, the analysis 
of the frGo-. rid-qr problem presupposes an egoistic human 
motivation. The same egoistic argument is put differently 
by Fa bricantCI9623 who pessimistically claims that, 
"We are more sinners than saints. 
It is all too evident that love of man 
in general, though it influences a great 
deal of behaviour, is in limited supply 
and is limited therefore in the economic 
and other aspects of life"CP. 4) 
Boulding C19152) provides a different reason for the 
economists' negI i gence of altruism and benevolence. 
Economists, he argues, have grown up around the phenomenon 
of exchange and its theoretical structure rests heavily on 
this process. Hence, the price Cthe ratio of the exchanged 
quantities) system is the basic theoretical tool to the 
extent that economists tend to regard society as being 
organized by it. However, the altr*uistic act Can 
unilateral exchange) carries no price. Economists in 
dealing with such phenomenon feel rather at sea because 
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they find themselves in an area of social life which is 
apparently priceless, they hardly know what to do. In line 
with Boulding's view one could argue that the economists' 
rejection of altruism is presumably based on its 
lack of conformity with economic efficiency inasmuch as 
the latter depends on the price mechanism. 
Modern economic theory was developed in a utilitarian 
context which postulates that the happiness of the 
greatest number is the outcome, if not the object, Of 
independent economic choices. But, as Bell C1981D has 
pointed out, it is by no means self evident that egoism 
and utilitarianism are so easily reconcilable Cunless 
indeed by religion), or that it is an obvious truth that 
'the interest of att is the interest of each'. In addition 
to the irreconciliability of the interest of all and the 
interest of each, economic theory had been developed on 
the liberalism corollary that "the rules regulating the 
relation betýieen individuals are to be procedural, not 
morally substantive" CBell, V@81, P4t). Hence, religion is 
discarded from economics because of its moral and 
normative rather than instrumental and positive 
presumptions. After Alfred Marshall C1890) economics moved 
away from its utilitarian schema and become concerned 
principally with the egoistic interest of each. Besides 
its ontological commitment to individualism, contemporary 
economic theory posits axiological individualism whereby 
individuals are assumed to be self interested agents 
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-- " moti-wat-m-d by ma. 1f dcfimod and vadueasa. 
In 'tho 
words of Buchanan and Tullock C1962, P. 273 "self interest 
is recognized to be a strong motivating force in all human 
activity; and human action, if not bounded by ethical or 
moral restraints, is assumed more naturally to be directed 
towards the furtherance of individual or private interest". 
The ontological and axiclogical individualism imbue the 
economtc man with an egoistic human motivation. 
It Thus,. the 
universal and fundamental element in the personality of 
the economic man is self interest, though many economists 
Ceg, Machlup, 1972, Hollis & Edward, 1976) believe that to 
speak of the economic man as selfish or altruistic is to 
- 11 speak of another 
thing. Given the notion of maximization 
and the norm of exchange, the economic man is a rational 
maximizer in pursuit of self interest. When act X is 
chosen by person i and act y rejected, this implies that 
i's personal interests are expected by i to be better 
served by x than by y. The implied concept of rationality, 
argues Sen Cl! @77. P. 342), is based on three propositions. 
Firstly, acts are judged onty by their consequences. 
Secondl'y, the assumption of act evaluation rather than 
rule evaluation; in other words, all rules of behaviour 
other that self interest are ipso facto ignored. Thirdly, 
the consequences considered in evaluating acts are those 
of one's own interest. This notion of rationality can be 
The concept of the economic man will be discussed at 
longth in ch. 2.4.2. infra. 
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easily refuted if the egoistic presumption is relaxed. 
However, the egoistic presumption has been generalized as 
a theory of motivation, though the methodological status 
of the economic theory demonstrates that it is not the 
case CParsons, 1940: ) or that it is just a special case 
CCollard, 1978). Economists, argues Vickrey C1953, P. 149), 
often abdicate their responsibilities as moral beings and 
emphasize the self-interest maximization and material 
success in a devi L- takes- the-hindmos t world. Such a world 
is now ebbing away. 
Though altruism has for long been recognized by 
anthropologists, sociologists and moral philosophers. its 
anal ysi sisa recurring minor theme in economics. 
Edgeworth C1881) was the first economist to attempt an 
integration of love and sympathy into the , theory of 
exchange. That interest in non-selfish economics is now in 
the air may be? seen from the appearance of Soulding's the 
economy of Love and fear C1973), Phelps' attruism, 
moratity and economic theory C1975) and Colland's attrutsm 
and oconomy CiQ76: ). These writers, and many others, attempt 
to draw attention to the implication of nonselfishness for 
economics. Edgeworth emphasizes that each agent has, in a 
calm moments, some consideration for the welfare of others. 
Boulding suggests that grants are no longer 'unusual' and 
must be integrated into the economic theory. In their 
reformulation of economic theory, Edgworth, Boulding and 
Collard allow for altruism when the agent experiences a 
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dieutility in the 'commodity bundleCs). Moreover, they 
treat altruism and exchange as distinct bodies, but do not 
attempt to incorporate the norms of altruism into the 
theory of exchange itself. Presumably, in their perception 
altruism is not an inculcated human norm. Meade C1973. ) 
regards the ideal society as "one in which each individual 
developed a real split of personality, acting selfishly in 
the market place and altruistically at the ballot 
box"CP. 52). Ironically, in Meade's society a ruthless 
businessman votes to help the poor who might be his own 
'victims Cas consumers or workers). Joan Robinson C1993) 
insists that altruism is not at all natural, but needs to 
be imposed upon individuals, the mechanism whereby it, is 
imposed is the moral sense or conscience of the 
individual. 
The rationality of non-selfish behaviour can be 
established by introducing the interrelation of utility 
functionsCSchwartz, 1970), or the assumption of attribution 
CCollard, 1978). In general we may observe that, 
Uý = ULC ctlcj) 
whore Uý is the utility function of individual L, CL and 
Ci stand for the commodities consumed by individual t and 
individual j respectively. This process shows that t's 
The utility function of the selfish person can be written 
as UL = Uý C C1 C2 ..... Cn: ) where Ct is the Os consumption bundleCs) 
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a Ut 
utility is not isolated from j's welfare, if ->0, then 
a Uj 
has altruistic taste pattern with respect to j 
a UL 
Cconversely, if -<0 then t discriminates against j). 
C7 Uj 
This process is true for altruism inasmuch as it is 
concerned with tastes and preferences and not with 
actions. Thus altruism is distinguished from positive acts 
of benevolence. CSchwartz, 1970; Culyer, 1973; Collard, 1978). 
The assumption of attribution or utility interrelationship 
does not, involve a quid pro quo, though it does involve a 
direct psychological utility rather than an economic 
resource vihich is utility generating. However, this process 
of attribution is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for altruism. The person may be motivated by 
general considerations of humanity, or the pleasure of 
`dinin6r wtth you rather than dintne atone', rather than 
sympathy for specific others. 
The expression of individual preference can be 
generally analysed within the theory of externality. The 
manifestations of j's distress cause external diseconomies 
to individual t Ci. e. serves to subtract from his utility) 
while L's relief of i's distress causes external economies 
to individual t Ci. e. serves to add to his utility). This 
is a typical example of saying that individual t has an 
altruistic taste pattern with respect to individual i. 
However, libertarian economists reject this altruism 
externality relation. James Buchanan CIQ5Q: ) argues, 
se 
"Th,;;, more.;, fact, that zomo momb-4;, rsa of tho 
community are poor does not, in and of itself, 
normally impose an external diseconomy on many 
of the remaining members. What does impose 
such an external diseconomy is the way that 
certain persons behave when they are poor. It 
is not the low income of the family down the 
street that bothers most of us; it is the fact 
that the family lives in a dilapidated house 
and dresses its children in rags that imposes 
on our 
- 
sensibilities. And we are willing to 
pay something to remove this external effect; 
it is relevant for behaviour". CP. 189) 
Buchanan's thepsis is aL cloar oxample of disguisGd 
self interest. The distress of others makes one feel ill, 
i. e. causing him external diseconomies. In attempting to 
rGpliof othors" distreass tho porson iss motivated to romove? 
his own felt distress. Hence the external diseconomies 
caused by seeing others' distress is offset by the 
external economies of relieving one's own distress. 
1.5. Concluding Remarks 
A modest attempt has been made in this chapter to 
investigate the key concepts in nonselfish behaviour viz, 
altruism and philanthropy and their underlying economic 
significance. The, analysis reveals that genuine altruism 
is rare; behind any so-called altruistic act there is an 
explicit or implicit self interested motives. Moreover, in 
many cases it is not at all clear where self interest ends 
and altruism begins. Many subtle arguments might be 
advanced vis A vis who determines whether an act is 
altruistic, tho objoct, tho subjoct, or tho spoctator. In 
principle, both genuine altruism and philanthropy are 
conceived as a quid without, a pro quo; however, analysis 
of their motives reveals that they are but a quid pro quo. 
The only significant difference between them might be that 
while altruism is a philosophical principle, philanthropy 
has been treated as an operational concept usually 
realized in a positive act of giving. 
Many economists recognize the norms of nonselfishness, 
nonetheless, egoistic human motivation dominates modern 
economic theory. The attempts to incorporate altruism in 
economic theory are naive and inconclusive: individuals 
are assumed to behave egoistically in the market place and 
altruistically at the ballot box. The incorporation of the 
norm of altruism through the interdependence of social 
welfare functions is limited and unsatisfactory. It is not 
enough to add the welfare of others to one's own welfare 
function to christen the person altruistic. The economy of 
the altruist is characterized by the predominance of such 
norms as fairness, truthfulness, trustingness, lawfulness, 
brotherhood and cooperation. Such an economy is virtually 
immune from deleterious acts, such as profiteering# 
misallocation of resources and speculative hoarding of 
money and goods. The recognition Cand the incorporation) 
of these norms would ultimately demand the reconstruction 
of the whole edifice of conventional economic theory. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF BENEVOLENCE 
2.1. Overview 
Benevolence and voluntarism are issues central to the 
Islamic ethical system; they are the foundation postulates 
of the Islamic perception of human nature. Through its 
teachings, Islam inculcates these ethical norms and 
insists on their dominance in the whole spectrum of the 
life of the muslim. Hence, Islamically, non-selfishness is 
an underlying presumption of all economic activity. The 
present chapter is an exposition on the Islamic conception 
of benevolence and its philosophical significance for the 
Islamic Economics. The analysis here falls into four 
sections. The philosophy of benevolence is explored in 
section two, where an attempt will be made to develop an 
Islamic theory of benevolence. Section three covers the 
Qur , anic concepts of benevolence. Section four discusses 
benevolence vi. G -\ via the basic foundations of Islamic 
Economics; it also attempts to reconstruct the concept of 
the *conomic man in the light of the Istamic rationaLity. 
Note that voluntarism both in western moral philosophy 
Ceg. Schopenhauer in his witt to Live and Islamic theology 
Cog. Ash'ritos: ) has a different connotation according to 
which man has freedom of choice and action. Voluntarism is 
here used in a technical sense to refer to an attitude of 
mind wherefrom springs a certain pattern of behaviour 
where one gives out of his wealth to further the welfare 
of others without any ulterior motiveCs) or external 
compulsion, rather out of one's religious commitment. 
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2.2 Tho Isalamic Philosophy of 
2.2.1. Benevolence and Human Nature 
Since Islam visualizes man as being created in the 
best of moulds, "We have indeed created man in the best of 
moulds"CQuran, 95: 4: ), he cannot be ill-natured. In the 
2 
jýadi7th, "Every child is born according to the fiý. rah" 
Cal-Muwata. P. 117: ). On the face of these statements, man 
is, in his original nature, good. Hence man is likely to 
be altruistic, cooperative and righteous. Nonetheless, 
there are at least some verses in the Qurlan which, prima 
fact&, contradict the above claim ; for example. "And men's 
selves are swayed by greed"C4: 128), "And man is ever 
niggardly"C17: 1003, "Truly man was created very impatient" 
C70: 19), "And violent is he Cman3 in the love of wealth" 
C100: 8). In other words, the Qur'an seems to suggest that 
niggardliness, avarice and the like, are also there in 
human nature. Now it might appear to some that the Qur'an 
presents two antagonistic theses regarding human nature.. 
The question is: are these theses irreconcilable? In order 
to answer this question it seems necessary to probe the 
depth of human nature from the Islamic perspective . 
The Islamic concept of fitrah holds that, every child 
is born pure, innocent and eýdowed with true understanding 
of God. Human beings are inclined to right and virtue but 
also caught in the meshes of customs, superstitions and 
false teachings . The problem before the prophets of God 
is to cure this crookedness and restore human nature to 
the state of fitrah. In the above hadTth, fitrah is used 
interchangeably with Islam, presuýably because all the 
heaven-messages from Adam to Muhammad are called the 
4roligion of Islam' or the.;, "roligion of fiýrah. I 
6a 
Man is composed of body and ruýi Cspirit), the harmonious 
progress and balanced evolution towards perfection require 
that attention should be paid to both aspects of man. 
Both al-GhazalECd. 1111, n. 'd. ) and ad-Dihl*aoiICd. 1762,1933) 
maintain that man possesses angelic and animal nature. The 
former is nafthah it(ýhiyah Ca breath from God); it is 
yearning or hoping for the other world, hence it elevates 
man towards heaven. The latter safeguards and sustains the 
material demands of the body, hence it usually binds man 
to the earth. For life in this world to flourish, it is 
necessary that man should have this duality in nature. The 
Qur , an states that the creation of man is purposive; "I 
have only created Jinns and Men, that they may serve Me" 
C51: 56: 5), "He brought you forth from the earth and made you 
husband it"C11: 61). In yearning for spirituality, the 
angelic nature helps man worship God; the ani mal 
nature, through its materialistic tenden cies, motivates man 
towards the material development of the earth. 
The duality in nature involves man in a continuous 
struggle between the two naturesphowever, the duty assigned 
to him is that of limited freedom. According to Naqvi 
C1981a-: ), the Islamic viewpoint of man's freedom is based 
on three distinctive, but related ideas. Firstly, man is 
theomorphic by nature with something God-like in him, "SO 
when I have made him. and breathed into him of MY 
Spirit"CO-urlan. 15: 29). Secondly, man has been invested 
with free will; he has the freedom either to become 
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by rcadi=ing fully his; thQomorphic natura or 
reject- God, thus becoming the lowliest of the low, "We 
-showed him the way: whether he be grateful or ungrateful 
Crests on his will)" CQur'an, 713: 3). Thirdly, man is held 
responsible for the use and abuse of his power of 
discretion, "Every self is a pledge for its own deed" 
CQur'an, 74: 393. However, in Islam, individual freedom is 
linked directly to the conscious act of discharging one's 
responsibility to help others. Failure to do so has been 
declared in the Qurlan to be denial of ad-din Cthe Faith); 
"Have you seen him who denies the Faith. 
It is he who repulses the, orphan Cwith 
harshness). And encourages not the feeding 
of the indigent"CI07: 1-3). 
Man is required to keep an equilibrium to his dual 
nature, since thereby the demands of both natures will be 
satisfactorily fulfilled , "But seek with whatever God has 
bestowed on you, the home of the hereafter, nor forget 
-773. Since the ruýt your portion in this world " CQur'an 28. 
is yearning for atam at-arwcvý - in the other world, 
wherein man demands fatýý Csuccess), the afore-mentioned 
equilibrium is not at all static; any Muslim continuously 
strives to foster whatever helps the ru, ý to attain its 
good brought back' to heaven. Having been created with a 
dual content, material and spiritual, man's fi; rah 
Cnatural disposition) and emotions ouqht then to be 
rightly recognized. Essentially, fitrah rejects that which 
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is opposed to it 
3. Man should not give free rein to his 
emotions, otherwise his dual nature ' is likely to be 
imbalanced. Through self discipline man can rightly 
recognize his emotions while not distorting the balance of 
his dual nature 
4. To understand the significance of -self 
discipline, it is necessary to elucidate further the 
Z concept of ru; ý and its synonym nafs. 
The Arabic words ruh and nafs are semantically 
different, not only that, each individually has a number of 
connotations. Only in post Qurlanic literature are ruiý and 
nafs used interchangeably by some Muslim theologians like 
Ibn Taymiyah Cd. 1328) and Ibn al-Qayyim Cd. 1: 350) to mean 
human spirit or soul, though Ibn al-Qayyim also refers to 
the nafs as the ego C19863, P. 264) According to them, each 
man carries a breath of life from God; it is called ruýL 
because of its purity, and it is called nafs inasmuch as it 
manages and regulates the body. This perception of ruh or 
nafs forms the basis of Muslims ethics and psychology. 
Three ego states of nafs can be distinguished viz, nafs 
ommarah Ccommanding to evil), nafs Lawamah Cit upbraids) 
and nafs mutm'innah Ctranquil). CIbn Taymiyah C1953). Ibn 
aLl-Qayyim C19-85) and BadriCV@87)). Note that, in Islam, 
Since fitrah is originally good, all fitrah-dictated 
acts are necessarily good. 
4 The psycho-emotional feelings often motivate man to do 
.1A 
? mz ruf Cgood acts) and/or munkar Creprehensible acts). 
Self discipline is of vital importance in fostering the 
former and restraining the latter. 
man isa originally good. Is he susceptible to temptations? 
The ego state of nafs ammarah motivates man to commit 
m is reprehensible). Moreover, man is Unhar Cthat' which 
subject to Satanic power5 which repeatedly evokes and 
motivates the ego state of nafs ammarah. taqwa 
CGod-consciousness) and righteousness safeguard man from 
the ego state? of nafs anwiax-ah as well as from Satanic 
power and thereby help the nafs to be tranquilized. 
al-GhazaliCn. d. ) asserts that the nafs has an innate 
fiýrah Cthat is, natural disposition) whose role is to 
recognize the good which helps achieve man's psychological 
balance. Psychological imbalance is inevitable when man's 
innate fiýrah is stained or -impaired. This explains 
al-GhazalTIs theory that throu6h "psychological 
surveillance', man tranquilizes himself by avoiding the 
temptations of nafs anv=xah and evoking the righteous 
potentialities which are located in human 
Satan is a power and a creature of God deprived of His 
Grace. and became in the spiritual world what an outlaw in 
a political kingdom. Satan has a power of devilish 
insinuation over man through a respite granted by God. 
However, man can also be a source of disobedience; in a 
figurative sense this is a Satanic power Ccf. Qur'an C2: 14; 
6: 1123 The closeness of Satanic power Cin its broadest 
sense) is described in the following iýadLth, "verily the 
Satan circulates in the body of a man like the circulation 
of blood. CBukhýirT, vol. 3. P. 142). In contrast. the reader 
must notice that God is nearer to man than man's own 
jugular vein CQur'an, 50: 165). Man's freedom to choose 
between good and evil is exercised through the temptations 
and allurements put forward by Satan. This is for the 
period of man's probation on this earth. However, Satan 
hag no power over sinccro worshipers of God. who are 
purified by His Grace. Ccf. Qur'an 15: 35-40). 
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Since the Muslim is psycho-ethi call y committed to God 
as the basic source of normativeness, the nafs is always 
aspiring to spirituality and spirituality-laden motives 
and actions. However, man is not an island; man lives in a 
symbolic environment as well as a physical environment and 
can be stimulated to act by symbols as well as by physical 
stimuli. Thus the nafs is likely to be affected in the 
process of communication or interaction - the so-called 
symbolic interaction 
6. Symbolic interaction involves the 
emergence of the sienificant others 
7 
who imbue the mind of 
the person with this or that trait of character or mode of 
behaviour. The effect of the symbolic interaction on the 
could be positive - leading to ethico-spiritual 
progress, or negative causing ethico-spiritual 
degradation. The nature and strength. of this effect depend 
on the stenificant others and the feedback from the others 
The term symbotic irtteraction was coined by Blumer 
C1937); it refers to the process by which individuals 
relate to their own minds or the minds of others; the 
process, that is, in which individuals take account of 
their own or their fellows' motives, desires, knowledge, 
means and ends, and the like. 
7 Kuhn CiQ64) defines the stenificant others as those to 
whom the individual is emmotionally and psychologically 
committed; those who provide him with his general 
vocabulary; those who provide him with his categories of 
self and other and their underlying roles; those who, 
through communication, sustain his self-conception. 
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a 
whom the person regards as his or her tookine-ela. -. v voLl 
In order to sustain spiritual progress a person must 
always choose the mutaqin Cthe righteous. ) as his or her 
possible significant others; and refrain from interacting 
with the mufsidin Cthe immorals). The effect of such 
interaction on the nafs or the rAý is given by the 
following Iýadfth, "The case of a good companion and a bad 
companion is like that of one who has musk [perfume] and 
7 
of one who blows a furnace [or an iron smithl" CBukharl, 
vol. 7. P. 315). In another hadTth, "A person follows the 
norms and customs of his bosom friend; so each one should 
consider whom to befriend" CAbu 0a-wu4d, vol-3. P-135). 
Now we should remember that the Qur'an might appear 
to some to be presenting two antagonistic theses regarding 
human nature; man is by nature benevolent and selfish. 
Given the duality in man's nature and the scarcity of 
resources 
9 for man to achieve his purpose on the earth. a 
The term Looking-gtass setf was coined by Cooley C190ý)- 
Social interaction provides a person with others' 
reactions towards him or her. For the person in question, 
others' reactions serve as a reflected feedback; a measure 
of what he or she is really like. However, Cooley's view 
needs to be qulified. Unlike. the mirror's reflection, 
others's feedback could be deceptive; it is only when the 
t others' are trustworthy should their feedback be a true, 
mirror-like reflection. 
Resources are scarce relative to the demand for them. 
Therefore, individuals should order their preferences and 
make choice among them. Presumably. the relaxation of this 
assumption will mean that all the available resources are 
froo' as distinguished from 4oconamic' resources. In such 
a theoretical society the analysis of egoistic/altruistic 
human behaviour will be meaningless. 
ec a 
somewhat selfish state - of mi nd is an important 
prerequisite for man's probation on this earth. The 
selfish state of mind, which signifies a regard for the 
self and manifests itself in the love of wealth, motivates 
man towards the material development of the earth. But a 
regard for the self is not a disregard for the others; 
every person is required to mind his own self so that it 
might be of greater service to others. As Muslehuddin 
C1978) asserts, "this [self -interest3 does not mean 
thoughtless development of self nor does it mean self 
destruction but it means a careful development having in 
mind one's duties to others'CP. 88). Man is religiouslY 
required to love other creatures of God in the same way as 
he loves himself. However, love is not love unless it is 
manifested in positive acts to promote others' happiness. 
Love is in fact doing good to others in every way and 
abstaining from injuring them and their lawful interests 
CAnsari, 1973). In other words, regard for self and regard 
for others are Islamically perceived as complementary 
rather than antagonistic. What is Islamically culpable is 
excessive regard for self accompanied by a disregard for 
others. By and large, both selfishness and selflessness 
are there in man's nature, but man is Islamically required 
to develop the latter and restrict the former to the 
minimum possible. The achievement of this depends on 
adherence to the Islamic injunctions vis A vis moral 
development. 
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2.2.2. Elonovolonc% arad tamkiyah 
The process of tazhiyah and its induced psycho-ethical 
orientation is essential in 'maximizing' the goodness of 
non-selfish behaviour. tazktyah is generally perceived as 
purification of something Cfrom adulterantsD, its growth 
and development. and to bring it to the height of its 
perfection" CIslahi, 1982, P. 19: ). This definition is neither 
accepted verbatim nor rejected outright. If it is applied 
to human nafs or ruh, Islahi's definition, though widely 
used, would be inconclusive and misleading inasmuch as it 
highlights the effects Cthe corruption of the nafsD while 
neglecting the causes. Self-discipline is a suitable 
term to be used for tazhtyah; self-discipline not only 
purifies the nafs but also eliminates the causes of 
corruption by restraining the nafs ammarah as well as 
safeguarding man from Satanic power. The Qur'an explicitly 
relates man's success in the hereafter to the process of 
tazhiyah Cself-discipline) because it elevates the nafs 
towards the world of spirituality. 
"By the nafs and Him who perfected'it, and 
inspired itCwith conscience of) what is wrong 
for it and what is right for it. He is indeed 
successful who achieved taokiyah " C91-7-9). 
The Qur'anic verses quoted taken in conjunction with 
the verse "We showed him Cman) the path, be he grateful or 
ungrateful Crests on his will)"C76: 3), form the basis of 
the psychological theory of Islam. Man is capable of doing 
what is good and what is reprehensible. External factors, 
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like divine messages. awaken the potentialities of doing 
good. The above verses also reveal that ta2kiyah depends 
10 - on taqwa CGod consciousnessD arid iman Cdevotion to God 
and belief in accountability in the heroafterD. The 
principle of accountability, in the 0-ur'anic phraseology, 
is expressed in terms of man being 'brought back' to God, 
"Did you think that we had created you in jest, and that 
you would not be brought back to UsCfor account)"C22: 1153. 
I-- The interaction between iman and taqwa evokes tazhiyah and 
helps the ruh attain its 'good brought back' to heaven. Z 
Tazhiyah is of a major significance for the moral 
development and the moral behaviour of the Muslim, and 
therefore, it is vital in motivating him. /her towards 
benevolence and righteousness. Since man seeks success in 
the hereafter, his acquisitive instinct cannot be allowed 
to degenerate into greed inasmuch as success is for "those 
who spend their wealth for increase in ta2kiyah" CQur'an. 
192: 19). So long as man's nafs is yearning for spirituality, 
tazkiyah is vital in developing the nafs muým 'tnnah and 
restraining the nafs ammarah. Tazkiyah thereby minimizes 
the effect of the selfish state of mind, purifies man from 
the vices of egoism and miserliness and endows' him with 
virtues of benevolence and righteousness. Tazktyah is hard 
to attain Cfor it needs much training and education), 
10 
- taqwa is unattainable unless the arkan Cpillars of Islam) 
are satisfactorily performed. Further development in taqu)72 
depends, inter atia, on righteous deeds. 
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nonetheless, it is indispensable for human development 
zkiyah towards perfection. The Islamic emphasis on tcý 
shows that pure reason is, not enough to generate genuine 
benevolence. Without tazhiyah, the nafs ammarah is free, 
therefore benevolence, if any, is likely to be in the form 
of disguised self interest, if not only caprice. It could 
therefore be argued that genuine benevolence is an 
emanation of the nafs/r-ujý through the process of tazhtyah. 
Hence, for a true Muslim, benevolence is not at all en 
PCSSant but, deeply rooted in his salvation-seeking nafs. 
2.2-3. Benevolence & the attributes of God 
Benevolence is also as a manifestation of man's 
endeavour to imitate the attributes of God. This is based 
an the view that "the object of man, s existence iss that he 
should become a manifestation of God's attributes" CKhan, 
1980 P. 134). Indisputably, God is the ethical ideal and. 
therefore, the possessor of the best attributes, "the best 
attributes belong to God: so entreat Him by them" CQur'an, 
7: 180). Presumably, based on this Qur'anic text, Muslim--,, 
especially the sophist, mistakenly devote their times to 
verbal remembrance of God's attributes. However, man's mere 
remembrance of God, s attributes is not sufficient for his 
moral development unless they are reflected in social 
behaviour. To avoid possible misunderstanding, man can not 
reach the perfection of God's attributes* yet his moral 
development requires that whatever reflects a divine 
attribute is 6ood and should be sought and fostered. 
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The Qurlan repeatedly'brings into focus the underlying 
moral significance of imitating the attributes of God. 
Some of these attributes are of a vital significance for 
the norms of benevolence. For instance, God is raýýn Cmost 
gracious: ) and ra? ýLm Cmost mercifulD CI: 2. ). No man is an 
island, his mutual social interaction with others requires 
mttratýamah Ccompassionate kindnessD which helps achieve 
peace, harmony and cooperation; "no pity is taken upon a 
person who does not take pi ty on other peopl e" 
CBukhIrl, vol. S. P. 18). God is razag Csustainer) C5: 58). His 
bounties are for all beings and closed not to any one. By 
imitating this attribute, man is not only motivated to 
help sustain others' needs, but it is also morally 
incumbent upon him not to discriminate among them. God is 
wahab, Granter of bounties. C3-8). All that man possesses 
Ctangible and intangible) belongs to God. To scrupulously 
perform Milafah Ctrusteeship), it is incumbent on man to 
share his wealth with other fellow beings. Therefore, the 
norms of giving are the manifestation of imitating the 
attribute of God as wahab. By and large, the purpose of 
man's creation is that he should receive the impress of 
God's attributes and should become a manifestation of 
them within the limits of his capacities. The underlying 
moral significance of these attributes is that, 
Islamically speaking, benevolence ought to be 
a governing principle of life. 
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2.2.4. The Islamic thoory of motivation 
The foregoing discussion reveals that benevolence is a 
paramount ethical value? in Islam. But what is it that 
motivates man, Islamic-ally, to promote the happiness of 
others? Western behavioural scientists are not unanimous 
as to the question of human motivation; an act might be 
motivated by many ulterior motives Ccf. ch. I. section 2. ). 
Western Csecular) theories of altruism and philanthropy 
regard acts and moti ves as ethically distinct; a 
benevolent act can not be void even though its hiden 
motives are not ethically substantial. In Islam, the 
motive behind an act is as important as the act itself. 
In the hadith "Acts are determined by their motives" 
CBukhari, vol. 7. P. S.: ). Based on this )ýadith, a benevolent 
act might be, Islamically, devoid of value even though it 
contributes to the welfare of others, because it is not in 
accord with the Islamic theory of motivation. The 
following Qur'anic verses explain true, and unpretentious 
benevolence and its underlying Islamic motivation. 
"And they Cthe righteous) feed, for the love of 
God, the indigent, the orphan and the captive. 
Saying, we feed you for the sake of God alone. 
No reward do we desire from you, nor thanks" 
C76: 8-1-0). 
"Those Cmost devoted to God) who spend their 
wealth for increase in taýzkiyah, and have in 
their minds no favour from any one for which a 
reward is expected in return. But. only the 
desire to seek the countenance of their Lord 
Most High" 092: 1e-20). 
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Hence, benevolence should be motivated by the expected 
approval of God, that is, from the highest motives and 
without the least tinge of worldliness. If other motives, 
such as ostentation, show, material reward or 
psychological excellence, are experienced, the benevolent 
act will be devoid of its Islamic value irrespective of 
its positive effect on others' welfare. Benevolence thus 
becomes highly spiritualized. 
2.3. The Basic Quranic Concepts of Benevolence 
From the early suwar CchaptersD of the Qur'an, Islam has 
laid special emphasis on many socio-spiritual virtues 
which help achieve brotherhood, fellow feeling and 
cooperation and thereby the social harmony and peaceful 
existence of a civilized society. Presumably, this would 
explain why the prophet of Islam, soon after hQrah Chis 
emigration from Makkah to Madinah), instituted the 
muwaRhah -a type of brotherhood which bound together 
every two Muslims with a fraternal tie. This muwýkh; A was 
primarily intended for establishing a norm of cooperation 
within the nascent Islamic society. However, as Sarwar 
C1969) remarks, muwakhah has developed into a universal 
brotherhood CQur'an, 49: 10), a brotherhood of one and-all, 
built upon mutual love, affection, kindness, sympathy, 
selflessness, etc. with a readiness of everyone to rectify 
mutual social relations in the larger interest of all. 
To understand the Islamic emphasis on brotherhood and 
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coopGration, let us elucidate the benevolence significance 
of such virtues as itisan, birz-, ithar and infaq. 
2.3.1. The concept of i"an 
Lexically, the word ihsan denotes perfection and the 
doing of 6ood deeds. In its Qur'anic connotation, Qtsan 
includes all that is Islamically good. "God commands 
justice, ihGan and liberality to kith and kin ...... CQurlan, 
16: 90). Based on this Qur'anic verse, i"an signifies the 
doing of good deeds even if they are not strictly demanded 
by justice. In many Quranic verses, the term U. ýsan, is 
related to God-consciousness and self restrain; those who 
are well acquainted with these qualities are necessarily 
aloof from ulterior motives, for they are only motivated 
by the expected approval of God. The Ourlanic expression 
of this motivation is given in an abstract form, "Is there 
any reward for it' 
. ýsan other 
than i; ýsan"C! 55-. 60). The concept, 
of i4san is of a comprehensive nature; 
"Oýsan means good behaviour, generous dealing, 
sympathetic attitude, tolerance, humane and kind 
approach, mutual consideration, and regard for 
one another's interest, rendering to others 
even something more than their due right, 
contenting one self with even something less 
than one's own due right". CSiddiqi, 1Q7Q, P. 61). 
As IzutsuC1959) observes, the Islamic usage of ih. san 
implies two particular classes of goodness; profound piety 
towards God and all human deeds that originate therefrom, 
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and acts motivated by the spirit of )ýitm . In fact, Qisan 
is the most i=ediate manifestation of the spirit of kitm_, 
"those who spend freely, whether in prosperity or in 
adversity, who restrain anger and pardon all men, for God 
loves those who perform i? isan" CQur'an, 3: 134). ihsan and 
iýitm are not difficult to reconcile; a person who always 
willingly helps others out of t"an, is, ipso facto, slow 
to anger, forbears from retaliating and forgives offenses. 
The concrete denotatum'of i"an is explicitly described in 
tho Qur'an as various acts of pious devotion. Moreover, 
Uýsan is synonym to voluntarism; the Qurlanic clarification 
of ihsan is that of some 'good' deeds volunteered without 
any earnest request, compulsion or, social coercion. 
"As to the God-conscious, they will be in the 
midst of Gardens and Springs. Taking joy in the 
thing their Lord gives them, because before 
then, they were muh. sirtLn Cgood doersD --- And in 
their wealth and possessions the right of the 
needy, him who asked and him who Cfor some 
reasonD was prevented Cfrom asking) "C51: 15-19). 
2.3.2 The concept of birr 
In a very striking form the Qur'an' affirms that bizr is 
unattainable -in the absence of positive benevolent actss, 
"By no means shal I you attain at-birr unless you give 
ý%itm is an Arabic equivalent of the Greek qataraxia', 
the freedom of the soul from all violent passions, the 
virtue of reining one's passionate nature from being moved 
and stirred upon the smallest provocation. Ccf Izutsu, 1959) 
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CfreelyD of that which you love, and whatever you give, of 
a truth God knows it well"C3: 92. ). As a wide concept, 
at-birr is not precisely translatable, however, as Izutsu 
C1959) notes, its basic connotation is kindness, affection, 
gentleness, justice, righteousness, honesty, veracity, 
considerateness and extensive benevolence. Generally 
speaking, at-birr is a comprehensive name for all actions 
motivated by love and righteousness and stipulated bq, tbý 
religious experience of taqwa CGod-consciousness). It is 
through the process of at-birr thýt "man reaches the 
highest of generosity, liberality and noblest - form of 
beneficence which can possibly arise from human spirit" 
CQureshi, 197! 9, p. 73). The Qur"anic emphasis on ctt-birr 
indicates that Islam does not accept the Western concept 
of altruism as a philosophical principle which is not 
nracessarily manifested in positive acts towards removing 
the distress of others. 
"It is not at-birr that you turn your faces 
towards East and West. But at-birr is to believe 
in God ....... Andýto spend your substance out of love of Him, for your kin, for orphans, for the 
needy, for the wayfarer, for those who ask and 
for the reason of slaves and to practice 
, regular voluntarism, to fulfill the contract 
which you have made Such are the people of 
truth and taqw; "C2: 177. ) 
at-birr exhibits three fundamental dimensions CAnsari, 
VD73). Firstly, faith in God which establishes humility, 
moral courage and optimism in one's moral behaviour at the 
very start. Secondly, love for God; it establishes 
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unfailing lovo for -doing good to humanity am woll ar. for 
one's betterment. Thirdly, taqwa; it establishes a sense of 
responsibility and moral earnestness. Therefore, at-birz, 
results from the interaction between the person's sense of 
God and his. /her sense of fellow-men, and manifests itself 
in various forms of benevolence. 
2.3.3. The concept of ithar 
Lexically, ithar denotes giving others preference over 
one's own. As a moral concept it implies self-denial and 
self sacrifice for the welfare of others, removing the 
distress of others despite one's earnest need. Inculcated 
to that extent, ithax, becomes an attribute of the mutaqin 
Cthe God-conscious persons) whose selves are tranquilized 
and year'ning for the approval of God. The moral theory of 
ithar could be deduced from the following Qur'anic text. 
"But those who before them had homesCin Madinah) 
and had adopted faith, show their affection to 
such as come to them for refuge, and entertain 
no desire in their hearts for thing given to 
the latter, but give them preference over 
themselves, even though poverty was their own 
lot. And those saved from covetousness of their 
own selves, - they are the ones that achieve 
prosperity " C59: 9). 
As a moral behaviour ithar can be manifested in many 
forms. Man is not an island; people live in society 
wherein the need for peace and social harmony is 
indispensable. However, peace and social harmony are hardly 
attainabIG without law and ardor. The more submission to 
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law and order is, in itself, a form of self sacrifice. 
This degree of ithar is a social necessity, though it is 
usually not noticeable in the real world. HabankaCIG79) 
distinguishes two types of tthar, 'a mothGr-child' and an 
"ideal' type. The "mother-child' type of tthar emerges 
from pure emotional affect, it is motivated by love, 
passion and sympathy. The main weakness of this type of 
ithar is that it is limited. A sympathises with B and 
treats hi m. /her altruistically, however, others are 
unlikely to be treated in the same way as B, presumably 
becaute what motivates A to behave altruistically is 
confined only to B and not extendible to others. 
The ideal ithar is a rational affection motivated by 
the sense of iman Cconviction and devotion) and taqwý. CGod 
consciousness. Unlike the 'mother-child' type. the ideal 
ithar is comprehensive; a person promotes the welfare of 
othersCconscious and unconscious beings) and does not 
discriminate among them. The paradox of self-sacrifice is 
resolvable through this ideal, taqwa-motivated ithar. The 
Islamic solution to this paradox is expressed in the 
following Qur'anic verse. "Think not, of those who are 
slain in God's way as dead. Nay, they live, finding their 
substance in the presence of their Lord" 3: 169). Any 
motive other than this is irrational and devoid of Islamic 
so 
value. The Islamic spiritual solution to the paradox. of 
self sacrifice is based on a certain presumption vi2, 
Muslims ought to be motivated only by the expected 
approval of God. 
2.3.4. * The concept of infaq 
Islam has laid special emphasis on infZlq fisabitiLtýh 
Cspending in the way of God), whereby the norms of 
benevolence are translated into positive acts of giving. 
The concept of infaq is based on the proposition that all 
bounties proceed from God and therefore should be used in 
accordance with His commandments. "Believe in God and His 
messenger and spend Cin the way of God) of that substance 
whereof He has made you trustees "CQur'an, 57: 7). From this 
follows the unique concept of amanah Ctrusteeship) which 
signifior. that absoluto ownorship bolongs to God and Re 
'delegated' the legal ownership Cand hence the property 
rights) to mankind under specified terms. However, 
adherence to these terms, given the nafs cxmarah and the 
somewhat selfish state of mind, necessitates taqwa. taqwa 
is the most important prerequisite of infaq, whereby 
continuous voluntarism is possible both in prosperity and 
adversity CQur'an 3: 134). ta(? wa guarantees a continuous 
remembrance of God and thereby contributes to and evokes 
the norms of inf&?. This is because the hearts of those 
who perform tnfiiq will dwell with God as the heart of the 
ei 
business man will dwell with his business. Therefore, 
infaq'is "the most afficacious remedy of the negligence 
from God - due to the love of the world and its 
paraphernalia" CIslahi, 1982, p. 191). 
For a person to perform a genuine infaq, his, /her self 
should be above the? love of the mammon. Cne can hardly 
foster others' welfare if his heart is entangled with the 
love of mammon and miserliness. "And those saved from the 
covetousness of their own selves, -they are the ones that, 
achieve prosperity"CQur , an, 59: 93. It, might, prima facto, 
appear to some, specially misers, that infaq contributes 
to the? reduction of their wealth. The Qurlan presents a 
psycho-spiritual 
-logical 
answer; contributing to the 
welfare of others, for the sake of God, does not reduce 
the person's wealth, rather it increases the wealth 
mani f ol d. 
"The parable of those who spend their substances 
in the way of God, is that of a grain of corn; 
it grows seven ears, and each ear has a hundred 
grains. God gives manifold increase to whom He 
pleases" C2: 2651). 
2.3.5. The grades of benevolence 
Benevolence is of three grades, viz, fairness and 
equity, conscious benevolence and instinctive benevolence. 
C Khan, 1980, P. 1363. Fairness is the doing of good equal to 
the good one receives from others. It is not only a 
minimum of benevolence, but also a condition for one's, 
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spiritual progress; in the haciLth, "He has no faith who 
wishes not for his brother what he wishes for himself" 
CMuslim, vol. l. P. 31). This fairness-benevolence relation is 
significant for Islamic economic theory, since it 
inculcates the norms of lawfulness, truthf ulness, 
trustingness brotherhood and cooperation. Thereby, it 
restrains many forms of reprehensible behaviour such as 
profiteering, cheating, misallocation of resources and 
12 
hoarding of money and goods speculatively Conscious 
benevolence is the doing of greater good in return for the 
good and the doing of good without an expectation of 
r owar 
13 
. nstinct benevolence flows out from the person as 
love and affection flow out towards one's kindred. 
Cultivated to that degree, benevolence would eventually 
become a natural instinct, but having been acquired 
deliberately, it will be the highest moral quality. It 
will manifest itself towards a wrongdoers not only in 
12 The economic significance of the f ai rness-bonevol once 
relation will be discussed at length in chapter three. 
13 Islam rejects noýL the exchange of gifts provided they are 
not- motivated by the laws of reinforcement and no societal 
cost whatsoever is imposed on the recipient if the latter 
fails to offer a gift in return for the one received. Many 
of the prophet's ahadTth encourage what might be called 
voluntary reciprociýy which helps the spread of love and 
brotherhood. 
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forgivQnomm bUt ,. JQO in b.. rQ"rojQr,, a4;,. Inculcatod to that 
extent. the norms of benevolence will be a necessary part 
of a person's 
ýcode 
of moral behaviour. 
14 
2.4. Benevolence & Philosophy of Islandc econondcs 
2.4.1. The Philosophical Principles of Islamic Economics 
2.4.1.1. The Concept of taw; ýLd 
The key to the economic philosophy of Islam is the 
concept, of tawtýtd; the recognition that there is no God 
but, God. TawtýTd has two aspects, metaphysical and 
axiological Cal-F! rUZql', 1992). The former purged religion 
absolutely clean of doubts regarding the transcendence 
and unicity of the God-head. The latter asserts that God 
is the sole and ultimate value, that everything else is 
only an instrument whose value depends upon God for its 
valueness. Abu SulaymanC1980) visualizes tawhid as a coin 
with two facos: onG implie? s that God is tho CrGator Cand 
hence the SustainerD and the other that men are equal 
partners or that each man is brother to another: "0! 
mankind be conscious of your Lord who created you from a 
single nafs Cperson) and from it created its mate and from 
them twain spread a multitude of men and women" CQrjr'an, 
14 Conscious and instinctive benevolence help secure a 
continuous unilateral transfer of wealth from the haves 
to the have-nots. This voluntary capital pooling which 
forms a third market in the Islamic economy will be 
discussed in chapter three. 
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This Qur'anic verse also implies that the man-man 
relationship should be based on brotherhood and equality. 
However, tawhLd has another dimension: everything in the 
universe is harmoniously moving towards one final end-, 
that is, God. Applying this to the field of economics. then 
man's economic activities ought to be motivated only by 
the approval of God, with no room for other objectives as 
final ends in themselves. 
2.4.1.2. The epistemology of Islamic Economics 
In 0-ur'anic phraseology, man is incapable of knowing 
what is best for himC4: 113. Man possesses a relatively 
absolute autonomy as opposed to the Kantian absolute 
autonomy 
is 
, for only God has perfect knowledge. Guidance 
comes through revelation, making wcthy Crevelation) the 
baLsic source of knowledge. Man has power to choose between 
good and evil and he is responsible because God, shows him 
what is good and what is evil. The 'positive' liberalistic 
economic paradigm dismisses all sources of' knowledge other 
than human knowledge derived through the 
hypothetico-deductive process. Presumably, this explains 
In his "Fundamental principles of the metaphysi6s of 
ethics' Kant used the autonomy of the will as the supreme 
principle of morality. Autonomy of the will is that 
quality of will by which a will Cindependent of any object 
willed) is a law to itself. Cthe will being that kind of 
causality attributed to living agents in so far as they 
are possessed of reason). Man-is, therefore, bound to laws 
of his own making. In other words, man is bound to act in 
conformity with his own will; a will which is designed by 
nature to give universal laws. 
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why 11 bor &., l Qti; a , notably Buchanan CI-OG83 l, amm or 
that distributional and redistributional judgements Con 
individualistic and non-individualistic/ external norms) 
are but "a hoodwink of the public of the existence of a 
hot line to God"CP. 183). 
Divine knowledge, it is believed, constitutes a hard 
core of sure knowledge which may be treated as a point of 
reference or criterion for judging the truth CKhan. 1978). 
The truth of the principles laid down by the Qur"an and 
the aýiadý. th of the prophet need no verification; they are 
axioms used to judge human behavicur. that is, human 
behaviour is Islamic onty if it is in accord with divine 
knowledge. However, this does not mean that human reason 
is invalid, but it should be within the bounds of over-all 
divine knowledge. It could be argued. therefore, that 
Islamic economics is necessarily value-loaded and hence 
mants economic activity should be kept within the bounds 
of Islamic epistemology. Accepting this, then benevolence 
should be a governing principle in all economic activities 
inasmuch as it is a divine-required value. 
2.4.1.3. The Principle of atladt 
The basic Islamic principle of rational human behaviour 
is the law of aPadt Cjustice and equilibriumD. The CZur'an 
states, "God commands justice, the doing of good and 
liberality to kith and kin"CI6: 90. ). "S6 establish weight 
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with balance and fall not short in the balance" C55: 19). 
The divine law of al'adt, argued NaqviCVD81a: ), connotes 
the philosophy of the right. It specifies what is right and 
then within this ethical framework, allows an individual 
I ro to choose the most beneficial course of action As a 
moral virtue, al'adl denotes a binding moral commitment of 
the individual to uphold a normative equilibrium in their 
17 
over-all life spectrum It could, therefore, be argued 
that any economic choice in Islam necessarily involves an 
ethical choice as well. Moreover, the primary task of the 
individuals, according to the principle of at "adt, should 
be to alleviate the -least, privileged persons CQur'an 
28: 5). The economic implication of this justice-induced 
benevolence is the priority of justice over efficiency. 
This is because Islam allows for distributional and 
redistributional judgement as well as emphasizing both the 
fact and the quality of the equilibrium Cunlike western 
theories of optimality which do not insist on the quality 
of the equilibrium). 
In this respect aeadl produces an opposite to the 
utilitarian principle which first specifies what is good 
CGg happiness) and then calls whatever maximizes this good 
to be right. 
17 Unlike western economics, in Islamic economics it is not 
admissible to obtain equilibrium solutions which are 
trivial from a normative point of view. 
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2.4.1.4. Thc;, Principle;, of Trusst*; Poship 
Islam has a distinguished concept of ownership; the 
true owner of all resources is God alone. The fundamental 
guiding principle in this regard is the Qur anic verse: 
"Unto God belongs the dominion of the heavens and the 
earth, and all that is therein" C5: 120). From this follows 
the unique Islamic concept of amanah Ctrusteeship), "And 
spend whereof He has made you trustees"C57: 7D. Through the 
concept of amanah, property rights have been 'delegated' 
to mankind under specified terms. Ownership is, therefore, 
not absolute, rather it is limited and qualified. The 
resources at one's command Cincluding one's own life) are 
bestowed upon one by God and have to be allocated in such 
a way and with the intention of achieving the approval of 
God CArif, 19943. Hence the rule of trusteeship must be 
obeyed in the disposal of wealth because as the Qur'an 
states: "And in their [the righteous] wealth and 
possessions the right of the needy, him who asked and him 
who Cfor some reasons) was prevented Cfrom asking)" 
is 
Based on this Qur'anic verse, NaqviC1981a) alleges that 
tha right of tho poor on tho woalth of the- rich appliGs 
retrospectively; soci al justice today requires- the 
rectification of the 'historical' injustice if any. It 
might appear, prima facte. that this 'historical' principle 
of distributive justice has some elements of truth. 
However. nothing in Islamic teaching could be taken to 
change the initial allocation of endowments Cother than 
voluntarism), provided. they result from uninjurious 
conduct. 
es 
CEU. iQ3. If th%., concQpt. of trustoozhip isa fully roali=od, 
GaLch person will voluntarily contribute to the welfare of 
the destitute; benevolence will, ipso facto, -be a part of 
man's moral behaviour. Egoism is at least minimized 
because, as Muslehuddin C19743 observes, it, will be "quite 
out of tune with the economic trusteeship envisaged by 
Islam according to which man is held a trustee for 
others-in-need and is bound to have regard for them in 
what-ever he earns"CP. 39). 
2.4.1.5. The Principle of Responsibility 
Individual freedom, in Islam, is directly linked to 
the conscious act of discharging one's responsibility to 
help others. Failure to do so has been declared in the 
Our , an to be the denial of faith: "have you seen him who 
denies the faith? It is he who repulses the orphan Cwith 
harness) and encourages not others to feed the indigent" 
C107: 1-3). This is the essence of the Islamic principle of 
responsibility which requires man to consciously chose a 
course of action that enhances the welfare of others, even 
though such a choice might reduce his/her material welfare 
C Naqvi , 1981 a). Responsibility here is not only what 
economists refer to as interdependence of individual 
welfare functions, that is the welfare of an individual is 
directly influenced by that of his neighbour: "By no means 
shall you attain righteousness unless you give (freely) of 
that which you love"CQuran, 3: 92). Responsibility is not 
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onl i ghtzý, nod --Ql f intoro'st or sympathy but rather a 
commitment. Hence, commitment is an alternative to 
19 
egoistic human motivation . Since the individual's welfare 
is redefined to include reward in the hereafter, 
commitment appears to be an entirely rational motivation. 
Egoism does not die out, however; it is most likely to be 
overcompensated by commitment. 
The principle of responsibility denotes that individual 
and soci al wel f are are compl ementary rather than 
antagonistic. Collective responsibility is a social as 
well as a religious necessity as may be understood from 
the following aiýadTth: "mankind are a fold. every member is 
a shepherd or a keeper unto every other and accountable 
for the welfare of the entire fold"CBukhari, vol. 3. P. 438) 
"A believer to another believer is like the brick of a 
building which holds one another "C Muslim. vol. S. P. 1368)). 
These ahadith stress the point that one has to identify 
his interest with the interest of others; both interests 
are component parts of the person's responsibility in 
life. The complementarity between the individual and the 
social good is possible only when the individual and 
The 
, 
concept of commitment has been suggested by 
SenC1977: ) as an alternative to egoistic and sympathetic 
behaviour since the latter is in an important sense 
egoistic. To Sen, commitment is the state wherein one feels 
that others' distress is wrong and he is ready to do 
something to stop it. It is only through commitment that 
an individual choose an act that he believes will yield a 
lower level of personal welfare to him than an alternative 
that is also available to him. 
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social welfare are closely linked up provided that the 
individuals maintain complete harmony between their 
individual and social good. CAfzal-ur-Rahman, 15D8O)- In 
accordance with the principle of responsibility, every 
person ought to strive for his and others' welfare even if 
he. /she gets no benefit from others. 
2.4.2. An Introduction to the Homo Islamicus 
The whole edifice of conventional economic theory is 
built on the presumption of rational human behaviour. 
Axiomatically, rationality is tantamount to the management 
and implementation of choices with a view of maximizing 
20 individual interest . The ontological and the axiological 
commitment to self interest, and the utilitarian principle 
underlying economic rationatity imbued the personality of 
the homo oconomtcus- with an egoistic human motivation. 
Methodologically speaking, the homo economicus becomes 
"the metaphoric or figurative expression for a proposition 
used as a premise in the hypothetico-deductive system of 
economic theory"CMachlup, 1972, P. 113). The hom: ) econom4cus 
Cthe rational primum mobite of the neoclassical economics) 
is "the child of the Enlightenment'and so the self-seeking 
individualist, of utility theory"CHollis & Nell, 1976, P. 54). 
Implied in the concept of the homo economicus is the 
20 For a detailed discussion on rationality vis A Vis 
maximization see ch. 4-. 2 infra. 
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psychological notion that all human needs are reduced to 
the common denominator of utility. CLutz & Lux, 1979, P. 45). 
It is the neoclassicists, JevonsCIS71), MengerCIG713, 
and MarshallCIS903 who raised the rationat economic man to 
the level of universal existence. Veblen(1! 915: ) rejects the 
materialistic path of the neoclassicists who perceive 
economic man as devoid of social motives. However, 
Gconomic man has bGon 'born again' with Li onel 
RobbinsC1935) and latter with Milton FriedmanCI953). 
Robbins turns the rationat economic man into a consistent 
economic man; a maximizer whose orders of choices are 
consistent. Note that this assumption upholds the 
separation of -ends and means. The logical positivist, 
Milton Friedman, imparted now life into economic man by 
insisting that all talk of his outmoded psychology and 
inhuman, overly mechanic and unreal character has been 
"largely beside the, point"CP. 31). In line with the 
thinking of the logical positivists, "if he [the economic 
man] behaves, according to predictions, he exists, whether 
we like him or not" CLutz & Lux. 1079, P. 67: ). 
The homo oconomicus, it, is presumed. is ondowed. with 
complete, fully ordered preferences, perfect information 
and an undefiled computing power His behaviour is to be 
The fact that these assumptions are invalid and 
unrealistic has motivated many economists, notably Herbert 
Simon and the managerial economists thereafter, to propose 
a different concept of rationality and hence a different 
portrayal of economic agent. Ccf. ch. 4: 2 infra). 
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explained as a series of -attempts to satisfy his- desires 
22 
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The, value considerations Cthe nature of wants, the welfare 
of others, etc. 3 are presumably beyond the scope of 
rational discussion insofar as they are subjective and 
arbitrary. Thus "value-free calculus of utility becomes a 
natural way of applying strict scientific methods to the 
economic behaviour of individuals" 
23 CHollis and Nell, 1975, 
P. 49). 
As a maximizer, the homo economicus is rational in an 
instrumental sense; "rationality is a means-to-ends not-ion, 
with no questions raised about the source or worth of 
preferences"CHargreaves-Heap and Hollis, 1987, P. 54). Put in 
thi s way, moans are indisputably rational insofar as 
they help achieve the objectiveCs) of the homo economicti-S. 
This utility-motivated behaviour is said to govern human 
behaviour in general; "all human behaviour can be viewed 
as involving participants who maximize their utility from 
a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal 
As Hargreaves-Heap and Hollis C10-87. P. 55) put it, in 
supposing that only desires motivate agents, the economists 
are taking sides in a continuing philosophical dispute 
between Humeans, who regard reason as the slave of the 
passions, and Kantians, who make room for the rational 
monitoring of desire. 
23 The positivists' models of man which presuppose the 
rational calculation of self interest are based on three 
epistemological foundations. Firstly, value judgements are 
not only unscientific but simply make no sense. Secondly, 
means. and ends are logically distinct. Thirdly, the 
findings of reason are universal and absolute. 
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smount of information and other inputs in aL variety of 
markets" CBecker, 1975, P. 14D. Eventually, the fictitious 
homo economicus becomes a homo sapiens. The assumptions 
underlying the concept of homo economicus Cinstrumental 
rationality, self-interest, rigorous calculation .... etc. ) 
are, to say the least, in substantial disagreement, with 
the Islamic philosophy of human life. The behaviour of the 
homo economicus is thoroughly alien to the Islamic 
behaviour, and a new conceptual i zati an of an Islamic agent 
is thus indisPensable. 
According to the philosophy of the 0-ur'an, human 
activities ought to be motivated by the achievement of 
fataý "So give what is due to kindred, the needy and 
the wayfarer. This is best for those who seek the 
countenance of God. And'such are those who are successful 
Cmuflihtn)" C30: 38). Fat; 7h is a comprehensive concept 
denoting all-sided welfare of this life as well as that of 
the hereafter CSiddiqi, 1979). Since the Muslim's' time span 
extends to include this life and the life to come, his/her 
welfare function exhibits both material and spiritual 
satisfaction. The moral significance of this is that ýa 
Muslim usually capitalizes on whatever contributes to his 
and others' satisfaction Cin the two worlds) and abstains 
from the negative values that cause mafsadah Cmischief). 
Muslims, therefore, are prompted to benevolence as a 
virtue of paramount spiritual satisfaction. The (ýur'anic 
Q4 
omphasis on spiritual progress is based on +-he principle 
that- the life to come is far more important than the 
ephemeral pleasure of the present life: "Nay, you prefer 
the? life of this world. But the hereafter is better and 
more enduring" C87: 15-17). Therefore, adopting material 
progress as a supreme objective of life is thus alien to 
the Islamic framework. Material progress is not 
undesirable; on the contrary, it is demanded so long as it 
is subservient to the achievement of fatýý. 
Now let us attempt to explore the behaviour of the 
homo Islamicus. In Qur'anic phraseology, Muslims entreat 
to God f or the provision of that which is good in 'this 
world and that which is good and in' the hereafter. Ccf. 
Qur'an, 2: 201). Thus the homo Istamicus, as a represntitive 
Muslim economic agent, behaves in such a way as to further 
his and others' falah over a two-stage life model; success 
in this world and succoss in the hereafter. Unlike the 
western concept of ho. mo economicus, the concept of homo 
Islamicus typifies a real not, a hypothetical, fictional 
man. Note that the homo oconomicus was never thought to be 
a whole man, only a man-in-the market place. Moreover, the 
concept of homo economicus does not imply that such a man 
in fact exists. As Naqvi C1991b, P. 82) put it "the term 
is used as a logical abstraction to highlight a simulated 
model of economic activity, in which man is the principal 
actor". The emphasis on the real man is because. 
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izi, im-nic-ally opzaking, hunizLrx 
objectively. It is the reat and not the fictiont2L man who 
is created withapurpose and accountable for his actions. 
Moreover, the diverse modes of human behaviour observable 
in the real world can hardly be abstracted in one ideal 
behaviour. Hence Islamic obfis-ctivity rejects the fictionaL 
man inasmuch as it is an inadequate symbolization of real 
human behaviour. 
The homo Istamicus behaves in such a way as to attain 
fatah through rational economic choice. The homo Istamicus 
knows, primarily, the supremacy of his spiritual concerns 
over his worldly pursuits; that is, economically speaking, 
the homo Istamicus has a high marginal utility for 
spirituality CNasr, 11DE36). Recall the Islamic theory of 
human motivation Cthe expectation of the approval of God) 
by which human beings ought to strike a just balance 
between theirs and others' interest. Thus there emerges 
the Islamic perspective of the inter-dependence of 
individual welfare functions. In the ýad7th: 
"Be cautious of harming your neighbour by the 
smell of your cooking unless you ladle out food 
for him. Give him from the fruit you have brought, 
if not, hide it and prevent your childern from 
out-doors eating in order not to make your 
neighbour's children become grieved to Look not to 
have iL"Cal-HundhirT, 1968, vol. 3. P. 357). 
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Hence, the homo Istamtcus' wolf-are depends not only on 
his material and spiritual satisfaction, but also an 
others' material and spiritual sati sf action. Others' 
welfare is not a mere parameter in the homo Istamicus' 
welfare function, but he or she is Islamically obliged to 
contribute positively to their welfare and abstain from 
the negative acts that cause distress or external 
diseconomies to others. Material satisfaction is to be 
restrained if it causes external diseconomies to others. 
The homo Islamicus takes into consideration the social 
cost and external diseconomies of his material welfare. 
Therefore, the homo lstamtcus eschews voluntarily all 
forms of consumption and production activities that cause 
Cor might cause) deleterious effects Cie. external 
diseconomios) an others. 
Now the homo Istamicus' welfare function could be 
written in its gonerad form as: W=W IMCM. sM. ), -S CS. PS. )Io 
where 14. and M. stand for his. /her and others' material 
satisfaction respectively; S. and S. stand for his/her 
and others' spiritual satisfaction respectively. 
measurement of S might pose a question. spiritual 
satisfaction is insatiable; the homo Istamicus is unable 
to measure it, nonetheless, hexshe can be psychologically 
conscious thereof. The homo lslamtcus' rational behaviour 
aWaW 
is governed by the condition that, > 0, and > 0, 
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aw 
that is pure ascetic Cif 0) and pure materialistic 
0w 
Cif -= 03 behaviour are both irrational and Islamically 
0S 
reprehensible. Since the homo Istamicus' utility function 
exhi bits a high marginal utility for spirituality; it, 
aWaW 
follows that -> This assumption implies that 
aSaM 
the homo Istamicus' preferences Cor choices) are ordered 
lexicographically. This would eventually lead to a unique 
consumer theory. Ccf. section 4.3.2.3. infra) 
2.5. Concluding Remarks 
The Islamic perception of human nature reveals that 
both egoism and benevolence are there in human nature. 
However, Islamic teachings insist that for man to attain a 
higher position in the spiritual scale, benevolence ought 
to be a sacrosanct ethical value. Therefore, Islam does 
not accept the assumption of egoistic human motivation; 
individuals are motivated by the anticipated approval of 
God and aspire fatah in a two-stage life model. The 
economic significance of this highly spiritualized 
benevolence is that the homo Islamicus- is rational if and 
only if he. /she behaves to further others' as well as his 
material and spiritual satisfaction. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ISLAMIC 'BEMEVOLEMCE MARKET' 
3.1 Overview 
On the basis of the arguments developed in the 
previous chapter, an attempt will now be made to propose a 
'benevolence market' as a unique 'third' market in Islamic 
economy. This market is assumed to emerge paco a pacc, from 
two imperative norms viz, the unilateral transfer of 
wealth, a quid without a pro quo, and the predominance of 
the rules of fairness. The following analysis falls into 
two sections. Section two explores the Islamic imperatives 
that secure and enhance the flow of unilateral transfer 
of wealth. The welfare effect derived therefrom will 
also be examined. Section three elucidates the economic 
significance of the 'faLirness-benevolence' relation. 
3.2 The Unilateral Transfer of Wealth 
This section explores the basic Islamic institutions 
whereby wealth is unilaterally and voluntarily transferred 
from the haves to the have-nots, viz, zakýth, ýadaqah. 
hibah and wagf. Through these institutions , conscious and 
instinctive benevolence is likely to be manifested in 
positive acts of giving. The analysis here is confined to 
the modus op-srandi of these institutions and is not 
concerned with their underlying jurisprudence Cunless 
otherwise it seems necessary) which is to be found in the 
diffused literature on ftqh (Islamic jurisprudence). 
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3.2.1. The Institution of Zahah 
Zahah is the third among the five immutable pillars 
of Islam and indeed the foremost socio-economic pillar. 
Lexi calIy, the wor d zakah denotes growth, pur i t. y, 
improvement, and blessing CAnis et aL, 1970, vol. 1, F1-3Gr3: ). In 
its Islamic connotation. argued al-Qaradaw! CI977. ), oa,? Oýth 
"the certain portion of wealth which God has prescribed 
for the beneficiaries, it also refers to the act of paying 
that portion". CPP. 37-38: ). Hassan C198e) visualizes the 
institution of zakah as "a pure transfer operation which 
siphons off from the rich into the hands of the poor and 
the needy"CP. 54). It is worth-noting that the term zakah 
has been mistranslated Cand hence misconceived) as charity 
CQureshi, 1979), poor-tax CMannan, 1994) organized charity, 
Cde Zayas. 1970). while others like Abu SaudCI980) and 
ChoudhuryCI983) regard it as a tax. However, za)-ah is 
neither a charity nor a tax nor it is confined only to the 
poor 
I. 'Institutionalized-benevolence' is the appropriate 
translation for zaRah. 
The norms of gi vi ng are symbol sf or man 0s 
responsibility towards his fellow-men. Through zakýh, 
a form of giving has been made a divine-dut. y. The Qurlan 
While the act of 'charity is an act of love which is 
avoidable without a societal cost, zakýih must be paid 
willy-nilly, and as a form of 'ibadah Cworship). it can 
neither be evaded nor avoided without a societal and a 
religious cost. Moreover. zakýxh is a quid without a pro 
quo while tax is an implicit quid pro quo, inasmuch as the 
tax-payer expects a return in the form of public goods. 
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'3h states, "take 2ak( of their wealth wherewith you may 
purify them and may make them grow"C9,1033. Addressing his 
envoy to Yemen, the prophet is reported to have said 
"Inform them that God has made it a divine-duty to pay 
zakýh; to be taken from the well-to-do and to be 
distributed to the poorer sections of the people"CBukhýr_i, 
vol. 2, P. 2723. The most distinguishing feature of zakah is 
that it fosters the welfare of the needy, whereas the 
duties resembling it in other religionsCcf. Rouse, 1021, 
Zarqa, 1988) are basically meant to support the priesthood 
and the religious institutions. 
As a divine-duty, zaRTzh might, prima facit-_. appear to 
some as irrelevant to benevolence-. To resolve this 
superficial paradox, two points need to be clarified 
viz, the haq-zakah relation, and the etymological relation 
between zWýtah and tazzhtyah. The Qur'an states, "And in 
their [the God conscious] wealth a hag for the needy, him 
who asks and him who asks not"C51: 19). It is a hag 
Ca divine-duty) of the well-to-do to pay zahah. Likewise, 
it is a hag Ca socio-economic right) of the beneficiaries 
to receive and even to claim zakah. The moral commitment 
to zakah as hag is a real manifestation of the ethical 
principle of aPadL. and since the latter is the minimum 
of benevolence, it follows that the relation between zakýh 
and benevolence is self-evident. 
The oakah-benevolence paradox could also be resolved 
by scrutinizing the significance of the etymological 
loi 
relation between zah(jYA and ta-zRi-vah. In his explanation of 
the far-reaching effects of zakýth, AbdalatiC1975, PP. 95-96) 
proposes that za, 167xh has a tremendous purification effect 
on wealth, the givers, the recipients and society at 
large. Abdalati's argument is herein developed further in 
an attempt to understand the zakah-taokiyah relation. 
Ctazkiyah will be used to imply both purification and 
self-discipline). Giving zalkýh voluntarily and consciously 
not only restrains man's egoistic behaviour but also 
evokes his consciousness of other beings. The 0-uran 
emphatically relates zaJctah to the growth of wealth, "And 
whatever you lay out by zak(ýzh seeking the pleasure of God, 
those- they receive -recompense manifold"C30: 39). This 
zakah-induced growth is presumably generated by the 
blessing of God and by the Cthe Grantor, the Sustainer) 
investment motivation inherent in zakah. On a coteris 
paribus assumption, idle wealth diminishes annually by the 
2 
amount of zaPEh Cmutatis mutandis. depreciation in the 
value of money and the opportunity cost should both be 
noted). Through zakah the recipients are helped to develop 
a sense of self-discipline; their socio-spirituality is 
elevated and their rancor, envy, and hatred are, thereby 
are diminished. Moreover, through zakah the recipients 
2 It might be argued that if the wealth is II arge, given 
mants average life expectancy, the annual diminution Of 
wealth is trivial and hence the zakýth-induced investment 
is insignificant. This is resolved Islamically through the 
prohibition of kanz -hoarding-Ccf. section two infra). This 
zakýh-hanz relation is the built-in investment motivation. 
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given a chance not only to cater for their welfare but 
also to be benevolent. Helping others to be benevolent is 
indeed benevolence par excetlence. With the predominance 
of zak, 3h, a special society will eventually emerge; a 
society wherein each individual feels morally responsible 
for the material and the spiritual welfare of others. 
Having said all this, if zal-, ýth is not a form of 
benevolence. what is it then that is called benevolence'? 
The basic feature of zal-. ýA is its comprehensiveness 
i nasmuch as it covers a wide spectrum of weal t h, 
contributors, and beneficiaries. As far as wealth is 
concerned, the zakah-base is widened so that a large 
amount of wealth participates in the welfare of the needy. 
Wealth is subject to 2akah if the following conditions are 
satisfied Cal-Kasani, d. 11$3! @, n. d. vol. 2. al-Qaradawi, 1977, 
vol. 2). Firstly, it is in the total ownership of the 
would-be contributor. Secondly, it is productive Ceither 
because of its nature or due to investment); that is, 
yielding or capable of yielding a return, income or 
profit. Thirdly, it sat-isfies the nisab 
3 Cthe minimum 
exemption limit). The prophet has been reported to have 
The nisab is 5 awsuqCapprox. 653Kg) of the land produce, 
40 dinarC approx. 85! gm) of gold, 200 dtrhrvnC approx. 5959m) 
of silver. The zakah incidence varies with reference to 
different kinds of property. For instance, the incidence is 
2.5% on capital, savings. and money incomes; 5%' of the 
produce of the irrigated land Cprovided labour and capital 
are employed in the irrigation process) or 10% if the land 
is irrigated by rainfall. 
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said'. "-zahah is only levied on the grounds of richness" 
CBukhari, vol. 2. P. 291. ) According to al-Kasani Cn. d. vol. 2. 
P. 911D this richness is synonymous with the ownership of 
nisab, while ad-DihlawiC1933, Part., 2. P. 43) equates the nisab 
to a one year adequacy level for a four-person family. 
Fourthly, regarding capital and savings, given nisab, zakah 
is due once a year. zakah an incomes 'and earnings, 
according to the most authentic view, is due an the 
spotCcf. al -Ghazal T, 11-063, al-OaradawT, 10-773. As far as the 
contributors are concerned, all Muslims are duty-bound to 
participate'in the welfare of the needy and the destitute, 
provided their wealth satisfies the above-mentioned 
conditions. The prophet is reported to have said: "the 
orphans's wealth should be invested in order not to be 
substantially diminished by 2akfýzh" Cal-MuwatE, P. 123). If 
there is any Muslim to be exempted from zaR72h, it is 
doubtless the orphan, and since the latter is not 
exempted, it follows, that no one is. 
The institution of zakýh is unique inasmuch a-, the 
dispersement of zakýh funds covers almost all possible 
types of 'need'. The Qur'an states, 
"qadaqatCzaJ-Gh. ) are for the poor and 
the ýestitute, and those employed to 
administer it, and those whose hearts 
have (recently) reconciled Cto Islam), 
for those in bondage and in debt, in 
the way of God, and for the wayfarer; a 
duty imposed by God. God is Knower and 
Wise"CQ: r0g) 
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Muslim jurists are riot at all unanimous as to the 
definition of zaRý%h beneficiaries Cmentioned in the 
Qur , anic verse), nonetheless. they regard them as categories 
of disadvantage persons. The following definitions are 
based on the opinion that has gained considerable 
consensus among the majority of Muslim jurists. as seen in 
al-QurtubT Cd. 1273-n. d. 8. /167-92) al-MawardECd. 1054, n. d. 
PP. 122-124), and al-Qaradawl* C1977, vol. 2. PP. 544-(394). 
faQ71 The r Cthe poor) is the one who has no income, while 
the misRin Cthe needy) is the one whose income is to be 
supplemented to meet his basic needs. In other words. the 
faqir and the miskin belong to the same category, but the 
poverty of the former is comparatively greater. The 
officials employed to collect and administer zaAah funds 
Cat"amituna 'atayyha), whether poor or rich, are entitled 
to a remuneration therefrom. Those who recently accepted 
Islam Catmu'ltafcevu cpjlubuhum. ) are given 2aPah in order to 
neutralize their hatred against Islam and to help them 
rehabilitate in the Islamic society. The term firriqab 
signifies that those seeking freedom from the bondage of 
slavery have a recognizable share in zaRýh. Debt-ridden 
persons are entitled to zakah whether the debt is incurred 
for personal purposes, or for the interest of the society, 
such as reconciling others' conflicts and thereby standing 
as a guarantor. All selfless activities undertaken solely 
for the service of Islam and for the benefit of the 
105 
society, that is, could also be financed 
from zaý-, 3h. The wayfarer is the traveller who has lost 
his.,,, her means of subsistence, be he. -, she rich or poor in 
his/her homeland. 
The claim that the beneficiaries are categories of 
disadvantage persons is indeed an utter misconception; 
eventually the eligibility criterion for the dispersement 
of zahýh would be ill-defined. A profound examination of 
O. u r, anic verse CQ: 60) suggests that the beneficiaries 
mentioned are categories of 'need' rather than of persons. 
It could therefore be argued that 'need' Cin its economic 
sense) forms the eligibility criterion of receiving and/or 
4 
claiming zahýh . The fagir and the mishin are symbols for 
all people living under poverty-induced need. The share 
allotted to al'amiluna 'alayyha signifies that zalaýh is 
not at all a burden on the government budget, It exhibits 
the need for efficient and effective administration of 
zahah itself. The share prescribed for cztmu' t taf atu 
qulubuhum symbolizes the societal need to safeguard itself 
from its weak-hearted members. Those in bondage, firriqab, 
coul d be regarded as a si mpl, ifi cati on for all 
exploitation-related "needs. All forms of "need' - that 
arise Cor might arise )due to unexpected or unanticipated 
cause(s) are included in the terms atgartminCthe debtors), 
and ibnussabit Cthe wayfarer). ftsabitM72hi is a symbol 
4 The genesis of this view is acknowledged to Ahmad(IGSI). 
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, 
for all needs associated with jihad Call forms of physical 
and mental exertion motivated by the approval of God and 
the protection, consolidation, and development of Islamic 
society). By and large, the 'need fulfilment' is the 
underlying welfare significance of aaX72h. 
In addition to zahýxih on wealth, Islam enjoins a special 
zakah which is imposed on individuals; that, is. zaloat'ul 
fitr, which is to be paid to the needy on the completion 
of fasts of Ramadan. As reported by Bukhari Cvol. 2. P. '-33! @) 
and Muslim Cvol. 2. P. 4558). "the prophet prescribed : zaPatut 
fitr, for every freeman or slave, male or female among the 
0 
Muslims- one sa' of dried dates or one sa' of barely" Cone 
qZi"=3Kg approx. ). Muslim jurists are unanimous as to the 
payment of this zaloah in kindCfrom ordinary kind of food), 
but, they are less so as to its payment in cash. However, as 
al-QaradawT C1077, vol. 2. P. 049) argues, the best course for 
fulfilling the purpose of this zahýh is to pay it in cash. 
Concerning its wisdom, Muslim jurists often draw on 
the fact that the "prophet prescribed zakatut fiýr as 
a purification of the fasting from empty and obscene talk 
and as food for the needy"CAbu DýwuZd, vol-2. P-421). Hence, 
it is a token of thankfulness to God and a compensation 
for any deficiency in the fasting. Moreover, it shows 
sentiments of brotherhood and affection for the needy. 
Cal-Qaradaw7i, 1977, vol. 2. P. 922). 
107 
However, a thorough - scrutinization of zahatut 
fitr 
reveals its far-reaching benevolence implications. Its 
significance revolves around the concept of tazRiyah 
Cself-discipilne). It is claimed that the Qur'anic verse. 
"prosperous is he who performs tazkiyah"037,4). was 
revealed in connection with this form of zakýih 
Ccf. aLl-Qurtubl*, n. d. vol. 20. P. 21 ). 
ihough 
al-QurtubT has 
questioned the validity of this claim without questioning 
its essence, the 'zahýih-tazXiyah' relation is indeed 
irrefutable. Purification as an established wisdom Cor 
reason) behind zakatut 
, 
fitr is questionable; its 
acceptance poses the question whether enfants are in need 
of such purification. Three factors might account for the 
underlying benevolence significance of 2akatut fitr. 
Firstly, -the zEkah-base is broadened and. the amount due on 
every person is so meagre. The implication derived 
therefrom is that none is exempted from voluntary 
contributions towards the social good. Secondly, it 
educates Muslims Ceven children) to develop a sense of 
self-discipilne as an indispensable prerequisite for the 
positive manifestation of the norms of benevolence. 
Thirdly, its connection with fasting exhibits a subtle 
implication of benevolence. For the Muslim, fasting is an 
opportunity to feel the 'deprivation' often experienced by 
the needy, whereby he,, Ishe is self-stimulated to foster the 
happiness of others. Presumably, this explains why fasting 
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appeared as an alternative to spending for the fieedy in 
all forms of expiation mentioned in the Qur'an Ccf. 2-196, 
4.92; 5. e! g; 5.95 and 58.4). 
3.2.2. The Institution of sadagah 
The institution of sadagah constitutes the kernel of 
Islamic voluntarism. Lexically, the word qadagah is 
derived from the root qidq which denotes truthfulness, its 
reciprocal form fada(? a, means to befriend, its reflexive 
form, tasadaqa, means to trust one anotherCAnis, et al. 1970, 
vol. I. P. 510). Muslim jurists maintain that sadagah 
includes every form of righteous deed; nonetheless, in 
their analysis the term is restricted to voluntary 
contributions, as distinguished from divine duties such as 
zakah C cf. al-Kasani, n. d. vol. 2.; al-Qurtubi, n. d. vol. 13) 
However, other Jurists, like al-Maward! Cn. d.. ) allege that 
ýadaqah and zahah are indeed synonymous CP. 113). It is 
worth noting that the two concepts appear as synonyms 
three times in the Qur'anCcf. 9: 58.60,103). Nonetheless, the 
two concepts are not interchangeable; the relation between 
qadagah and zakah is a whole-part relation; zakah is only 
a subsection of sadaqah. deZayas C1970, P. 63) defines 
jadagah as "an attitude of mutual appreciation. an act of 
loyalty to God and to one fellow beings, a sense of true 
humanhood". 
Both in its etymological and Islamic connotation, 
qada(? ah is a witness to truthfulness, which eventuallY 
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equates the Muslim's heart-concealed belief with his or 
her revealed behaviour. The Qur'anic verse C2: 177-: ) insists 
that righteousness is attainable only when the person"s 
faith is revealed in positive acts of sadaqah. Ostensibly. 
this is the spirit of the ? ýadith, "qadagah is a proof Cof 
one's conviction. )". CMuslim, vol. l. P. Ie4). This perception 
of sadagah implies that benevolence is necessarily an 
operational concept as well as a philosophical principle. 
Unlike the western secular concept of charity. qadagah is 
not restricted to the norms of giving. qadaqah is rather a 
spontaneous benevolence which includes all formsrhelping 
others or fostering their happiness; hence, to translate 
it as charity or alms is incorrect. The prophet has said: 
"every act of goodness is sadagah" CMuslim, val. 2. P. 492. ). 
b 
Ass such, ' sadagah is broadened so that no Muslim feels Cor 
considers himself) exempted therefrom. This might explain 
the prophet's hadt7th that, "sadac7ah is incumbent, upon every 
Muslim, and whoever finds nothing to give, should do a 
good deed" (Bukhýri-, vol. 2. P. 300). By and large, sadaqah is 
an attitude of mind which instigates the person to promote 
the welfare of others, presumably as a spiritual-moral 
commi t ment. 
-adaqah is not confined to Muslim beneficiaries; 
universal brotherhood and cooperation necessitates that 
both conscious and unconscious beings are eligible 
for it. The non-Muslim who bears no malice to Muslims is 
eligible for the latter's benevolenceCQur'an. roO: e). Through 
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fadagah tho sonso of other 'boings is inculcated to the 
extent that Muslims are required not to discriminate 
, 
ýtadL th, between conscious and unconscious beings. In the 
"In every animal haying a liver fresh with life, th. ere is 
fadagah" CBukhari, vol. e. P. 253. Hence, sadagah is enjoined 
whenever a need for it arises, irrespective of who the 
beneficiary is. This psychological theory of sadaqah 
exhibits absolute benevolence. However, the dependents of 
the giver are more eligible to his. /her sadaqah than 
others. "Whatever you spend Cof wealth) is for parents and 
kindred and orphans, the destitute and for the wayfarer" 
CQur , an, 2: 215). In the hadLth reported by Abu Dawud 
Cvol. 2. P. 440) "and begins with those for whom you are 
responsible Cfor sustenance)'. i. e. in the dispersement, of 
qadagah. In another hadTth the prophet said, "sadagah to 
the non relative is mere sadaqah but to the relative is 
both qadagah and a link "CBkhari. vol. 2. P. 321). This is the 
essence of the often- quoted proverb sadagah beeins at 
home. The emphasis on 'relatives' does not negate absolute 
benevolence as might, prima fact&, appear to some. 
Firstly, the dependents of the giver are more eligible to 
his sadagah inasmuch as their sustenance is a divine-duty 
and hence takes precedence over voluntary acts towards 
others. Secondly, the giver who sustains his dependents 
and thereafter promotes others' happiness is likely to 
prevent societal cost such as rancor and hatred which 
would otherwise exterminate the family tiesý. 
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Can the act of qadagah be Islamically devoid of 
value? As a test of truthfulness, the subject-matter of 
-adagah ought to be of high marginal utility to the giver. 
d*O you who believe spend of the good things which you have 
earned,.... And seek not the bad Cwith intend) to spend 
thereof Cin sadaqah) when you would not take it for 
yourself save with disdain"CQrur 'an, 21267). Hence, any act of 
. ýadaqah the subject-matter of which is impure, unlawfully 
earned, or inferior to the giver, is devoid of value. 
Moreaver, the act itself ought to be above ostentation and 
dissimulation and cause no injury whatsoever to the 
recipient Ccf. 0-ur'an, 2: 262-264). Failure to avoid these 
reprehensible traits will eventually nullify the Islamic 
value of ýadaqah. However, the Qur'an enjoins both the 
disclosure and the concealment of qadagah, "If you disclose 
fadaqah, it is well, but if you conceal it and give it to 
the needy, it will be better for you"C2: 271). As al-OhazalE, 
Cn. d. vol. l. P. 205) asserts, the preferability of either 
disclosure or concealment Cof qadaqah) depends on the 
person's intention which varies according to the ruling 
circumstances. 
However, the institution of sadagah is beset with two 
catastrophic misconceptions. Firstly, the prophet has said 
"the upper hand is better than the lower hand, the upper 
hand being the one which bestows and the lower one which 
receives"CHuslim, vol. 2. P. 495). This ýxadtth. is often quoted 
vis A vis beggary Ccf. al-Qaradawi. 1977; Bablibli, ice2). 
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Nonetheless, it is maintained that, the giver is superior 
to the recipient. 'As if he is living an ý; adaqah' is a 
phrase often used as a figurative indication of disgrace. 
The positive act of giving is indeed better than the 
negative act of receiving inasmuch as benevolence is a 
paramount ethical value. However, the spirit of the 
Islamic legislation suggests that this is true if and only 
if the recipient would have been better off even without 
receiving sadagah. Therefore, the prophet's hadTth should 
be conceived only as an incitement to benevolence. Should 
it be understood to mean the superiority of the giverlitl'OU 
undermine the Islamic philosophy of benevolence. 
'th The second misconception is related to the ýtadt 
"verily ýadaqah is the offscouring of mankind and it is 
permitted not for Muhammad and the family of Muhammad" 
(Muslim, vol. 2. P. 5193. The majority of Muslim jurists are 
of the opinion that this hadLth covers both 2aPah and 
qadagah. However, after scrutinizing the different views, 
al-C2aradawi C1972, PP. 729-39) claims that the hadith was 
valid so long as tho prophet, was alive; that is, it had a 
special significance for the prophet and his family during 
his life time. al-KasaniCn. d. vol. 2. ) alleges that, as an 
offscouring of mankind, sadaqah is impure and God 
glorified the prophet and his family by allowing them not 
to receive itCP. 915). However the above hadith needs 
reexamination in the light of the fact that people are 
equal brethren and differ in their grades and closeness to 
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God according to taqwa. Firstly, the mere fact that God 
enjoins sadm7ah negates its impurity. Secondly, "qada(? ah 
is an offscouring of mankind" is simply a figurative 
expression. A dollar of qadagah might be an offscouring of 
the giver, but the dollar itself is not impure. Thirdly, 
the ; ýadTth implies that qadagah is a means of "need 
fulfilment' and not a means whereby a person is brought 
nearer to the prophet or his family. Had this been allowed, 
ý; adaqah would have been accumulated in the hands of 
spiritAial Leadors. and thus ceased to serve its purpose. 
3.2.3 The Institution of hibah 
A substantial amount of both tangible and intangible 
wealth is expected to flow unilaterally and voluntarily in 
the benevolence market through the institution of hibah. 
hibah is defined as "a contract whereby a person disposes. 
without consideration, of property belonging to him during 
his life time to an other person"CSabiq, 1985, vol. 3. P. 534)- 
hibah is, ipso facto, synonymous with gift inter vivos, a quid 
made with no conditional quo. CHowever, its broadest 
connotation is not confined only to the gift proper as 
will be mentioned later in this section). It might, prima 
facie. appear to some that hibah is synonymous with sadagah; 
the difference is, however, very subtle. Ibn Quddýmah 
Cd. 1222. n. d. 5, /6493 argues that the two concepts are 
distinguished according to their motivation; that is, 
while qadaqah is motivated by the approval of God, hibah 
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is- motivatod by rapprochement and mutual affection. This 
is a superficial difference inasmuch as all acts ought to 
be motivated by the approval of God. While 'need' is the 
eligibility criterion of receiving sadaqah, both the needy 
and the well-to-do are possible beneficiaries of hibah. 
Moreover, the spiritual weight of qadaqah outweighs that 
of hibah. The hibah Cgift inter vivos3 is meant to develop 
the spirit of brotherhood and to cement the bonds of 
social harmony and cooperation. In the hadLth, " give gifts 
to one another. for gifts take away rancor"CMishkat, vol-l- 
P. 646). 
hibah is subdivided into two forms, viz. hibatut 4ayn 
(gift of the substance) and hibatul manfa'ah Cgift of the 
usufruct). hibatvt 'ayn is not, always a quid without a pro 
quoCIbn Rushd, d. 1198,1981, vol. 2. P. 331); +-he expected quo is 
either in the form of the approval of God or remuneration 
from the recipient. According to some jurists, argued Ibn 
Rushd, a remuneration-related gift is devoid of value 
inasmuch as it resembles a speculative sale Ca contract 
involving uncertainty). Other jurists, like Imam Malik, 
maintain that a fair compensation for a gift received is 
a prevailing custom that becomes an acceptable, sociallY 
imposed condition. The denotative implication of this view 
is that hibahCgift inter vivos) is a sale contract rather 
than an act of benevolence, indeed a contract involving 
uncertainty. Presumably, failure to comply with this 
coercive compensation might cause severe societal cost to 
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the recipient. It is true that "the prophet used to accept 
a gift and to give a compensation for it"CAbu Dawud. vol. 2. 
P. 1004). This had7th signifies that the prophet taught 
voluntary gi ft exc hange it does not presuppose 
reciprocity as a necessary condition in gift exchange. 
Moreover, giving with an expectation of reward is utterly 
forbidden, "and bestow not favours, seeking greater benefit" 
CQur'an, 74: 6-). By and large, gift exchange is a paramount 
social virtue, its raison d'6tre is to strengthen the 
bonds of social relation between members of the society as 
well as to serve as a tool of voluntary distribution of 
weal th. 
Another form of hibat-ut 'ayn is the institution of 
uýasiyyah Cbequest); a genuine quid without a pro quo, often 
misconceived as a mere mechanism whereby the decedent's 
wealth is disposed. "it is prescribed for you, when death 
approaches one of you, if he leave wealth, that he bequeath 
unto parents and near relatives in accordance with 
justice; a duty incumbent upon the God-conscious"CQwlan. 
2: 180). Muslim Jurists define wo-qiyyah as "a gift, made bY 
a person to another of a substance, a debt or a usufruct, 
in such a way that the beneficiary shall take possession 
of the gift after the death of the testator "C Sabi q, 1995. 
Vol-3. P. 584). This definition raises the question whether 
the bequest of the usufruct is Islamically acceptable. 
Some jurists reject the wa; -, iyyah of the usufr, uct, arguing 
that the decedent no longer owns the substance, hence he 
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or aho haQ no right, to bQquoath what ir. virtually ownod by 
othersCthe heirs. ) CIbn Rushd, 1Q81. vol. 2. P. 335)- Indeed, 
this view has some elements of truth in it; the bequest of 
the usufruct causes serious ambiguity regarding ownership; 
the substance is owned by one person while its usufruct is 
owned by another 
5. 
Two conditions are imposed on wa-qiy_yah in order not 
to violate the rules of al"adICfairness, -Ijustice). Firstly, 
the beneficiaries are necessarily non-heirs; wasiyyah to a 
would-be heir is utterly void according to a )ýadith of the 
prophet Ccf. Bukhari, vol. 4. P. 6). Secondly, on the 
authority of an other JýadTth the bequest shall not exceed 
one-third of the estateCcf. Bukh3rT, vol. 4. P. 3). It is said 
that this condition is valid so long as there is a legal 
heir. Cal -0-urtubT, n. d. vol. 2. P. 261; Ibn Rushd, 1991. vol. 2. 
P-336). Motivated by the sense of benevolence, waqiyyah 
should satisfy the rules of aPadL. Through wa_qtyyah, the 
testator is attempting to foster the welfare of others 
Cnon-heirs), with no ulterior motive(s) other than the 
approval of God. But the latter requires commitment to the 
rules of aL1adLCcf. Qur'an, 4: 12-14). However, the decedent's 
wealth belongs, jure divino. to the legal heirs. Virtually, 
5 To avoid possible misunderstanding, this view is herein 
considered valid so long as the recipient has a property 
right over the usufruct with no legal ownership whatsoever 
an the substance. However, the gift of the usufruct is 
irreproachable if the recipient's possession of the 
usufruct is terminable ie. valid only for a specified 
period of time. * 
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the testator's act of benevolence should not be at the 
expense of the would-be heirs, "And let those who, if they 
leave behind them feeble offspring, would be afraid for 
them, be wary. Let them hence fear God and speak [in 
waseiyyahl with conscientious justness"CQurIan, 4: 9_). The 
prophet expresses the spirit of this verse in a stylistic 
hadith which awakens- both the individual's sense of 
benevolence and his or her commitment to at'adt. "To leave 
your heirs rich is far better than leaving them poor 
begging the people"CAbu Dawud, vol. 2. P. 1004). 
Two forms of unilateral transfer of the usufruct are 
worth mentioning, viz, "Exriyyah Cgratuitous loan), and (7arl 
ýtasanCinterest-free loan). tZiriyyah is generally perceived 
as a contract whereby a person hands over to another 
person without consideration, a non-consumable item for 
the latter's use during a specific time. or for a specific 
purpose, to be returned after use CSabiq, 1Q9S, vol. 3. PP. 
293-40). More specifically, "Eirtyy(2h is a terminable grant 
of the usufruct of a productive asset to a needy person. 
Its cooperative denotation could be deduced from the 
Qur , anic verse, "Help each other in righteousness and 
God-consciousness" C5: 2). However. the Qurlanic verses 
C107: 5-7) emphatically warn Muslims against refusing to 
grant the usufruct of their assets to the needy 
Cal-QurtubT n. d. vol. W-P. 214). 'Zirtyyah is arecommended 
voluntary initiative; nevertheless, it is mandatory 
whenever the need of others become urgent. 
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"ariyN, ah might appear to some as a form of granting 
the surplus, and its underlying benevolence assumption is, 
ipso facto, disputable. Recall that, giving out of the 
desired most is the sine qua non of the Islamic 
bonevolence. This maxim distinguishes between lariyyah and 
the granting of the surplus. In the words of Zarqa C1989, 
P. 185. ), the marginal utility of "artyyah is substantial for 
the donor, while the utililty of the surplus for the grantor 
is negligible. Therefore, "Eriyyah involves a much larger 
transfer of real income. Another benevolence-related 
problem is whether the recipient is liable to any damage 
or loss caused to the borrowed object. Muslim jurists are 
not unanimous as to this matter, presumably because of the 
conflict in the reported (xýxad7th. At one pole we find the 
týadith that "there is no compensation [for "iiriy: ýPahl on 
the donee" CAbu D3wud. vol. 2. P. 100! @: ). At the other pole, we 
encounter the hadtth that "Zxriyyah is "a loan with a 
guarantee of its return" CAbu Dawud, P. 1010). The first 
not MaShhA J had-Lth is _r Cf aMOUS. ) according to the majority 
of jurists who therefore hold that a fair compensation 
should be paid for any loss or damage. caused to the object 
borrowed. CIbn Rushd, IQ8I, PP. 313-14: ). However. this view 
Jeopardizes the whole philosophy of Islamic benevolence. 
In fact the a, ýZid-Lth mentioned are not irreconcilable. In 
accordance with the principle of al"adl, the payment of a 
fair compensation is i, mperative if it is proved that the 
object is lost or damaged by the recipient intentionally 
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Cnote the difficulties facing this condition). In normal 
circumstances, the principle of at'adt and the principle 
of benevolence motivate the donor to remit any claims as 
they equally motivate the donee to pay a fair 
compensation. Put the two arguments together, the more 
benevolent the donor, the higher the probability of 
remission, and the more benevolent the donee the higher 
the probability of compensation. 
The second form of granting the usufruct is what is 
referred to as gard hasan Cinterest-free loan3. gard has-an 
is a contract whereby wealth Cparticularly money) flowss 
unilaterally and voluntarily from one person Cthe lender) 
to another Cthe borrower), on condition that the latter 
agrees to repayCprovided he has the? ability). CSabiq. vol. S. 
P. 144). Muslims are enjoined to provide interest-free 
loans to the needy; in Qur'anic phraseology, gard hasan is 
regarded as a loan advantageous to C-odC2: 245; 64: 17). 
Savers who might worry about their future welfare should 
they grant their savings to the needy in the way of 
qctdaqah could, through (? ard ý%asan, satisfy their 
benevolence impulses while not jeopardizing their future 
welfare. Hence. (? arq týasan exhibits a twofold benevolence 
act; the act of providing the needy with the necessary 
loans and the act of forgoing the opportunity cost of 
their savings Ctheir profit-share). The donor expects no 
remuneration from the donee; nonetheless, the loan is 
profitable and lucrative; in Quranic phraseology, God 
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will multiply theksao loanra manifcdd C2- 246; FS4: 17. ). 1n +- h- 
hadTLth of the prophet "if anyone removes his brother's 
anxiety, God will remove from him one of the anxieties of 
the Day of Judgment"CAbu D. 7--ýwud, vol. 3. P. i3763. By and 
large, gard hasan, as an act of benevolence, is of vital 
socio-economic significance for both the lender and the 
borrower. 
Generally speaking, there are three moral principles 
governing the modus oporandi of qarq iýasan. Firstly. due 
to the adverse effect of being in debt, interest-f ree 
loans are allocated on the basis of genuine need. To many 
Muslim economists, notably MannanCI! 980) and ChapraCIID85), 
qa. rd hasan is viable and effective only in the provision 
of consumption loans. Only the barest psychological needs, 
argues Mannan CP. 263), are to be financed through garq 
iýasan. Such a naivety narrows both the concept of need and 
the concept of benevolence; human needs change through 
time, and the possibility of interest-free loans could not 
be eliminated so long as the assumption of benevolence is 
not relaxed. Secondly. debts should be written down in 
accordance with the Qur'anic verse, "when you deal with 
each other in contracting a debt for a fixed time, write 
it down. Let him who owes the debt dictate" C2: 292). This 
procedure is said to be effective in avoiding any disputes 
regarding the rights and the obligations of the lender and 
the borrower respectively. Cal-Qurtubl, n. d. vol. S. P. 393). 
The far-reaching implication of the debt document is to 
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safeguard the rights of the heirs. Thirdly, given the 
borrower's ability, the repayment of the principal loan is 
an imperative moral responsibility. "The wealthier's 
procrastination (in debt repayment] is unjustice"CBulehari, 
vol. 3. P. 343). The principal loan could be guaranteed 
against risk of default, however, the lender enjoys no 
guarantee whatsoever on the market value Cor the 
purchasing power) of the loan Any stipulated or demanded 
excess over and above the principal, is indist-inguishable 
from interest and hence prohibited CAbbas. 1997, PP. 66-67. 
However, the borrower is allowed to express his 
benevolence impulses by repaying in excess; in t-he ýtadTth 
"the best among you is he who pays his debt. s in the most 
7 handsome manner " CBukhari, vol. 3.339. ). Should the debtor 
be in difficulty. the lender is morally required to behave 
in accordance with the Qur'anic verse, "If the debtor is in 
difficulty, grant him time till it is easy for him to 
repay. But if youCthe lender) remit it by the way of 
sadaqah, that is best for you if you only knew"C2: 280). 
6 Some Muslim economists suggest loan's indexation at least 
to maintain the latter's market value Ccf. Chapra, 1995, 
PP. 39-42). Some western economists, for instance, PryorC1985), 
questioned the possibility of interest free loans unless a 
fee system is devised. However. those who call for 
indexation or a fee system are rejecting the Islamic 
prohibition of interest as well as relaxing the assumption 
of benevol ence. 
7 This practice should be restrained to the minimum 
possible, because if it is allowed to be a socially-imposed 
custom. it would eventually resemble the predetermined 
interest. 
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3.2.4. The Institution of wagf 
Lexically, the term wag/ Cendowment) means to prevent. 
or restrain. Islamically, wa(? / connotes-the "the detention 
of a property Cwhose usufruct is exploitable without 
impairing it) and the complete dedication of its usufruct 
to a form Cor forms) of benevolence and voluntarism". (Abu 
Zahrah, 1972, P. 5). It is claimed Csh. Ency. of Istam. P. 626) 
that Muslims found Byzantine's endowments in the conquered 
lands and adopted the system for the practice of qada(? ah 
recommended by their religion. However, the system of Wa9f 
is as old as the Pharaonic periodCAbu ZaLhrah, 1972) and it 
was known to pre-Islamic Arabia, though it was motivated 
by ostentation and vainglory Cad-Dusuqi, d. I E322, 
n. d. vol. 4. P. 75). Islam is not credited with many economic 
institutions Cincluding wa9f). as it is indeed credited 
with rectifying and modifying their modus operandt and 
their underlying motivations. The first Islamic waq/ was 
instituted by "Umar ibn aLl-KhatabClater the second Caliph) 
who. in compliance with the prophet's recommendation. made 
a piece of land "inalienable Cnot to be sold. nor given 
away as a gift, nor inherited) and dedicated its usufruct 
to the needy, the relatives, those in bondage. in the way 
of God, for the wayfarer 'and for the entertainment of the 
guests" CBukharT, vol. 4. P. 27). 'Umar's philosophy of wa(? f 
forrhs the solid basis for the jurists' deduction that 
waqf property is virtually perpetual, inalienable, and 
irrevocable. 
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Generally speaking, waqf is either aht-z, in the 
interest of one's own family and descendants. or -khayr? -, 
designated for general benevolence purposes. However, this 
distinction is not peculiar to waqf; recall that sadaqah 
is for one's own family as well as for the needy at large. 
Principally, these forms of waqf constitute a perpetual 
manifestation of qadaqah. History witnessed many attempts 
to dissuade waqf aht-1 from its spirit of benevolence; 
that is, some waqf properties were meant to disinherit 
women and/or to avoid property seizure (cf. Abu 
Zahrah, 1972, PP. 9,19-22). Nonetheless, one could hardly 
agree with Williams C1987, P. 338) and MintjesCI977, P. 30) 
that waqf ahtT has been deliberately instituted to avoid 
the laws of inheritance and. /or to avoid property seizure. 
Nor should one accept Anderson's C195I. P. 292) claim that 
waqf ahtT exhibits no beneficence or (? urba Capproach, to 
God). In accordance with Islamic ethics, any act which 
transgresses the divine laws and. -'or violates the rules of 
at"adtp isa not only ab initio void but alsao -c;, qually 
reprehensible. Property seizure or confiscation is without 
doubt a severe infringement upon the jure divino rights of 
private property, except where the property in question has 
a been earned through unjustifiable practices Ironically, 
This is not to claim that confiscation of private 
property for the public good is reprehensible. However in 
this particular case the payment of fair compensation is 
imperative. 
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wa(gl/ ahL7 hasa boon aubjoctod to many 'attempts of 
non-compensation property seizure. Ccf. Abu Zahrah, 1972, PP. 
9 
The fact that waqf ahI7 has been misused by some 
donors or infringed upon by some rulers, consciously or 
unconsciously motivated by their greed, does not detract 
from the venerability of the institution. waqf khayrt has 
been tremendously effective in the provision of public 
goods at a zero market price, as well as in fostering the 
welfare of the needy Cboth conscious and unconscious 
bei ngs). as -Si ba C 1982. PP. 121 -128) mentioned thirty 
fascinating examples of public utilities financed by waqf. 
Notable among these utilities are mosques, schools, 
hospitals, asylums, feeding and curing stray animals, 
marrying off the needy. financing infrastructure, and 
assisting indigent- mothers. Some of these arrangements 
still survive but many are disappearing. 
What are the peculiarities of wag/ that make it a 
most venerable institution ? waqf exhibits a far-reaching 
spiritual -economic significance for the donor(s) as well 
as for the donee(s). In the )ýadith of the prophet. "when a 
person dies, his Espirituality-generating] deeds terminate 
except, a perpetual fýadaqah, or Ittm [intellectual work] 
9 Note that Ahmad C1987. PP. 139-40) attempted to scrutinize 
the legal -historical polemic of waqf seizure. He concluded 
that the snatched wa9f lands, originally conquered lands. 
belonged to Bayt at-HaL Ci. 9. state-owned). Though this 
view might justify the confiscation of waqh ahtz.. it can 
hardly justify the confiscation of waqf khayri inasmuch as 
the latter becomes effectively a public property. 
125 
wh9rLnfrom benefit is acquired, or a pious child who prays 
f or hi m"C Abu D-awud. vol . 2. P. 812). Musl im jurists are 
unanimous that the perpetual sadaqah is synonymous to 
wag/. However, this hacITth has not been given the scrutiny 
it deserves. The spirit of waqf is there in the beneficial 
"itm, in the pious child, as it is indeed in the perpetual 
fadaqah. Note the assumption that while the benevolent 
expects no reward from the donee, nevertheless his or her 
spiritual aspiration Cthe approval of God) is undeniable. 
The donor generates a perpetual thawab Creward in the life 
to c ome) from these deeds and hence a perpetual 
contribution to his spiritual progress. wag/ generates a 
perpetual, unilateral flow of wealth to the beneficiaries. 
Unlike qadagah Cinter vivos. ) the flow of unilateral wealth 
from waqf is not terminable by the death or the inability 
of the donor. Cad-DihlawT, 1933.2/1115). In other words, 
should the donor institute a waqf. the flow of unilateral 
wealth to the needy will be relatively immune from any 
uncertainty arising from the former's death or inability. 
However, those who fail to grasp the spirit of waqf. 
misconceivedly inveigh against it. It is alleged that wa9f 
implies the removal of a large , part of wealth from 
industry and commerce to lie moribund under the "dead 
hand'. Moreover, wa(? f is said to be characterized by a lack 
of incentives for its proper devel opmentCcf. Anderson, 1951, 
PP. 297-298). The claim that waqf property is necessarily 
idle, is devoid of any support. waqif is, ipso facto, 
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produativo, and its furthor dovelopmon+- is- nocossaLry to 
ensure a perpetual thawýxb Cto the founderD and a perpetual 
flow of wealth Cto the beneficiaries. ). With the exception 
of a naive Maliki view, the majority of Muslim jurists T 
maintain that unproductive u)aqf should be substituted for 
a more productive one. CAbu Zahrah, 1972, PP. 154-57). In 
other words, the perpetual, thawab and the perpetual flow 
of usufruct is incompatible with the'lack of incentives to 
develop the wagf. It is true that waqf 'properties have 
been mismanaged: this is hardly ascribed to the lack of 
incentives, as it is indeed ascribed to their ambiguous 
10 form of ownership However, if any institution is to be 
described as "bad' or ineffective because it happens to 
have been mismanaged, few institutions woul d, have 
survived. 
Vickrey C1962. P. 553 alleges that endowments maLy have 
a depressing effect on the economy; they may reduce the 
level of expenditure of the donor or those who would have 
been his beneficiaries in the absence of the endowments, 
and hence reduce the economy's expenditure at the macro 
level. However, Vickrey's worrying is unjustified inasmuch 
10 Muslim Jurists are not unanimous as to the legal 
ownership of wagf. According to the Hanaf! and the Shafi'! 
school, wa(? f is the sole property of C-od. Cnote the naivety 
of this view). The Malik'! hold the view that wac? f remains 
the possession of the founder or his heirs, but they are 
blocked from the usual rights of ownership. waqf is ttle 
sole property of beneficiaries according to the Hanbali 
school. Ccf. Abu Zahrah. 1971, PP. 89-92). Ironically, the 
mismanaged waqf in the contemporary Muslim world is owned 
by the state. 
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as this reduction is at least compensated by the increase 
in the expenditure of the beneficiaries. Moreover, the 
improvement in the needy's level of living is likely to 
increase the effective demand, thereby stimulating the 
level of investment and production in the economy. 
Presumably, because. in western societies, life estate and 
discretionary trusts are means of avoiding estate or death 
dut. i es, and because charitable institutions enjoy a 
considerable tax exemption CHockley, 1079, PP. 251-255), 
western economists inveigh against endowments mainly 
because they are likely to cause a substantial reduction 
in -the inland revenue. However, this western perception of 
endowments does not necessarily fit in the Islamic concept 
of wagf. Since waqf is not exempted from the payment of 
zalo72hll . it follows that it is not exempt from any 
government-imposed tax. 
By and large, the venerability and viability of waqf 
stem,. from its crystalizing of the spirit of sadaqah. Due 
to methodological inconsistency, v)aq/ has been 
misconceived and thereafter widely misused. It is worth 
noting that waqf is generally governed by the divine 
imperatives regarding qadaqah, yet its modus operandi is a 
product of the jurists' intellectual reasoning, hence. it 
All forms of waqf ShL7 Cfamily endowments) are subject to zakah; waqf )ý. Layri is said to be exempt from zah; Jý so long as it fosters the welfare of the needy Cibn Quddamah 
. n. d. vol-2. P-e333- As long as ulaqf is for the needy in 
-general, and zahýxh is meant for need fulfilment, it seems that paying 2aPýxh on Waqf is the same as paying zahýh to 
one's own self. 
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ca, njoysa no saanation and can be modified without distorting 
the spirit of sadagah. The classical problem of waqf is 
ambiguity as to its ownership which could be resolved by 
transferning the legal ownership to a group of trustees 
representing both the founder(s) and the beneficiaries. 
The suggested procedure will secure the productive 
capacity of waqf and thereby safeguard the interest of the 
founder and the beneficiaries. Appropriate measures and 
directives are to be issued by the state to ensure the 
efficiency of waqf. The state should also reserve the 
right to interfere in waqf if the latter does affect the 
social good. 
3.3 The Econoyvdcs of Unilateral Transfers 
To start with, we should clarify Buchanan's CV983) 
thesis that non compensated transfers Cincluding all 
unilateral transfers) are rents to the recipients, and are 
likely to motivate rent-seeking behaviour which would 
eventually dissipates economic valueCP. 71). Such behaviour 
is socially ineffective inasmuch as it creates no value 
while utilizing scarce resources CP. 83). Buchanan's thesis 
goes as follows: Suppose that it is widely known that a 
potential donor plans to make a substantial gift to 
unidentified beneficiaries. A rent-seeking competition 
will arise among those who place a positive value on the 
prospect of being among the recipient group. However, a 
substantial portion of the investment of effort, time and 
resources, in this activity will be socially ineffective 
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and wasteful. The higher the probability of being a 
recipient. the lower the rent-seeking investment and hence 
the lower the social waste. In accordance with Buchanan's 
thesis, unilateral transfers to non-relatives or to the 
needy in general. where the number of potential recipients 
is great. are economically ineffective and socially 
wasteful. 
Buchanan's thesis is not necessarily applicable to 
the Islamic concept of voluntarism inasmuch as the thesis 
relies. implicitly. on three invalid suppositions. Firstly, 
the subjective claim that onLy compensated transfers are 
economically and socially effective, implies a relaxation 
of the assumption of benevolence. Given Buchanan's view, 
it follows that bribes, as compensat: ed transfers, reflect 
minimal resource wastage compared to that of gifts for 
instance. CPresumably. bribes are resource-wasting only if 
they are regarded as morally and legally inappropriate). 
Secondly, in Buchanan's perception, the recipients of 
unilateral transfers are, ipso facto, gamblers. Thirdly, 
the donors are assumed to launch a pre-gift publicity. Any 
society accepting these three suppositions is likely to be 
beset with Buchanan's thesis. The Islamic "benevolence' 
market' is beyond this thesis because its ethical norms 
categorically reject Buchanan's presuppositions. 
Islam's ultimate aim of unilateral transfers is to 
foster the needy's welfare Cboth material and spiritual). 
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Tho objoctivo of chap ý2tn__a T*ah, according to ash-Sh_tib17Cd. 1: 3Q0, 
1969), is the promotion of the welfare of the people by 
safeguarding their faith, life, intellect, posterity and 
property Cvol. 2. P. 5). Any distortion caused to one Car 
moreD of these fundamentals is likely to affect the 
material and the spiritual well-being of the individual. 
The individual's welfare, argued ChapraCV079), may be 
realized if there is proper enrichment for a fuller 
realization of Islamic spiritual values Cin the individual 
as well as in the society). and adequate fulfilment of all 
basic material needs of life. CP. e3. Muslim jurists are not 
unanimous as to the exact limits of needs' fulfilment, 
however, many jurists espouse the view that needs should 
be fulfilled to the adequacy level CIbn Hazm, d. 1064. n. d. 
vol. 6. PP. 155-55; al-QaradawT. 1972, PP. 5t37-71). Some Muslim 
economists Ceg. Chapra, 1979 and Salamah, 19134) insist that 
it is the responsibility of the -state to ensure the 
adequacy level of welfare to each individual. This view is 
philosophically inconclusive. Without the individual's 
initiative the state could hardly foster the welfare of 
society. The state cannot escape reliance on taxation. and 
borrowing if the assumption of benevolence is relaxed. 
However, taxation will prove ineffective because of the 
high probability. of tax evasion, tax avoidance and free 
lal 
12 
riding Since interest on loans is not-, allowed and 
non-profitable public goods cannot, be financed through 
prof it -s har i ng, borrowing Will be ineffective - as 
interest-free loans will diminish with the relaxation of 
the individual's initiative. 
What is the most effective form whereby unilateral 
wealth is efficiently transferred from the haves to the 
have-nots? This is the perplexing question of efficiency; 
the 'in money' versus "in kind' distribution. Liberal 
economists espouse money transfers on the grounds that, 
they maximize the recipient's freedom of choice and 
constrain the dictatorship of the giver. (cf. Hochman and 
Rodger s *. 16693.1 n other words, money transfers are 
efficient from the recipient view point. The 
functionalists. argues CulyerC10733, who visualize 
unilateral - transfers from the giver's point of view, 
propose that any form of transfers is efficient should it 
most effectively enable the , giver to reveal his/her 
altruistic impulses. Note that the Liberals presume the 
rationality of the recipient whereas the functionalists" 
12 Is there a free-rider problem even under the assumption 
of benevolence? While NaqviC1988) insists that free-riders 
Will not disappear, Mannan(i989) calls for the 
minimization of such behaviour. Since there is no free 
ride to heaven, there is no temptation to avoid unilateral 
transfers as long as the latter are bonds of the approval 
of God. Ina*n ideal society where all individuals are 
, 
God-conscious, free riding, which is negatively related to 
commitment, will eventually disappear. Put -it this way, in 
a fullY-fledged Islamic society. the free-rider problem 
will not die away, however, it will be of a negligible 
effect. 
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-vi OW raxhi bi tSa disguised sol f -interest. SSU nC9, 
Islamically speaking, transfers are initially meant to 
uplift the recipients, it fbllows that the utility of the 
result Cnot the utility of the act. 3 ought to be 
considered. This, inter alia, gives rise to the basic need 
approach whose objective is to provide opportunities for 
the full physical, mental and social development of the 
individual. Siddiqi C1998). highly influenced by this 
approach, favours transfers in kind inasmuch as it raises 
the efficiency and the productivity of the labour force, 
increases social production, raising the income-generating 
capacity of the poor. thus decreasing the need for income 
transfers. 
However. the recipients" rationality is not always 
guaranteed. Johnson C1973. P. 87: ) observes that despite the 
precautionary measures taken on food stamps issued to the 
poor inU. S. the poor of ten sol d thei r stamps to 
non-recipients and used the money for unqualified 
purposes. "consumers are not always efficient optimizerst 
especially concerning nutrition and health ...... Additional 
cash income is sometimes spent on food of lower 
nutritional value ...... or on items other than food. " 
CStreeten, 1979, P. 137. ). MannanCiQ89) develops a fascinating 
proposal by virtue of which the giver evaluates the 
alternative forms of allocation and chooses the one that 
yields a maximum result-utility. This view is acceptable: 
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the giver's evaluation does not really affect the 
recipient's decision provided that the latter is not 
ir. rat tonaLCinsane, simple-minded or feeble-mined). However, 
if the recipients are irrational or not capable of 
choosing the best course of action, according to the rules 
of at'adt, their freedom of choice should be circumscribed 
in their own interesJ3. By and large, the efficiency of 
unilateral transfers Cwhether in kind or in money) are to 
be Judged by their ultimate contribution to the welfare of 
the needy. 
Unilateral transfers raise an ethico-economic dispute, 
viz. the viability and efficiency of "person-to-person' 
vis A vis 'institution-to-person' distribution. Could 
zahah collection form a relevant frame of reference for 
all forms of unilateral transfers? Since its introduction, 
zakýh had been centrally collected and distributed. This 
practice exhibits the responsibility of the stato for the 
management and control of oakah fund. However, in the 
course of time the state responsibility for zakah was 
discontinued and it 'was Cand still i S. ) , generally 
speaking, left to the individual conscience. However, the 
donors have to choose between two possible types of 
distribution, that is, direct transfers to the recipients 
13 1 derived this opinion from the spirit of the Qur'anic 
verse "And give not- the feeble-minded [personslyour wealth 
which God has made a means of support for you, but feed 
and clothe them therewith and speak to them words of kindness and justice. "C4: 5) 
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or indiroat, tranofqarsa through an intormodiaLry imatitution. 
SiddiqiCIG89) alleges that person-to-person transfer is 
ineffective in modern time due to the lack of direct 
contact especially in urban societies. According to 
Siddiqi, , it is comparatively easy for the needy to 
approach an intermediary institution. CPresumably, Siddiqi 
does not mean that the person-to-person transfer might 
displease the needy and. /or the giver -a view once held 
might imply a derogatory view of unilateral transfers). 
However, direct transfers crystalize the deep meaning of 
brotherhood. cooperation and social integration which the 
intermediary institutions could hardly achieve. 
Institutions have their own problems and demerits; 
political and social upheavals, the subjectivity in funds 
allocation. the costs of running the institution, .... etc. 
By and large, both direct 'and indirect transfers serve the 
social good very effectively in some situations. but are 
inappropriate in some others; in other words, 'they must 
necessarily co-exist. 
The Islamic emphasis on unilateral transfers -shows 
that every Muslim is morally responsible for the welfare 
of the needy, but it does not indicate that Islam 
tolerates or encourages qadagah-seeking behaviour. 
Fostering one's own welfare is an uncompromised moral 
imperative, and it is indeed a necessary prerequisite for 
a benevolent attitude towards others. In the ýxa(27th, "One 
would rather cut and carry a bundle of wood on his back 
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than ask somebody who may or may not give him" CSukhari, 
vol. S. P. 1633. Begging is not- only a disgrace but also 
reprehensible. nonetheless, it is 'obligatory' if, without 
it, the person is likely to jeopardize one Cor more-) of 
the five, ýbasic objectives , of sharýL"ah Cthat is, the 
maintenance of faith. life. intellect, posterity and 
property). In the hadýth, "A beggar has a right though he 
may be riding a horse" CAbu Dawud, vol. 2. P. 437). In other 
words, given the derogatory nature of begging, the beggar 
is. ipso facto, in a state of dire need and ought not to 
be sent away empty-handed. It is the moral responsibility 
of the individuals to help and uplift those who have 
failed to foster their own happiness. In the ýacftth. "A 
Muslim is a brother to a Muslim, he neither oppresses him 
nor leaves hi'm helpless" CMuslim, vol. 4. P. 136. ). 
3.4 The Economics of the 'Fairness-Benevolence' Relation 
This section introduces the assumption of benevolence 
to reciprocal transfers; that is, exchange. Note that the 
assumption of egoistic human' motivation usually generates 
the 'devit-takes-the-hindmost' type of economy wherein the 
homo economicus si mply a ruthless maximizer. Islamically, 
the process of exchange is governed by the othico-economic 
framework; individuals stand firm on the norms of at"adt 
and benevolence and abhor egoistic motivation. Should 
these norms be ensured, 'exchange' will be determined and 
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COMP10tod undor thca umbrolla of laLwfulnogsa, truthfulricasar., 
trustingness, brotherhood and cooperation. This procedure 
helps to restrain such negative norms as profiteering, 
rent-seeking, deception, chicanery and fraudulent 
dealings, and misallocation of resources. Thus, in hisxher 
pursuit of a satisfactory 6ain, the homo Islamicus is. 
ipso facto, honest and fair; he or she does not make Cor 
attempt to make) the other party worse off. 
3.4.1. The Establishment of at'adt 
Islam lays unique emphasis on the quality of at'adt, 
absolute justice; in Qur'anic phraseology, the whole 
universe has been created in at'adt. and the sole purpose 
of all risalat Cdivine messages) is to ensure the 
establishment and the predominance of aPadtC15: e5; 57: 25)- 
It is quite natural to apply this principle to human 
activities. Thus, all human economic relations are 
necessarily governed by the ethical norms of at"adt. In 
addition to its ontological and cosmological connotations 
Cie. balance and harmony). aPadt also implies rendering 
to each what is his due. SiddiqiC1! 979. P. 42) asserts' that 
aPadl signifies the removal of . unjustified injury to 
others or to one's self. However, the concept of at'adt as 
an injury-free state is a three-dimensional concept; it 
encompasses the relation between the parties involved Cthe 
parties enjoy equal power when the contract is 
deterrýinedD, the relation between the parties and the rest 
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of society Cthe individual versus the social good), and 
the relation between the parties and God Cthe immutability 
of the ethical imperatives). 
However, the non-injury state is not self-explanatory. 
Provided that al'adl represents the minimum requirement of 
benevolence, economic conduct is assumed to be injury-free 
if and onl yifit sati sf i es the f 011 owi ng 
conditions. Firstly, it should be Islamically permissible, 
otherwise it will be devoid of value. Secondly, it should 
be free of all forms of 8harar. Gharar, means deception, 
and a gharar contract is the one that involves uncertainty 
and gambling CSabiq, 1985, vol, 2. P. M. This is a 
misspecification and a misrepresentation of the contract 
whereby one party is relatively immune from uncertainty, 
while the other party is not. Thirdly, given the above 
conditions, the parties involved should be mutually 
agreed, provided that they have equal power when the 
contract is determined. "0 you who believe, devour not 
your wealth among you in vanities, except it be commerce 
by mutual consent "C Qur'an, 4: 29). This verse emphatically 
enjoins the removal of fasad Cmischief) from all business 
contracts. The above conditions represent the basic 
determinants of the "fairness- benevolence" relation. In 
order to ensure that al'adt prevails, all impediments to 
its establishment must be removed. 
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: 3.4.2. Fair Markot Valuation 
Fair market valuation is indispensable if the economy 
is to function efficiently within the rules of at'adt- The 
Qur , an emphatically condemns the fraudulent use of unjust 
weights and measures, "Woe betide the skimpers, who exact 
full measure from other people, but give short measure and 
weight themselves"C83: 1D. Benevolence in business dealings 
demands, at the very least, proper valuations which ensure 
to each individual his or her due. "Give full measure and 
be not, one of those who measure short. Weigh with the true 
balance and do not under value other people's things, and 
do not go about causing mischief ". CQur'3n, 25: 182). This 
verse also illumin-aleSthe need for a proper medium of 
exchange without which fair exchange is simply impossible. 
No doubt, without fair valuations and symmetric business 
relations, each individual will act, fraudulently in an 
attempt to compensate for the loss incurred. However. the 
needy are the real victims of this unjust, system since 
they can hardly find equal opportunities to compensate. 
3.4.3 The Rejection of riba 
The basic ethico-economic example of removing an 
impediment towards at"adt is the rejection of riba. The 
Qur , an states, "0! you who believe, be God-conscious and 
give whatever remains of rib77. if you are indeed believers, 
yet if you desist you shall have your capital; neither 
wrong nor be wronged"C2: 275-279). The word ztba denotes 
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excess or addition, however, in Islamic shart'ah it has 
been used in a sense other than the lexical one; it deals 
with the ethics of business vis a vis loans, sales with 
deferred, prices, barter exchange and currency conversion. 
According to al-JassasCd. 991,1910. ) "It is known that riba 
of J72hitiyah [pre-Islamic era] was a loan with stipulated 
excess paid for time and God has prohibited it"CP. 4653. 
This form of riba is catted 'riba of the Qur , an', or '. riba 
in debt'. A careful reading of the Qur'anic tex. ts an riba, 
taking into account the pre-Islamic economic system. 
reveals that riba is characteristically indistinguishable 
from interest Cthe predetermined capital compensation3. 
C Abbas, 1987, P. 493. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to elaborate upon 
the socio-economic dimensions of riba. however. it is 
worth while, at this juncture, to identify the egoistic 
morality underlying the predetermination of capital 
14 
compensation xiba contracts involve eharar and hence 
infringe the ethical norm of at"adt. Regarding productive 
loans, the capital rentiers are risk-averters, striving to 
mako thomsolvor. immune from business uncertainty. while 
the capital users Centrepreneurs) are risk-bearers. Put in 
this way, in a riba contract, the renti er -entrepreneur 
relation is asymmetric. Regarding the riba-based 
14 For a-philosophical and thought -provoking study of the 
predetermination of capital compensation see AbbasC1987) 
especially ch. 1-2. 
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consumption loans, the rentiers are flourishing on the 
basi s of others" distress rather than benevolently 
relieving it. This is indeed egoism pax, excellence. Only 
the wealthier can weather the adversity of business 
misfortune, and so argued HishanCV972) "i t would be 
irrational for lenders to be willing to lend as much to 
the impecunious as to the rich members of society, or to 
lend the same amounts on the same terms to each"CP. 250). 
In the rentier's mentality honesty is not a panacea, and 
since perfect foresight is ontologically and 
epistemologically impossible. business finance requires 
that borrowers are perfectly honest and equally rich. 
Through this subtle selfishness, the bulk of finance would 
be spontaneously channeled towards the well-to-do. 
Consequently, wealth becomes a circuit between the rich 
among the p9opleCcf. Qur"an, QS: 7: ). 
The rejection of riba does not mean that Islam negates 
the mere fact of capital compensation; unlike other 
economic systems, Islam insists on the quality of the 
reward. Consumption loans are to be provided as unilateral 
transfers Crecall the Islamic concept of qarq ; ýasan). As 
far as productive loans are concerned, Islam lays a unique 
emphasis on symmetric relations-, since uncertainty is a 
business reality, to avoid eharar and to ensure at'adt, 
both the rentier and the entrepreneur ought to be risk 
bearers. This is the kernel of profit-sharing which relates 
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capital compensation to the actualities of production 
Through the profit-sharing mechanism, capital is 
spontaneously supplied to the most feasible and productive 
projects rather than being allocated on the basis of the 
entrepreneur's ability and wealth. 
In line with the Qur'anic rejection of '. riba in debt', 
the prophet has imposed certain restrictions on commodity 
exchange and currency conversion in an attempt to 
distinguish the conditions under whi ch they may 
effectively entail riba. In the týadtth, "Gold is to be 
paid for by gold, silver by silver. wheat by wheat, barley 
by barley, dates by dates. salt by salt, like for like and 
equal for equal, payment being hand in hand. If these 
classes differ, then sell as you wish if payment is made 
hand in hand". CMuslim. vol. 3. P. 9343. This had7th has been 
interpreted as an explicit rejection of the so-called 
qribý*t in oxcoss'Ccf. Ibn Rushd. vol. 2. PP. 120-333. Howover, 
no rational man is expected to participate in a 
spot-exchange of two commodities of the same kind, weight 
and value. Therefore, the ýLadtth mentioned is meaningful 
only if it is 'interpreted as referring to different 
amounts of the same kind of goods. Put it this way: the 
exchange of different amounts of the same kind of goods is 
prohibited. Furthermore, exchange of different commodities 
should be an the spot, otherwise it may implicitly 
15 For more elaborations on this point see ch. 5. infra. 
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generate an stipulated excess ., Cxtba: ) . In another 
hadt th, 
the prophet said, "Beware there can be an element of riba 
in credit" CMuslim. vol. 3. P. 839). Thus, the exchange of 
commodities on credit is allowed only if they are valued 
currently through a common denominator Cmoney3. 
As to the avoidance of riba in currency conversion, 
the prophet is reported to have said, "Let dinar be 
exchanged for dinar with no addition on either side, and 
dirham be exchanged for dirham with no addition on either 
side"C Muslim, vol. 3. P. 834). However, the spot exchange of 
one dinar for an equal dinar could hardly be conceived. 
al- GhazalTCn. d. ) argues that "the exchange of dirham for 
an equal dirham is allowed since it is a work that no 
rational man would desire, , nor could a merchant deal 
therein"Cvol. 4. P. E30. ). Again currency conversion is allowed 
if it is on the spot. So, although the exchange of equal 
amounts over time is not reprehensible in itself, it is 
prohibited because it will eventually lead to undesired 
transactions that cannot be monitored. 
By and large, the Qur'anic injunctions on 'rtba in 
excess" reflects the necessity of rejecting the advance 
fixation of capital compensation inasmuch as it impedes 
the establishment of at'adt. The exchange restrictions 
imposed by the prophet are meant to avoid 8haz-ar and all 
forms of concealed impediment to the establishment of 
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at"adt. This process necessitates +-he avoidance of barter 
Cvia the use, instead, of a proper medium of exchange), 
and the use of the spot currency conversion. 
3.4.4. The Prohibition of maysir 
The removal of market improprieties necessitates the 
rejection of maysiz- which includes all kinds of gambling 
and hazardous business dealings. "0 you who believe! 
Intoxication and maysir [gambling] ...... are an abomination 
of Satan's handiwork. Eschew such Cabomination) that you 
may prosper "CQur'an, 5:! @O). The essence of maysir is "the 
acquisition of another person's#. property while it is 
uncertain whether that person would get the fair 
recompense "CIbn Taymiyah, 1969,10G. /283). Business contracts 
should be non-injurious, that is. mutually agreeable and 
eharar-free. Adequate knowledge is. therefore, a necessary 
prerequisite for the establishment of at"adl. In addition 
to its violation of the ethical norm of at'adt, maysir is 
likely to cause enmity, jealousy and disputes in the market 
and this then affects its proper functioning. Cad-DihlawE. 
1933,2Z106). Such egoism would motivate the rent-seeking 
behaviour; individuals fraudulently accruing parasitical 
gains whithout creating or adding economic value. 
3.4.5. The Elindnation of Bribery 
Bribery, whether undisguised or concealed. is another 
impediment to al"adl and it cannot be justiýied on moral 
or socio-economic grounds. The Qur'an states, "And devour 
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not your w,;,. -klth among yourzolvoz unjustly, nor slip it, to 
the rulers to devour sinfully part of the people's wealth, 
while you knowC2: 1883. Efficiency in resource utilization 
demands perfect honesty on the part of the individuals. As 
Chapra C1979. P. 253 argues, this necessitates the complete 
elimination of all forms of corruption and bribery which 
are intended to gain an undue advantage in money, position, 
jobs or contracts. Recall Buchanan's CiGS33 claim that, 
bribes, as compensated transfers, reflect minimal resource 
wastage. Presumably, Buchanan visualizes bribery onty from 
the briber's point of view. However, bribery reflects many 
vices. Firstly, the briber reprehensibly violates the rules 
of fairplay. Secondly, the briber is selfish because as he 
or she fraudulently pays to have what would have been the 
share of others. Therefore. the act of bribery is 
injurious and likely to cause jealousy. hatred and rancor 
and thereby affects the social good. 
3.4.6. The Elimination of Hoarding 
Another form of removing impediments towards the 
establishment of al'adt is the elimination of hoarding. To 
avoid possible misunderstanding, we have to differentiate 
between two types of hoarding. viz. thtinaz and Q%tikar- 
The Qur'an states, "and those who hoard [making iktinaz I 
gold and silver, and spend it not in the way of God: 
announce unto them a grievous penal ty"CQ: 34). There is no 
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unanimity among Muslim jurists as to the exact connotation 
of the term iktinaz; while some understood the term to 
denote the non-payment of zakýih. others insist that it 
refers to the state of idle wealth CAl-QurtubE. n. d. vol. 8 
P. 125). Idle wealth has a far reaching negative effect on 
the economy; it depresses the level of expenditure in the 
economy, reduces the flow of capital and hence affects the 
level of investment and production. Because of gestation 
lag, the injection of capital into the economy does not 
lead to instantaneous growth, hence. argued AlhabshiCIG97), 
"hoarding for a period t, will not only stagnate the 
economy for the same period t, but, due to economic 
retrogression during the stagnation period, will stagnate 
the economy for an even longer period"CPP. 10-ilD. However, 
a lapse of time is needed before the retrogression is 
completely nullified. 
The two definitions of iktinaz are not irreconcilable. 
Idle wealth and the non-payment of zahah both affect the 
social good and violate the ethical principle of at'adt. A 
rational Muslim would not pay zahah while keeping his 
wealth idle, nor would he decline the payment of zakah 
whether his wealth is idle or not. So long as zahýh is an 
immutable duty whose payment is imperative, rationality 
requires that wealth must not be kept idle Cwhich becomes 
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necessary even to maintain the real value of wealth 
holdings). This subtle 2alqah-thtincez relation is the 
inherent, investment motivator in an Islamic economy. 
The second type of hoarding is Qttihar; withholding 
of goods speculatively. In the Jýadith, "only the misguided 
hoards " CAbu Dawud, vol. 2. P. Q80: ). The majority of jurists 
misconceivedly restrict the prohibition of iýittkar to the 
basic necessities of life such as foodgrains. Ccf. Sabiq, 
1985, vol. 3. P. 107). The jurists maintain that ihttkazl is 
prohibited only if the following conditions are satisfied. 
Firstly, the hoarder is a buyer, that is he is not the 
producer of the object hoarded. Secondly, the object 
hoarded is a foodgrain. Thirdly. the with-holding of the 
object is injurious to the consumers. CIbn Qudd3mah. n. d. 
vol. 4. P. 244.;! ý-abiq, 1-085, vol. 3. P. 107. ). However, the essence 
of thtih-ar is that it interrupts the process of fair 
exchange, thereby creating artificial scarcities and 
arbitrary manipulations of the markets. This is likely to 
happen irrespective of who hoards what. Hoarding of goods 
speculatively exhibits egoistic extremity; the hoarder 
causes deep distress to genuine consumers and 
parasitically extorts his or her earnings therefrom. This 
profiteering behaviour must be inhibited. 
3.4.7. Other Market Imperfections 
The prophet laid three ethical guidelines for fair 
exchangG. Firstly all forms of speculative dealings have 
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been rejected in an attempt to remove all kinds of market 
imperfections which impede the ethical norm of at"adl. 
For instance the prophet prohibited mulamasah Csale-at-a 
touch: ), munabazah Csale-at-a-toss3, muhhadarah Cthe sale of 
grain before their benefit is evident: ). mu, ýaqatah Cthe sale 
of wheat still in ears for pure wheat3. muzabanah Cthe sale 
of fresh dates for dried dates by measure3CBukhari, 3/2243. T 
I 
These contracts are prohibited mainly because of their 
indeterminacy and ambiguity; the subject-matter is not 
properly valued and one party is likely to be deceived. 
Thus all forms of speculative business dealings Cwhich 
involve eharar) should be removed. Secondly. the business 
contract is void unless the subject-matter is present and 
in complete possession of the seller. In the ý. adirth, "do 
not sell what you do not, possess"CAbu Dawud, vol. 2. P. IDQ5)- 
Thus bill of exchange sale is strictly prohibited; in 
this type of exchange the commodity is sold without full 
possession and the bill of exchange is then sold and 
circulate in the market without the commodity being moved 
to any buyer. There is an element of riba which cannot be 
monitored; selling the bills of exchange is simply selling 
money for money. Thereby speculators accrue fraudulent 
gains through artificial manipulations in the market and 
hence artificial rises in market prices. CNote that in this 
case market prices depend an artificial manipulations 
rather than on the market forces of supply and demand). 
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M-Urdly, pric,. aýr. mhould b%, dQt. Qrn-LinQd by thQ mark4; b+- 
forces with no intervention either in the supply or in the 
demand side. In the hadTth "Do not meet riders Ccarrying 
merchandise) to buy therefrom until they reach the market, 
you ought, not to bid against each other, and a town dweller 
must not sell for a desert dweller Cie. the former should 
not act as a broker to the latterl" CMuslim. vol. 3. P. 799). 
Many socio-economic implications could be drawn from this 
hadLth Firstly to avoid eharar and deception, buyers and 
sellers should have an a prioz-i knowledge of the market 
prices. Secondly, brokers are not allowed to intervene 
with the supply side of the market, causing artificial 
manipulations in the market price and hence accruing 
fraudulent and parasitical gains. Bidding against each 
other ought to be inhibited as an egoistic behaviour. 
Bidding with no intention to buy CnajcqhD is an artificial 
intervention in the demand side which usually affects the 
genuine consumer. 
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
Benevolence as a paramount ethical value has many 
socio-economic implications. The all -encompassing concept 
of benevolence has been used in the development of the 
'benevolence market' where each individual, rich or poor, 
is expected to contribute. Two forms of benevolence are 
likely to interact in this market. viz, uni lateral transfers 
intended to uplift the needy, and the establishment of the 
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ethical norm of aPadt in market exchange. Unilateral 
transfers not only foster the welfare of the needy, but 
also contribute to the spiritual progress of both the 
donors and the recipients. Exchange relations between 
individuals are based on at"adL. and all impediments 
thereto should be completely nullified. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONSUMER AND ENTREPRENEURIAL BEHAVIOUR 
ON THE ASSUMPTION OF BENEVOLENCE 
4.1. Overview 
The preceding analysisCch. 2.4.2: ) concludes that the hOMO 
lstamicuv typifies the Islamic economic agent if and only 
if he or she strives to promote others' welfare Cboth 
material and spiritual) besides his. -, her own. We should 
remember that benevolence is a sacrosanct ethical value in 
an Islamic economy. The following analysis endeavours to 
provide an insight into the behaviour of the homo 
Istamicus as a decision taker C consumer /producer). Section 
two is an essential coverage of the concept of economic 
rationality and its intertwined principle of maximization. 
Section throe is an exposition on consumer behaviour. 
Section f our is an elucidation on entrepreneurial 
behaviour. An attempt will be made in sections three and 
four respectively, to identify the homo Istamicus' 
consumption and entrepreneurial behaviour. 
4.2. Rationality and the Principle of Maximization 
Traditional economic theory postulates a homo 
oconomicus who, as a decision tak or C consumer ,, 'producer)* is 
assumed to behave rationally. Rationality is so pervasive 
that it is pertinent to determine its economic meaning 
before embarking on any discussion vis A vt, - the decision 
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taker. The term rationat, according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary. denotes "agreeable to reason; not absurd, 
preposterous. extravagant, foolish, fanciful, or alike; 
intelligent, sensible". The assumption of rationality is 
not peculiar to economics. but, argues SimonCiQ78, P. 53, is 
endemic, and even ubiquitous, throughout the social 
sciences. However, it seems that economists are taught to 
emphasise a specific form of rationality: Traditional 
economic theory conceptualizes rationality under certainty 
as a consistent maximization of a well-ordered preference 
function such as a utility or a profit maximization. 
CBecker. i962, P. i; Arrow, 1987, P. 71; Sen, 1987, P. 69). Thus the 
principle of maximization is one of the most fundamental 
assumptions of economic theory. So much so that it has 
almost come to be regarded as an equivalent to rational 
behaviour. To the classical economists. such as Smith 
C17763, rationality'had the limited meaning of preferring 
more to less; in modern tý-rminology, this is equivalent to 
profit maximization 
I 
Rati onal i ty, under certainty. could be seen as 
maximization in pursuit of self interest. It is one of 
the most fundamental characteristics of an individualistic 
Note that consumer rationality is a term coined by the 
marginalists, JevonsCi87i) and WalrasCD374); presumably, 
it was unknown to their classical counterparts. Consumer 
rationaliy., in its marginalist connotation, is identical 
to the maximization 'of utility under a budget constraint. 
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capitalistic economy that it is rationalized on the basis 
of rigorous calculation, directed with foresight and 
caution towards economic successC Weber, 1974, P. 763. In its 
utilitarian usage, economic success implies the making of 
money, for "Man is dominated by the making of money, by 
acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life" 
C Weber, 1974, P. 53. ). This instumental rationality recognizes 
no values save those which enhance the achievement of the 
proposed ends. Virtues are virtues only in so far as they 
contribute to self interest; "Honesty is useful because it 
assures credit; so are punctuality, industry, frugality, 
and that is the reason they are virtues "C Weber, 1074, P. 52). 
CUnnecessary surplus of these virtues thus appears as an 
unproductive waste). As SenC1987, P. 69) asserts, rational 
behaviour under the self interest approach is a special 
I 
caser rationality under the axiom of consistency. If a 
person does pursue self interest. his or her behaviour 
might have the consistency needed for the maximization of 
a cogent function. However, a person can be consistent 
without nocessarily maximizing solf intorest. 
4 
Economic rationality is based on the assumptions of 
omniscience Cperfect knowledge of what there is to be 
known3 and perfect competition. To use the words of 
ArrowC19973, rationality becomes strained and possibly 
even self-contradictory if these assumptions cease to 
hold. Though unrealistic, the assumption of an omniscient 
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homo oconomicua is crucial to the conventional economic 
theory. "His Chomo &conomicusl most fatal limitation, from 
the point of view of real-world applicability, is his 
omniscience"CHutchi son, 1984, PP. 2-33. Perfect competition 
2 is another loop hole in the concept of rationality . The 
indivisibility of goods, imperfect mobility of factors of 
production, advertisement, product di ff er enti al. and 
positive information cost, are practical impediments to 
perfect competition. Imperfect competition is thus "the 
permanent and ineradicable scandal of economic theory". 
C Si mon, 1979, P. 9). Unfortunately, a theory whose very 
assumptions are thoroughly unrealistic is used as a 
criterion of economic behaviour. It seems that economists 
are enamoured by abstraction and simplification; 
economists give no heed as to whether the assumptions are 
realistic,, let alone the applicability of the theories. 
"Rationality is seldom so definite, that one can be sure 
that the assumptions of any theory are closely met in 
practice" C Newman, 1965, P. 7). In reality, the assumption of 
2 The concept of perfect competition is based on four, 
unrealistic assumptions, Firstly. the anonymity of firms 
and consumers, ie. homogeneous commodities and identical 
consumers. Secondly, firms and consumers are numerous; no 
individual producer /consumer can effect the market price. 
Thirdly. perfect information, which, given the assumption 
of maximization, leads to the prevalence of a single 
price. This assumption implies zero information cost. 
Fourthly, free entry into and exit from the market, which 
implies an uýimpeded flow of resources between alternative 
occupations, that is. perfect factor mobility. 
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value neutrality is vacuous, yet, it is crucial to 
positive economics. Economists are, therefore, either 
plain utopians, in whose perception humans must behave 
symmetrical to their counterparts in the hypothetical 
society, or they are "reality-phobian". for reality is a 
stoz, m)petret whose introduction might open the pandora box 
of normative considerations which can not be monitored by 
the positivists. 
The notion of maximization interwoven with the concept 
of rationality is not applicable under the conditions of 
uncertainty or imperfect competition. As it has been 
conceived, rationality is incompatible with the limits of 
the human beings, even augmented with artificial aids 
CArrow. 1987). SimonCI955) suggests bounded rationality as 
an alternative to global and 'omniscient rationality. 
"Rationality [argues Simon, 19793 is bounded when it falls 
short of omniscience. And failures of omniscience are 
largely failures of knowing all the alternatives, 
uncertainty about relevant exogeneous events. and 
inability to calculate consequences "C P. 502) To help 
remove this difficulty, the maximization of subjective 
expected utility, put forward by Neumann and Morgenstern 
C1944), has been introduced as a criterion of rationality 
3 This bounded rationality leads to the emergence of 'satisficing' rather than 'maximizing" as a base for the 
managerial theories of the firm. 
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and come to dominzato the economic theory of resource 
allocation under uncertainty. In the words of Sen CiQ97. 
P. 723. the subjective expected utilityCSEU) takes the form 
of weighing the value of each of the outcomes by the 
respective probabilities of the different outcomes. The 
probability-weighted overall 'expected value', thus 
derived, is then maximized in this approach to rational 
choice under certainty. As Simon C1979, P. Q. ) asserts, the 
optimal solution provided by the SEU depends on all of 
the moments , of the frequency distribution of uncertain 
events. Empirically, when it has been subjected to test in 
the real-world, even in relatively simple situation. the 
behaviour of human subjects has generally departed widely 
from it. It is this total rejection of global rationality 
Cunder both certainty and uncertaintyD that explains why 
Simon C1947) suggests the replacement of the homo 
economicus by an organism of 
. 
limited knowledge and 
abilityCan organism of bounded rationality). 
Is rationality an objective concept? Is there such 
a thing as trans-cultural consistency-related rationality? 
Rationality demands more than just consistency, "It, must, 
at least, demand cogent relation between aims and 
objectives actually entertained by the person and the 
choices that the person makes "CSen, 11997, P. 733. Economists 
perceive rationality as a theory of means, not a theory of 
ends. In chosing between the alternatives. each individual' 
Ise 
can be rational in the sense that, given the expected 
costs and benefits, he will choose the course of action 
which guarantees the highest possible expected benefit. 
CWhynes, 1984, P. 1983. As people differ in their valuation 
of costs and benefits, rationality is neither universal 
nor objective; it is a value-loaded, subjective concept. 
Rationality is indeed a cultural concept, CWeber, 1! 9743. and 
rationality as maximisation. even if its assumptions hold, 
could be an ideal onty for a capitalistic society in which 
self interest is a sacrosanct ethical value. Thus economic 
systems of different paradigms could have different 
concepts of rationality. 
Islam does not reject the concept of rationality as a 
criterion for the individual's economic behaviour, rather 
it negates the western concept of rationality and its 
interwined assumptions. viz. egoistic human - motivation, 
the individual is the best judge upon his actions. CNote 
that the fundamental tenet of modern liberalism is that, 
human beings are to be regarded as indepencient, self 
determining beings, each the judge of his own actions; a 
corallary of this tenet, argues BellClOSI. P. 47). is that 
the rules regulating the relation between individuals are 
not at all moral I y-substanti ve: ) Unlike the utilitarian 
principle, the Islamic principle of at'adt specifies what 
is right, and within this ethical framework allows an 
individual to choose the most beneficial course of action. 
Moreover, the epistemology of Islam reveals the limitation 
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of human knowledge and emphasises the necessity of divine 
knowledge, hence man cannot be a judge of his actions, let' 
alone decide what is and what is not rational. Therefore, 
it is imperative that a new concept of rationality is 
deemed necessary. 
Muslim economists present some naive and inconclusive 
views as to what economic rationality is. According to 
Kahf C1978) and DuniaCI! 0943, economic rationality is the 
maximization of material and spiritual satisfaction within 
the Islamic ethical framework. Siddiqi CiQ7Q: ) argues that 
Islamic rationalityLiMPlieS orientation of actions towards 
maximal conformity with Islamic norms. Hayk al C 1093) 
proposes that man. Islamically perceived, is ipso facto 
rational in the sense that he is capable of choosing a 
course of action which is appropriate to his religious 
concept. of the good. However. to avoid methodological 
N 
inconsistency, economic rationality ought, to be analysed 
in the light of convictionat rationatity; the realization 
of man's purpose on the earth. Both the means and the 
objectives of any economic choice are subjected to the 
constraint of convictional rationality and ought to evoke 
those intrinsic positive values which help tranqu ilize the 
individual' s nafs. Therefore, means and ends are neither 
logically distinct nor morally neutral. CThis is a 
fundamental departure from the homo economicus who faces 
no constraints regarding the means: 1. The Ultimate 
objective of the Islamic rationality is the achievement of 
Ise 
al"adt Cequilibrium3. Hance. to agree with GSZhh-animC1Q8S: ), 
Islamic rationality is neither a positive nor a normative 
concept; rather it is objective inasmuch as the Islamic 
principles are objective because they motivate human 
behaviour towards the realization of at"adt. Gi ven 
convictional rationatity, the homo Istamicus' behaviour is 
rational if and only if it furthers his and others' 
material and spiritual satisfaction. By and large, by 
presuming egoistic human motivation, modern economic 
theory axiomizes the rationality of the agent; that is 
maximization. Islamic ethics, on the other hand. insists 
on adding the rationality of behaviour as an -indispensiLble 
element. 
4.3. Consumer Behaviour 
4.3.1. The Neoclassical Consumer's Behaviour 
The neoclassical consumer theory is based on the 
libertarian norms of hedonism. rationalism. individualism 
and freedom. Given these norms, the consumer Cie. households 
and unattached individuals3 is said to be rational in the 
sense that he or she maximizes utility or satisfaction. 
Again we have to learn to walk before we? can run, and 
attempt, initially, to determine the meaning of utility. 
In the words of RobinsonCIG83), "Utility is a metaphysical 
concept of impregnable circularity; utility is the quality 
of commodities that makes individuals want to buy thein, 
and the fact that individuals want to buy commodities 
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shows that they have utility"CP. 483. For the purpose of 
economic analysis, utility has been defined as the 
satisfaction or benefits derived by a person from the 
consumption of wealth. Nevin CI! 978, P. 433, however, argues 
that satisfaction and benefits are introspective terms 
relating to inner sentiments or emotions and not to a 
thing having an objective, physical existence. Others 
assert that "utility is a want-satisfying power; it is 
some property common to all commodities wanted by a 
person. In this sense it resides in the mind of the 
consumer who knows it by i ntrospecti on"C Watson and 
Getz, 199i. P. 763. Being a product of one's own feelings and 
thought, can one venture to claim that. given libertarian 
norms, utility is simply egoistic? BellCiGBI. P. 79) 
perspicuously maintains that utility implies egoism and 
self interest. Others. like Rothenberg C1965) emphatically 
reject the claim and insist that utility maximization does 
not imply selfish hedonism; one's concern for others is as 
much a part of one's utility function as one's concern for 
oneself. CP. 228). Already it has been asserted Ccf. ch. l. 
supra), that this interdependence of utility is not 
genuine inasmuch as it exhibits a disguised self interest. 
By and large, the concept of utility, as it is used 
in economic analysis, is personal, subjective and vague, 
nonetheless. it determines what- is and what. is not an 
economic good Cor commodity). "A commodity does not, have 
to be useful in the ordinary sense of the word; the 
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commodity might satisfy a frivolous desire or even one 
that people would consider immoral. The concept is 
ethically neutral. If one wants it, a good or service has 
a utility for that person"CWatson and Getz, 1981, P. 76). 
Implied in this definition is the presumption that a good 
or service is an economic good or commodity in so far as 
its marginal utility is positive. Thus any good is an 
economic good at a particular time for a certain person 
and non economic (or even causing disutility) for the same 
person at a particular time. Moreover, the fact that A 
der. ives utility from the consumption of wine does not 
necessarily imply, that B must derive utility therefrom; 
yet wine is an economic good! It is indeed a real weakness 
that the whole edifice of the neoclassicl economic theory 
is based on such an amorphous and capricious concept as 
uti 11 ty. 
Since utility is an introspective concept it cannot 
be measured, thus the technique of indifference curve 
analysis has been evolved. 
4 By ranking his/her subjective 
4 Note that the classical cardinal utility approach 
carries within it the assumption of measurability; it 
gives numerically comparable estimates of the intensities 
of preferences. The arbitrary units of measurements are 
called utits. Many economists fired heavy shells at 
cardinal utility, eventually "ordinal utility' was set on 
a throne consisting of tools containing indifference 
curves. Ordinal utility means that the consumer is assumed 
to order or rank the subjective utilities of goods. Thus 
the ind 
' 
ifference curve replaces the curve of diminishing 
marginal utility. CAsimskopulos, 1979. ch. S; ' Watson and 
Getz, 1981 , ch. 5-63. 
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utiliti-c;, s of good and services. the consumer is able to 
form an indifference map representing his taste. The 
indifference map shows each and every one of his 
indifference curves; the locus of commodity combinations 
fr_om which the consumer derives the same utilityCFg. ID. It 
Y 
x 
Fg(i) The IndU f erence Map 
is customary in indifference curve analysis to make the 
following assumptions about the consumer's psychology. 
CBaumol. 1972, PP. 210-11; Mansfield, 1975,, PP. 22-32). Firstly, 
completeness; the consumer is able to set up a preference 
ranking of the possible combinations. Secondly, consistency 
or transitivity; if bundle A is preferred to bundle B, and 
B is preferred to C, then A must be preferred to C. 
Thirdly, nonsatiety; the consumer is not over supplied 
with either commodity, ie. he prefers to have more of 
commodity X and. -, or commodity Y. Fourthly, diminishing 
marginal rate of substitutionG this assumption amounts to 
5 The marginal rate of substitution is defin*ed as the 
number of units of a certain good that must be given up if 
the consumer. after receiving an extra unit, of another 
good, is to maintain a constant level of satisfaction. 
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assuming that the more the consumer has of a particular 
good, the less important to him Crelative to other goodsD 
is an extra unit of this good. From these assumptions four 
properties of indifference curves can be deduced. Firstly, 
indifference curves must have a negative slope. Secondly, 
higher indifference curves represent greater satisfaction 
than the lower ones. Thirdly. they cannot intersect. 
Fourthly, they are convex to the origin. One could venture 
to say that the so-called plausible assumptions about the 
consumer's psychology are neither realistic nor objective; 
they are as subjective as their sine qua non; utility. 
Hence, indifference curves analysis is not a universal 
representation- of the consumer's psychology, thus economic 
systems of different paradigm and ethical norms could have 
different apprehensions of consumer theory. 
However, the consumer is assumed to maximize utility 
under the constraint of hi s income and the price of the 
commodities. The rational consumer, in a two-commodity 
example, is in equilibrium Cie. choosing an optimal bundle) 
when the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the 
ratio of the prices of the two commodities. This is 
usually known as the equimarginal return. CNevin, 1978. PP. 
54-56). It follows that. technically speaking. optimality 
indicates that the marginal utility of income is the same 
for the two commodities. Note that the equimarginal 
condition does not differentiate between the types of 
consumption, ie whether they are necessities or luxuries. 
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Asa ZaLmaLnC 1096. P. iD puts it, in neoclassical consumer 
theory there is no theoretical difference between an 
additional Rolls Royce for a Multi -millionaire and an 
additional loaf of bread for a starving person. In a 
diagrammatical presentation, the consumer's optimality is 
defined by the tangency of an indifference curve to the 
budget line or the consumption possibility curve CFg. 2: ). 
Y 
y 2 
I-I 
X1 
Fg(2) The EquUtbrturn of the, Consumer 
In the words of MansfieldCI975, P. 39). the indifference map 
shows what the consumer's preferences are; the budget line 
shows what the consumer can do. 
6 This budget line is not 
value-neutral as it might, pzima facie, appear to be; it 
is based on the presumption that, in his longing for 
utility maximization, the consumer exhausts his available 
income. 
a The budget line is the boundary to the consumer's choice 
for acquiring commodity X and,, Ior commodity Y. Its slope is 
thus equal to the price ratio of two commodities. 
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At point A CFg. 2), the consumer maximizes his utility; 
a maximum constrained by the consumer's limited budget and 
by the prices that have to be paid. The mere fact that the 
consumer is in equilibrium does not necessarily imply that 
the consumer satisfies his wants. The equimarginal returns 
emphasise the fact of the equilibrium, not its quality. 
thus it is open to criticism on the grounds that it is 
ethically trivial. A consumer, rich or poor, whether he 
satisfies his wants or not, is in equilibrium and hence 
rational, if the marginal utility of his income is the 
same for all goods. Does it make any sense to say that a 
consumer, living below the poverty line, is maximizing his 
or her utility? Indubitably not. 
4.3.2. The homo Islamicus' consumption behaviour 
4.3.2.1. Hastahah versus Utility 
In line with the ethically loaded objectives of the 
homo Istamicus, the concept of mastahah is introduced as 
an alternative to the traditional concept of utility. All 
matters Cbe they activities or thingsD generate mastahah 
if and only if they help achieve the objectives of human 
life CZarqa, 1980, P. 13; Ghanim, 1993. P. 35). Put, in this way, 
mastahah is that quality of goods and services which 
enhances or safeguards the objectives of shart**ah or the 
individual's 
jfatý; 
A Cfelicity in this life and the life to 
comeD. *The opposite is mafsdahCmischief); a characteristic 
of all Islamically banned. vicious goods whose demand and 
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supply -alam-ticitios are viruadly zero. FgCS. 3 shows that 
the optimal bundle for a consumer facing a choice between 
economic and vicious goods is X* which contains no vicious 
goods; i e. a corner point, solution. Note that mere 
adherence to Islamic injunctions regarding vicious 
goods generates maqLahah. 
VtCtOUS 
coods 
EconomLc 
(loods 
F9(3) vicious goods and corner sotution 
Though maqlajýah is a subjective concept it is not as 
vague and ambiguous as utility. Four reasons are said to 
account for the superiority of *astahah over utilit Y. 
CKhan. 1987, PP. 9-103. Firstly, the consumer is relatively 
free as to the determination of mastahah; the criterion of 
judgement is not left to his or her subjective whim. Put 
in this way, individualistic and non-i ndivi dualistic 
Cdivine) judgements interact in determinin, q mastahah. 
Cthe individual is not the best judge of his actions3. 
Secondly, the individual's mastahah is, ipso facto, 
consistent with social mastahah, unlike the individual"s 
utility which will often be in conflict with social 
utility. This point needs to be qualified; consistenCY 
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between the individual's and social mastahah is ethically 
desired, however, its possibility necessitates a further 
assumption, vio, altruistic human motivation. Thirdly, the 
concept of mo, -Iahah underlies all economic activities in 
society. Thus, it is the objective underlying consumption, 
production and exchange. Note that in neoclassical 
microeconomics, utility underlies consumption while profit 
underlies production. Fourthly, many economists maintain 
that it is impossible. even in principle, to compare the 
utility enjoyed by one person with the utility enjoyed by 
7 
another CBatson and Getz. 1981. PP. 90: ). The utility 
represented by 45 to a poor man may mean a great deal; to 
a rich man, it may not be worth picking up. For reasons of 
this kind, it is impossible to make a comparison of 
rigorous scientific validity between the utilities enjoyed 
by different people CNevin, 107B. P. 43-44. ). However. it is 
relatively possible to compare the ma-? Latýah derived by two 
persons, one consumes to ward off hunger and the other 
consumes to improve his health; the former's mastahah is 
comparatively greater. 
7 The interpersonal comparison of utility or mastah. ah is 
important in judging whether individuals are bettýr off or 
worse off as a result of a certain economic policy. Such 
comparisons are indeed necessary in 4maximizing' social 
benefit and minimizing social injuries. 
167 
4.3.2.2. The Structure of Islamic Consumption 
.1 
Islamically, consumption is ethically-oriented, thus. 
it is not at all structureless 
8. Consumers face an ethical 
al I owabi Ii ty constraint besides the traditional 
Ctechnical) feasibility constraint. The core of ethically- 
oriented consumer behaviour is the batance doctrine. The 
Our , an states "And let not your hand be bound to your neck 
Clike a niggard) nor stretch it wide least you become 
blameworthy and destitude"C17: 29), "And those who, when 
they spend neither squander nor are they parsimonious, but 
hold a Cjust3 balance between those extremes "C 25: 6573. The 
batance doctrine is a middle course between asceticism, 
which denounces wordly pleasure, and materialism, which 
warrants unstructured sensuous cardinal pleasures. 
Asceticism is an intolerable, negative attitude towards 
life; "virtue is not in running away from life, but in 
making life run along the right path "C Ahmad. 1970, P. 7). 
The rigours of hedonistic desires are mitigated since 
"Lust for wealth, lust for power and lust for position and 
prestige. are alien to the Islamic scheme, of things" 
CSiddiqi, 1979, P. 7). Muslims are enjoined to avoid 
niggardliness and spendthrift and to maintain a relatively 
satisfactory standard of living; thereby expedite the flow 
of unilateral transfers and stimulating investment to 
enhance sustained earnings for future generations. 
a The term was introduced by SmelserC1963); it denotes that 
consumers are essentially free to choose the consumption 
bundles, and their demand is constrained onty by their 
income and the prices of the commodities. 
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The "balance' doctrine could be construed as exhibiting 
the Islamic emphasis on the rationality of the consumer's 
behaviour. CNote that in conventional economic theory, onLy 
the consumer's rationality is axiomatically sacrosanct). 
Islam takes notice of possible behavioural impediments 
which might deflect consumers from the 'balance' doctrine. 
Firstly, Islam explicitly prohibits consumption of 
khabaith Cvicious goods), such as dead meat, blood, swine's 
flesh, intoxications and any abomination dedicated to 
other than God. CO_ur`an, 2: 173; 5: 9; 6: 145). The mastahah 
derived from the consumption of these goods is negative, 
ie. causing mafsadah. Essentially, the commodity space 
will be redefined to exclude all vicious goods; this 
implies that the homo Istamicus consumer face a bounded 
social consumption menu; a contracted commodity sub-space 
CNaqvi, 1! 981b. P. 63; Alhabashi. 1987. P. 6). 
Secondly, benevolence and the sense of other fellow 
men restrain greed and envy. "This [greed and envy] is an 
outcome of a purely materialistic attitude towards life 
and cuts at the roots of the Islamic concept of balanced 
life. This result in a craze for artificially raising the 
standard of living"CAhmad. 1970, P. ii). 
Thirdly, isrýzf CextravaganceD and tabz7. r Csquander) are 
frowned upon by Islam. "----And eat and drink, but be not- 
prodigal for God loves not the prodigals"COur'an. 7: 3i); 
"And squander not Cyour wealth) wastefully. surely the 
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squanderers are the devil's brethren"COur , an. 17: 215-73. 
Some jurists distinquish between ts-raf and taboir; israf 
is exceeding the limit on spending beyond the genuine 
needs; tabzTr is the expenditure on the frivolous and 
unl awf ul Others, however, use the two terms 
interchangeably to denote wasteful and inappropriate 
spendi ng. C Al -Our tubT. nd. vol . 10. P. 2483.7he ethi cal 
constraint of avoiding wasteful consumption indicates 
further that the social consumption menu for each 
individual consumer is essentially bounded. 
Fourthly, Islam inhibits conspicuous consumption; that 
is, the use of consumer goods in such a way as to create a 
display for the purpose of impressing others rather than 
the satisfaction of normal consumer demand. 
9 CDonaldson, 
IGS4, P. 154). This ostentatious display of wealth "has very 
pernicious 'demonstration effect' upon other sections of 
the societyCAhmad, 1970, P. 11: ). It is likely to cause social 
unrest in the form of envy, rancor and hatred among 
members of the society. Real-world observations show that 
conspicuous consumption Cextreme affluence) occurs onty at 
the expense of others being exposed Cunder consumption). 
Instead of being derived from conspicuous consumption that 
implies a negative attitude towards others, psychological 
9 Conspicuous consumption leads to what has been termed 
Weblen effect' Cafter Thorstein VeblenCi857-VQ2! Q); Veblen 
effect is the phenomenon whereby as the price of an- 
article falls, some consumers construe this as a reduction 
in the quality of the good or loss of its exclusiveness 
and cease to buy it. 
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oxcollonco. in itc Imlamic pors; poctivo, ir. dqibrivi;; Pd from 
benevolent behaviour Cpositive attitude towards others: ). 
------- So. vie with one another for the good deeds "CQur "an, 
2: 148; 5: 48D. Conspicuous consumption is an outcome of the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of few to the neglect 
of the masses and., Ior the lack of investment opportunities. 
Under -consumption often arises due to lack of purchasing 
power and,, Ior the lack of goods and services. A 
fully-fledged Islamic society is virtually immune from the 
concentration of wealth, due to the ethical norms of 
benevolence and aPadL. Ccf. 0_ur'an, 59: 7). The unilateral 
transfers, the employment opportunities promoted by the 
entrepreneurs' creativity, would, ceteris paribus. ensure 
sufficient purchasing power to each individual in the 
society. Fair factor compensation C cf , ch. 5.1 nfra) . 
entrepreneurs' moral commitment, and their longing for 
after-life reward, would, cotoris paribus, invigorate the 
entrepreneurs' creativity and thereby secure employment 
opportunities and a sustained flow of goods and services. 
Thus. "while there is no conspicuous consumption leading 
to wastages in an Islamic economy, there is no place for 
under consumption either 'TMannan. iQ84. P. 00) 
4.3.2.3. Consumer Choice and Income Allocation 
Intrinsically. the homo Zstamicus is constantly aspiring 
mctqtattah. Since the concept of maqta)ýah exhibits the 
interdependence of social welfare functions, benevolence 
171. 
appears as a centrepiece of economic activity. Benevolence 
is not confined to others-oriented behaviour; it reveals 
itself even in promoting one's own welfare. Inculcated to 
that extent, beiievolence would effectively necessitate the 
reconstruction of consumer choice and budget allocation. 
The first choice facing the homo IsLamicus is unique; 
income should be allocated, primarily, between satisfying 
wordly needs and spending in the way of God. Since the 
homo Islamicus is not ready to trade off after-life reward 
for Wordly pleasure.. his choice exhibits a lexicographic 
ordering 
10 
. This implies that the equimarginal analysis is 
virtually a vacuous concept. Economists often eschew this 
ordering on the grounds that it is a bizarre choice 
CNewman, iQ65, P. 24). Suffice it to say that in an Islamic 
perspective this choice is not bizarre inasmuch as it is. 
jure divino, imperative. The choice between material and 
spiritual satisfaction CFg. 4: ) appears in a lexicographical 
order. Any point on a vertical line to the right Czone W 
is preferred to all points on a lower line to the left. 
Moreover, any point on a higher horizontal line Czone S. ) 
is preferred to points on a lower line. Note that points 
10 Lexicographic ordering purports that alternative X -is 
better than Y if and only if X is better than Y on the 
most important criterion on which they differ. This form 
of ordering has been criticized on the grounds that strict 
adherence to it prevents the trade-off, or balancing, 
between cri+-eria. CFishburn, ie74, P. i444). This claim is 
valid only if substitutability is possibe and permissible. 
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on +-he same line are not equivalent, mo-a-Lahah increases in 
the direction of the arrows. Moreover, the homo Istamicus 
spt ri tual 
1400cla 
1 
Fg(4) income Attocation Between MateriaL 
and spirituat satisfactton ' 
is assumed to fulfil a minimum level of material 
satisfaction M*. In zone M the homo lstamýcvs is biased 
towards material satisfaction up to M* Cprovided that 
spending in the way of God is positive). Beyond 14* the 
homo Istamicus behaviour -would exhibit an unbounded bias 
towards spending for the cause of God. Consequently, the 
homo Istamicus optimal choice is on a higher horizontal 
line to the boundary of the vertical line CM*. such as 
point E. If this is generalized to all members of the 
society then, at least. a semi -egalitarian society would 
be attainable. 
The second choice facing the homo Istamicus is the 
allocation of the wordLy needs budget between saving and 
present consumption. Conventional economic theory presumes 
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that people are myopic by nature and therefore pay little 
attention to future happenings. Thus, people, on average, 
aýe likely to experience a disutility in saving unless 
they receive a positive remuneration; interest. 
il Cne could 
venture to argue that this myopia-induced time preference 
is compatible onty with materialistic individualism and 
egoistic human motivation. Given the norms of benevolence 
and al'adl, the individual's responsibility towards others 
Cincluding his kith and kin). and his unsatiable longing 
for spirituality, the proposed myopia is likely to induce 
saving. Muslim economists, notably SiddiqiCIO933, Zarqa 
C1983) and KhanCIGS7. ) maintain that the expected rate of 
return is more effective than interest in stimulating 
private savings. 
12 One could hardly accept this view 
verbatim. The rate of return. or the capital reward in 
general, is neither the raison d'dtro nor the sine qua non 
of saving. or investment, nevertheless. it is there inasmuch 
as it is required by at"adl. Since hoarding is banned, and. 
due to zahEth, mere saving is an economically-negative act 
CKahf, 1979), the intimacy of saving and investment implies 
II This is precisely the time preference explanation of the 
phenomenon of interest though, philosop, ýically speaking, a 
rather fallacious justification thereof. C Abbas, 1987, ch. 2). 
12 This view needs to be qualified; the rate of return is 
ambiguous; in an economy composed of multi-firms it is 
impossible to speak of a single rate of return. It is more 
appropriate to use the averaee rate of return, but even 
this is beset with the difficulty of determining it. 
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the absence of the saving-investment gap CKhan, iQG73. CNote 
that the saving-investment gap is' unavoidable in dynamic 
analysis involving time). 
To what extent could the homo Islamicus trade-off 
between saving and present consumption. This, asserts Kahf 
C19130,25), depends on the drive or tendency for saving 
and. /or consumption. Kahf constructed an i ncome-al location 
indifference curve Cin a rather conventional manner3 as a 
locus of all points of combination of saving, and final 
spending which exhibit the same level of satisfaction. 
Since final consumption, in Kahf's view, includes spending 
in the way of God. the homo Istamicus is perceived as 
trading-off after-life reward for wordly satisfaction; 
behaviour indubitably alien to the homo IsLamicus. 
Consumption is herein defined to include only spending on 
goods and services, nonetheless, the equimarginal analysis 
is inappropriate. The following arguments are 
worth-emphasizing. Firstly, present and future consumption 
are not spiritually-neutral; caring for one's own welfare 
and eschewing the dependency on others is in itself 
spiritually-positive act. Moreover, saving and investment 
invigorate the provision of unilateral transfers. Secondly, 
present and future consumption are essentially governed by 
the batance doctrine CQur'an, 25: 67: ). Put the two arguments 
together, each combination. of saving and investment is 
indifferent to itself. This lexicographic ordering is 
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explained in CFg. 5: ) which is drawn on the same assumptions 
of C Fg. 4). C* is the minimum consumption level required by 
the norms of benevolence and alladt. Beyond C* any 
combination having more saving is preferred to the ones 
with less saving. Thus combination D is the optimal 
allocation. Again point B reveals a semi -egalitarian 
society given the individual's firm adherence to the 
proposed behaviour. 
4 
ScLvtngs 
Fq(5) Income Attocation Betveen 
Saving and Consumptton 
Having determined the present consumption budget, the 
homo Istami. cus pursues the choice of possible bundles of 
commodities Cgiven his commodity sub-space), where each 
commodity can be obtained in non-negative amount. 
13 Before 
13 Note that the analysis herein is restricted to choice 
under certainty as distinguished from choice under 
uncertainty, such as thep best bet in a gambling situation. 
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, gmbarking on aL di-scusasaion of , this i ssuo. it is; worth 
emphasising that the vague. concept of wants-satisfaction 
Cthe basis of utility maximization) is incompatible with 
the concept of maqta)ýah. It is a standard assumption 
in economic theory that resources are scarce relative to 
the demand for them. Human wants springing from biological 
and psycho-cultural needs are unlimited. Thus, given the 
fact that many wants cannot be fulfilled instantaneously 
Cthe opportunity costD, human wants cannot be fully 
satisfied even if resources are abundant. This presumption 
gives rise to "economizing' or "efficiency' in economic 
analysis. "Economy, or economizing, means to achieve a 
given objective with the fewest resources- at least cost. 
..... . ....................... Efficiency means to achieve the maximum possible 
benefit from given resources "C Watson and Getz, 1981, P. M. 
Economy and efficiency thus mirror each other. 
The scarcitY-wants fallacy is, by and large, alien to 
the Islamic perspective. Inconclusively, Mannan C1984, PP. 
108-12), asserts that scarcity forms a basis of -Islamic 
economics, however, wants are restricted not only by one's 
ability to buy but also by social and moral norms. Many 
Muslim economists Cchief among them, Chapra, 1979; Khan, 
1987: Siddiqi, 1989) suggest needs futfitntont as an Islamic 
alternative to want satisfaction. As to whether resources 
are sufficient for basic human wants, Khan's C1997) answer 
is an emphatic yes. This view does not- lack support, 
17.7 
even from the mainstream of western economics. If the 
producers' sovereignty is restrained CGalbraith, 1972. ), or' 
if the affluence-induced desires are curbed CHeilbroner 
and Thurow, 1975: ), and thereby the individual's wants are 
restricted to the essentials, the rigors of the problem of 
scarcity and unlimited wants would eventually disappear. 
The fulfilment of basic needs for all members of the 
Islamic society is imperative. Implied therein is a clear 
demarcation between one"s fulfilment of basic needs and 
his or her ability to pay. Presumably, the unilateral 
transfers are stipulated to bridge the gap, should there 
be any. It is worth-noting that conventional economic 
theory presumes that at a zero Cor very low) income, a 
minimum consumption is attainable onty through borrowing 
Cdissaving). Thus, poor people would die of hunger should 
they accept not to live on debt, while others Cthe rich) 
are affluence-afflicted. 
The emphasis on basic needs fulfilment violates Pareto 
optimality Cthe economists most sacrosanct concept) 
14 
, and 
thereby actuate a unique consumer theory. Three factors 
14 
This is the rule of optimization formulated by Vilfredo 
Pareto C1848-1923). It states that perfect competition 
would automatically maximize cottective ophetimity in the 
sense that no reallocation of resources could make anyone 
better off without at least making one person worse off. 
The rule is not independent of ethical value judgements as 
it is alleged to be. Pareto optimality emphasises the fact 
of equilibrium but does not insist on its quality. As Sen 
C1970) puts it, an economy can be Pareto optimal even when 
some are in affluence and others are starving as long as 
the starvers cannot be better off without cutting into 
the pleasure of the rich. 
178 
account for tho invalidity of PaLroto optimality CNaLqvi. 
1099, P. 299. ). Firstly, the basic needs fulfilment requires 
the- use of the maximin criterion whereby the needs of 
those who have the minimum will have to be maximized. 
CIt is worth noting that the redistribution of wealth from 
the haves to the have-nots is a sacrosanct Islamic norm; 
it stems both from individualistic and non-individualistic 
Cdivine3 judgements. CPareto optimality does not. recognize 
such judgements). Secondly, in the maximin calculus, the 
needs of all individuals will not carry equal weight - 
indeed, those of the poor carry most weight. Thirdly, the 
norms of at'adt and benevolence assign top priority to the 
satisfaction of basic needs, thus, social justice gets 
priority over efficiency. 
How is the present consumption budget allocated to the 
homo Istamicus' needs? Recall that the five objectives of 
sharDah Cthe maintenance of human lite, property, faith, 
intellect and posterity) can be fulfilled at three levels. 
vio, essentials, complementarities and amelioratories. Two 
levels of preference ordering are worth emphasising. CKhan. 
iGS7, PP. 10-13). Firstly, necessities must be fulfilled on 
high priority basis. followed by the complementarities and 
the ameliaratories respectively. CThis preference ordering 
is not based on normative presuppositions; it is positive 
inasmuch as it is empirically verifiable. The fact that 
p, epople assign priorities to their neads is self-evidentD. 
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Thus, the choice between essentials, complementari ties and 
amelioratories exhibits a lexicographic ordering. Secondly, 
regarding the choice within the three categories, the 
equimarginal analysis is again a vacuous concept. The 
balance doctrine will remain valid throughout the three 
categories. Those who satisfy their basic needs are 
obliged to foster the necessities of others. In the hadTth, 
"If anyone residing in a region sleeps hungry [due to 
destitution] the people of that region will fall out of 
the grace of God"Cibn Hanbal. 1971, vol. 7. P. 4880301 It is only 
when all individuals' basic needs are fulfilled that one 
should proceed to the complementarities. The socio-economic 
implication of this constraint is that society moves 
collectively from one standard of living to a better one, 
in a semi -egalitarian norm. 
4.4. Entrepreneurial Behaviour 
4.4.1. The Conventional Theory of the Firm 
Traditionally, economists have posited the entrepreneur 
as the locus of decision-making in the firm. "The textbook 
picture of, the firm". argues Donal dsonC 1994, PP. 139-93, "is 
of a single-plant, single-product enterprise run by a 
single-minded 'entrepreneurs' with the sole object in, life 
of maximizing profits". Except in individual proprietors, 
the concept of entrepreneurship, as conceived above, seems 
strained; it is hard to determine exactly who is 
responsible for entrepreneurial - tasks in large 
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partnerships, corporations and joint-stock companies. 
Nonetheless. the entrepreneur is identified with the firm; 
the former being an, abstract, maximizing calculator. Note 
that the assumption of profit maximization is symmetrical 
to the assumption of utility maximization for consumers, 
presumably due to economic rattonaLtty. By their very 
nature, entrepreneurs organise the factors of production, 
determine what and how much to produce Cand sometimes the 
product price) and thereby bear the risk and uncertainty. 
Unlike the other factors. the entrepreneur, being a 
residual -claimer, might receive a negative reward 
is CNevin, 
1979, P. 92: ). In maximizing their profit. entrepreneurs 
Cfirms) are confronted onty by the traditional feasibility 
constraint; ethical and moral considerations are no more 
than vacuous judgements. Presumably, this explains the 
use of ethicatty-neutraL entities Cfirms) instead of 
entrepreneurs; indeed, the assumption of ethicatLy-neutrat 
human catcuLator (entrepreneur) is rather paradoxical and 
even self-contradictory. 
Some economists have challenged the assumption that the 
maximization of profit holds the key to the explanation of 
Is This view needs to be qualified. The entrepreneur is 
maximizing profit as a residual Cor what is called pure or 
extraordinary profit: ), which is equal to the total revenue 
minus the total cost. However, the latter includes the 
wage of entrepreneurship, or what is usually referred to 
as the normal profit. Hence the entrepreneur's negative 
reward is possible only should the incurred loss exceed 
the normal profit, in which case the entrepreneur will not 
only forgo his profit Cresidual) but he will be fined too. 
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entrepreneurial behaviour. Scitovsky C1943) questions 
-the psychology of profit maximization; "By attributing to 
the entrepreneur the desire to maximize his profit we also 
attribute to him a particular psychology, which, though 
very plausible, is rather special "CP. 57). Furthermore, to 
assume that maximization of profit is identical with the. 
maximization of satisfaction is only to assume a P-uritan 
psychology of valuing money for its own sake. Contemporary 
entrepreneurs, who derive satisfaction from their work Can 
implied zero income elasticity for the supply of the 
entrepreneurship). are likely to be motivated by factors 
sucf as ambition, a spirit of emulation and rivalry, pride 
in work, etc. 
Herbert Simon C1959) rejects profit maximization on the 
basis of bounded xationattty; uncertainty and imperfect 
knowledge. A firm may aspire to satisfactory levels for its 
profit, market share, etc. without thought of' maximizing 
any objective function at, all. Firms which are satisfied 
to achieve such objectives are satis-ficine Cor Simonizine, 
to use a modern term) instead of maximizing. The Carnegie 
school, notably Cyert' and MarchCI983), makes use of 
Simon's hypothesis to develop a behavioural theory of the 
firm; to show how firms really act, not just how they 
ought to act if their decisions were all optimal. 
The fact that most modern firms are characterized by the 
separation of ownership from control has contributed to 
the theoretical deviation from profit maximization. It has 
1132 1 
been suggested CBaumol, 19593 that firms will attempt to 
maximize total sales rather than profit. Sales represent 
a measure of management's success, and there is a clearer 
correlation between the salaries of the executives and the 
company's sales than between their salaries and profit. 
Marris C1964) and Williamson C1954-1 maintain that the 
behaviour of the firm will be dictated in part by the 
interest of the management group. Galbraith C1972) argues 
that large corporations are run by the technostructure 
Cprofessional managers, engineers); the corporation's goal 
is thus the survival and autonomy of the technostructure. 
Nonetheless, profit maximization remains the standard 
assumption in microeconomics, because, to use the words of 
Mansfield CiQ75, P. 148: ), it is a close enough approximation 
for many important purposes, and it provides rules of 
behaviour for firms that choose to make as much money as 
possible. If this justification contributes any thing to 
the issue, it is its advocacy of Puritan psychology. Note 
that none of the alternative theories of profit 
maximization negate the idea of profit as a driving force. 
Moreover, whether the- firm is motivated by profit 
Cmaximized or satisficed) Or by the sole interest of the 
management, group, the notion of self interest is there. 
Entrepreneurs are thus egoistically motivated; nothing 
constrains their behaviour other than the usual technical 
feasibility. In such an environment, benevolence, if there 
is any, is onty expressed in the ballot box! 
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4.4.2. The Behaviour. of the Homo Islamicus Entrepreneur 
Indubitably, the ethical norm of benevolence plays an 
enormous role in moulding entrepreneurial behaviour in an 
Islamic perspective. The homo Istamicus entrepreneur is 
essentially benevolent; top priority is assigned to social 
good over personal gains. Ultimately, entrepreneurs will 
forgo profitable alternatives which are less conducive to 
the social good. A benevolent entrepreneurial behaviour, 
argues SiddiqiCI979, P. B5-), is manifested in two different 
but correlated forms, vio, altruistic services to others. 
and cooperation with others in furthering social interest. 
This view needs to be qualified in order to avoid a 
possibly hazardous dichotomy between 'our, ' and "their.. " 
welfare. Entrepreneurial altruistic behaviour is restricted 
neither to times of disaster nor to the ballot box; it 
must be consistent from within and without. This ethical 
restriction is essential to be free of the eccentricity of 
the egoistic Cand maximizer), businessmen who, ironically, 
occasionally reveal some philanthropic impulses to their 
vi cti ms Cconsumers and,, Ior workers). Entrepreneurial 
altruistic bohaviour oxhibits thea, following vital -c; oconomic 
i mpl i cati ons. 
Firstly, since the supply elasticity of the "banned" 
goods is zero, and extravagant and conspicuous consumption 
is inhibited, it follows that the social production menu 
is contracted symmetrical to the consumers' contracted 
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commodity sub-space. Thus, as Naqvi Cigalb, P. 633 has 
pointed out, the free disposal assumption of neoclassical 
economics does not hold in an Islamic economy 
16 
. 
Secondly. homo Istamicus entrepreneurial behaviour 
eliminates unfair practices; profiteering, artificial 
market manipulations, misallocation of resources, selfish 
exploitation of resources Cundermining future generations3 
Ccf. ch. 3.4.2. -upra. 3, and unfair factor compensation Ccf. 
ch. 5.2:. infra. 3. Furthermore, as Naqvi CI! @81b, P. 653 and 
AlhabashiCI987, P. 83, have noticed, entrepreneurs cannot 
lower the social welfare by dictating price and output 
configurations or by keeping production level below the 
socially optimal one. 
Thirdly, since benevolence reveals the interdependence 
of social welfare functions, production activities which 
involve deleterious third-party effects Cthat is, external 
disec'onomies. such as waste, pollution, noise, etc) are 
virtually curbed. Individuals must be vulnerable to proper 
compensation if the third-party effects are inevitable and 
practically unavoidable. To, NaqviC1Q81b. P. O9) the presence 
of externality is justification for greater, though less, 
ie The neoclassical free disposat assumption states that 
firms and individuals can reduce their holdings of goods 
without cost. Hence. no one will pay the negative price 
and so free disposal ensures that no price is negative. 
CGravelle and Rees. 1981, P. 179. ). In an Islamic perspective, 
the ethical cost assigned to vicious goods represents a 
negative price, therefore the free disposal assumption 
does not hold. 
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coercive government intervention. Nonetheless. unless the 
entrepreneurs' benevolent initiative is efficacious, all 
measures of ' controlling the deleterious' third-party 
effects will be abortive. 
17 
Fourthly, production must be symmetrical to basic needs 
fulfilment. Producers" sovereignty is virtually abandoned. 
The self -interested, prof it-seeker producers create tastes, 
affect the individuals' consumption and social behaviour. 
and thereby create wastage and more likely conspicuous 
consumption. This must not. be understood as a thorough 
advocacy of consumer sovereignty. 
18 Many western economists 
17 Free markets can not induce firms to take account of the 
deleterious third-party effects simply because there is no 
market in the latter. For instance. firms will continue 
polluting so long as the marginal benefit of polluting is 
greater than its marginal cost, which is zero. Economists 
suggest three remedies to control the third-party effects 
CHirshleifer. 1976, PP. 450-513. Firstly, a corrective tax; a 
penalty that is just enough to balance the harm suffered, 
on the margin. by others. Such compensations would not 
solve the problem of externality; it is the ultimate 
consumer who would bear this additional cost. Secondly, 
unitization; firms causing 'external diseconomies to each 
other could be merged to internalize the'externality. The 
internalization of externality might be an appropriate 
solution whithin the firms. nonetheless, it would not curb 
the deleterious effects suffered by the society. Thirdly, 
the property assignment; if the producer initially owns 
the right to generate deleterious effects on others, the 
victims are not entitled to compensation. If the other 
parties initially entitled to be save from deleterious 
effects, the producer could offer terms of compensation at 
which they will accept a degree of harm. Indubitably, each 
individual is entitled to be save from any deleterious and 
injurious effects, but it is highly dubious and even 
ridiculous to speak of producers as having a property 
right on polluting others. 
19 In a free market economy, consumers are said to be 
sovereign; they know their wants and express them in terms 
of actual choice. In response. the profit-seeker producers 
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con-mid-or conmumor sovereignty ar. a myth. Galbraith CiQ723 
asserts that "It is not, the individual's right, to buy that 
is being protected. Rather. it is the seller's right to 
manage the individual 'TP. 2213. Consumer sovereignty in the 
private sector has not been totally usurped, however, 
argues DonaldsonC1984, PAS83, consumer choice is certainly 
severely limited due to consumer ignorance and continuous 
bombardment from marketing men [advertisements and sales 
promotion3. Consumer sovereignty. argues KhanCI985, P. 2443 
"conflicts with the Islamic concept of TawhrdCthe unity of 
God). which suggests that the resources of earth are the 
creation of God, and he only has the right to lay down 
thei r mode of utilization". However, Khan's view 
undermines the consumerps freedom even within the 
contracted commodity sub-space. In fact, Islamicallyo. 
neither the producer nor the consumer is sovereign; the 
contracted nature of the social production and consumption 
menus, the ethical imperatives on waste and conspicuous 
consumption behaviour, and the high priority assigned to 
basic needs fulfilment. leave no room for consumers and 
producers to pursue the right to manage or influence each 
other. The institution of at-hisbah Cthe maintenance of 
public morality and economic ethics) is essential to 
ensure a fair' and congen4t consumer -producer relation, and 
to inhibit any attempt to gain sovereignty. 
would effectively direct their production towards the 
satisfaction of these wants. Put it this way. demand often 
creates its own supply. CRotherberg, 1968, P. 3273. 
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In the light of the foregoing ethical imperatives, let 
us attempt to explore the goal of the homo Istamicus 
entrepreneur. Recall that the homo Istamicus is inherently 
longing for falý3th in a two-stage life span Cthis world 
and the hereafter). Highly influenced by this prototype, 
SiddiqiCI979) conceives entrepreneurial behaviour as a 
stereotype of the individual Muslim. Others, like Kahf 
C1978), emphasise the need for a clear demarcation between 
the general -objectives of any economic activity and the 
goal of the firm. However, it must be stressed that the 
use of ethically-neutral entitiesCfirms). instead of 
entrepreneurs. obscures Islamic imperatives and thus lead 
to some gross and catastrophic conclusions. 
The goal of the homo Istamicus entrepreneur remains to 
explored. Axiomatically, the profit motive is not repugnant 
to the Islamic ethical framework, nor is production devoid 
of profit. Unequi vocal I y, profit augments the 
entrepreneur's material and spiritual achievement. besides 
its traditional function of maintaining business growth 
and socurity. 
19 Thus a cynical entrepreneur who scorns 
profit would soon be out of the market. Presumably, due to 
19 Profit is herein defined as total sales minus total cost 
Cpayments for contractual inputs including the wage of the 
entrepreneur). Intrinsically, the Islamic concept of profit 
exhibits a distinct distributive share; it differs from 
pure or economic profit in that it is a compensation for 
the entrepreneurial inputs Ccapital and entrepreneurship3. 
For further details see Abbas C1997. Ch. 4.3. ). 
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the recognition of profit, within the Islamic ethical 
framework, constrained maximization has been proposed as a 
felicitous goal for the firm; "profit maximization can be 
used as a fair criterion if we look at it as constrained 
not only by cost but also by ethical values and 
legislations"CKahf, 1! 979, P. 33). Note that the ethical 
norms of benevolence and at"adL militate against actions 
motivated by maximization. Moreover, even at a theoretical 
level, profit maximization is unattainable due to 
uncertainty and imperfect knowledge Cthe bounded 
rationality). The homo Istamicus entrepreneur is guided by 
the overriding concern for social good, thus, some 
economists, notably, Siddiqi(1979) and MannanC1984), 
assert that the goal of the entrepreneur is to achieve a 
satisfactory profit. The latter is any profit between the 
lower limit Can average income sufficient to ensure an 
efficient life for the entrepreneur) and the upper limit 
Cthe profit necessary for business growth and security). 
C Si ddi qi , V@79, P. 107). 
Satisfactory profit, however . 
defined, MUG t be 
downright fair Cnon-injurious); thus, it demands fair 
factor compensation, fai. r commodity pricing besides the 
absence of artificial market manipulations. Si ddi qi "s 
digrammatical analysis of satisfactory profit CP. 147) is 
unacceptable inasmuch as profit is imputed in the cost 
iso 
curve. As Siddiqi alleges, the level of output QI CFg. Ba: ) 
corresponds to the minimum satisfactory profit. Thus, the 
entrepreneur's fixed reward is imputed in the cost curve 
to the neglect of capital and entrepreneurship. The latter 
are supplied entrepreneurially; their reward cannot be 
fixed in advance and hence cannot be imputed in the cost 
curve. Alternatively. one could venture to say that only 
the output levels corresponding to the shaded area CFg. 6b) 
are profitable; both the entrepreneurial and the 
contractual inputs are compensated. The firm does not 
adhere to 
eCFg. 6b: ). which maximizes profit, even if no 
Prt ce Price 
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(6) The Satisfactory Profit 
firm enter the market. The? entrepreneur's responsiveness 
to the social good Cand hence to the effective need of the 
consumers) would either decrease or increase the level of 
output and thereby drive the firm away from *maximum 
profit. Highly influenced, presumably by this socially 
oriented production, MannanCI984) calls for the active 
participation of the government to coordinate and initiate 
the multiple objectives of the firm. Choudhury CV996) goes 
AC 
AR = MR 
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beyond general assertions'and suggests that each firm must 
be assigned with a minimum level of production. Therefore, 
"unlike the case of free entry and exit of firms found in 
the classical and the neoclassical economic thought, the 
exit and entry of firms in an Islamic market are 
determined by conditions of meeting a minimum social 
level of production of goods and services"CP. 243). Thus, 
equilibrium is not unique; there is a possibility for the 
existence of many systems whereby prices are coordinated. 
Hence, profit is no longer the only guide for resource 
allocation. By and large, the Islamic, convictional 
rationality and the entrepreneurs' ethico-psychological 
orientation weaken the competetive process. Hence, to 
agree with NaqviC1! Q81b, P. 57), even at a theoretical level, 
the model of competetive equilibrium may not be of much 
use in simulating market behaviour in an Islamic economy. 
4.5. Concluding Remarks 
The foregoing discussions reveals that maximization 
is technically unattainable and Islamically undesirable. 
The rationality of the homo ZsLamicus is determined by its 
conformity-with the ultimate goal of fatajý. rather than in 
pursuing self interest. Given the Cethical) allowability 
and the Ctechnical) feasibility constraints. consumers 
thus face a contracted commodity sub-space. and follow a 
lexicographic ordering of choice. Likewise, producers 
face a bounded production menu. and assumed to satisfico 
Crather than to maximize) a fair profit. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CAPITAL-LABOUR AMD EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 
ON THE ASSUMPTION OF BENEVOLENCE 
5.1. Overview 
This chapter is mainly an attempt to verify the 
following proposition: The establishment, of the ethical 
norms of at'adt and benevolence removes all possible 
impediments to fair factor compensation, thus contributing 
to the establishment of a congenial "labour-capital' and 
4employer-employee" relationship. The analysis here falls 
wi thi n five sections. Secti on two elucidates the 
philosophy of factor compensation vis A vis fixed and 
sharing contracts. Section three investigates the Islamic 
concept of profit-sharing; its philosophy. advocacy and 
forms. An endeavour is made in section four to develop an 
abstract model of Islamic profit-sharing firms; -their 
feasibility and viability vis A vis the current debate an 
self-managed firms. 
5.2. The Philosophical Principles of Factor Compensation 
Though riba is rejected as predetermined capital 
compensation and sharing contracts are suggested instead# 
yet, there is still aý possibility and a need - for the 
co-existence of fixed and sharing compensation. Each form 
of compensation is applied under those conditions which 
i. Q2 
satisfy the ethical norm of al"adl and its underlying 
benevolence significance. An attempt will be made in this 
section to lay the foundational postulation of 
capital-labour compensation. 
5.2.1. Fixed Contracts 
Fixed contracts are to be applied to that form of 
capital which, apart from depreciation, can be utilized 
without impairing its identity CShafi. 1975). From the 
user's viewpoint, these forms of capital are either 
'utility-generating' like houses, or 'prof it-generating' 
like machines. Regarding houses for instance, the user is 
paying rent for the utility provided since houses 
generate no profit to be shared. CWe ignore problems 
associated with the inflation of house prices here). 
On the other hand, if the prof it-generating machines were 
to be utilized on a profit-sharing basis. the owner-user 
relation would be asymmetric and the ethical norm of 
at'adt thereby violated. If no profit is generated, 
both the owner and the user will go unrewarded. However, 
the owner will still have his capitalCmachineD -presumably 
depreciated- but the user's exertion Clabour) will be 
wasted. Thus. Islam does not allow profit-sharing to be 
applied to capital whose identity is not impaired during 
the production process. 
However, in fixed contracts the owner can remain 
immune from the depreciation cost by imputing it to the 
fixed rent. But the owner might still suffer if the user 
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cannot afford to pay the rent. The problem of default can 
arise either due to the user's premeditation or due to a 
difficulty encountered. If the default is due to a 
difficulty, then according to the norm of benevolence. 
the debtor should be granted time till it is easy for him 
Cor her. ) to repay. Ccf. Qur"an. 2: 2903. The premeditated 
defaulter's assets are to be liquidated to compensate the 
original owner. Indeed the owner is not expected to 
behave benevolently towards a premeditated defaulter who 
malevolently violates the ethical norm of al"adt. 
Regarding labour, Muslim jurists distinguish two forms 
of fixed compensation associated with two different types 
of labour: ijarah Cwage paymentD, and ju'alah Ccommission 
payment). CIbn al-Qayyim. 1! @7S). Wage fixation is associated 
with the contracts of service. For a wage contract to be 
'in concordance with the rules of at"adt, the subJect 
matter of the contract Cor the work to be done) must 
be definable, relatively assessable and possible to 
complete. Cal-GhazalT, n. d. vol. 2. PP. 64-55). Provided these 
conditions are met, the wage payment should be known and 
fixed in advance. Thus the wage payee is positively 
rewarded irrespective of the outcome of the work. Again 
this predetermination of the wage payment remains to be 
j usti fi ed. 
The permissibility of tjarah Cwage fixation) has been 
visualized as an 'exceptional" contract CIbn al-Qayyim, 
1973, vol. 2. P. 25. ). Some work has no direct or countable 
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profit, to be shared, like most, of +Lhe civil services; 
other work lasýs for a few hours'with no profit at all to 
be shared. eg. paint-ing or repairing a house. Moreover, not, 
all peopl 0 are ready t'o f ace and bear busi ness 
uncertain'Ly, simply because they lack +Lhe abiliLy. For 
these reasons, amongst others, wage fixation is permitted. 
To avoid possible mi sunder st-andi ng, this exception is not, 
to be conceived as an artificial violation of at'adt. Wage 
fixation is not jýharar-free; the wage payment may be more 
or less than the value of the work actually done. However, 
I 
this minimum gharc-r is unavoidable, and it is therefore 
allowed within the ethical framework of at"adt; otherwise 
people are likely to experience inconvenience and 
hardship. 
Commission payments are used when the subject-matter 
of the contract under question may or may not be realized. 
The most distinctive feature of this contract is that the 
compensation i's fixed in advance. nonetheless, it is 
payable onty if the work is successfully implemented. 
CIbn al-Qayyim, 1973. vol. 2. P. 5). The subject-matter of the 
commission contract is "any work during whose 
implementatýon no benefit- however small- accrues to the 
commission payee"CIbn Rushd. 1! 981. vol. 2. P-235)- Painting a 
house, for instance, cannot be on a commission basis. 
For, if the painter paints only part of the house. the 
payer will have his house partially painted, without 
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rewarding the painter- according to the terms of the 
commission contract. The owner of a stolen car, for 
instance, may enter into a commission contract with an 
agent, by virtue of which the latter returns the stolen 
car. Should the agent fail, he would be entitled to no 
payment irrespective of the dangers that he may undergo. 
Cnote that the norm of benevolence might motivate the 
owner to reward the agentD. Thus it could be said that the 
commission contract presumes the indivisibility of some 
labour tasks. 
S. 2.2. Employer-Employee Relation On Fixed Contracts 
Having examined the Islamic philosophy of "fixed' 
factor compensation, it seems pertinent to highlight the 
Islamic perception of the "employer -employee' relation. ' 
Indubitably, the establishment of the ethical norms of 
at'adt and benevolence would evolve a congenial *employer- 
employee' relation in acccordance with the norms of 
brotherhood and cooperation. As AhmedC 1086) asserts, 
acrimonious and hostile feelings are unlikely to appear in 
an temployer-employee' relation based on the bonds of 
brotherhood. Note that the predominance of egoistic human 
motivation begets an antagonistic qemployer-employee" 
relation inasmuch as each struggles to maximize his or her 
earning in 'a - devit - takes - the -hindjwst' world. Such 
behaviour is indeed socially wasteful; it jeopardizes the 
employer's and the employee's interest as well as 
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impairing the social good through the substantial waste in 
capital and labour due to industrial strikes and/or 
business closure. 
The predominance of benevolent human motivation 
crystalizes individuals' consciousness of their duties to 
each other as well as to society at large. Mal-practices, 
such as exploitation of the workers. and the workers' 
arbitrary pressure are not only damaging to congenial 
qemplayer-employeel relations. but they are also 
disadvantageous to the social good. However, these 
undesirable practices are avoidable through the 
establishment of aPadt whereby the employers and the 
employees restrain their self interest in the light of the 
Islamic maxim: no inJury and no reprisat. Moreover, the 
assumption of benevolence motivates them to foster theirs 
and others' welfare. The workers are not permitted to 
receive their due payments without performing their 
assigned duties. "Woe betide týe skimpers, who exact full 
measure from other people, but give short measure and 
weight themselves"CQur'an, 83: 13. Thus it could be argued 
that the worker's welfare function exhibits a positive 
weight for both the employer's and society's welfare. 
Morally-unjustifiable strikes, workers turn-over, and 
absenteeism, would eventually disappear. 
Likewise, the employers protect their workers from the 
burden of unnecessary labour, maintaining and increasing 
the workers" efficiency and not impairing their social 
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life. Employers are assumed to behave in accordance to the 
following injunctions. "Weigh with the true balance and do 
not undervalue other people', s things----"CC2ur1an, 26: 18; 2-3) 
"I do not wish to lay Can undue) burden of labour on you, 
if God wills you will certainly find me among the 
righteous persons" CQurlan. 29: 27: ). In the hadith, three 
persons will be the enemy of the prophet an the day of 
Judgment, among them, "a man who employs a worker, then 
takes the full measure of work from him, but does not pay 
him his wages" CBukhýrl. vol. 3. P. 258). Should these norms 
be established. the employer's welfare function would 
exhibit a positive weight for the workers' and the 
society's welfare. The employer's behaviour is thus free 
from exploitation of workers, arbitrary firing of workers 
and artificial manipulation of the market. 
In a congenial employer-employee relation, the workers' 
claim for a fair wage does not infringe the right of the 
employers nor do the latter afflict the former by 
depriving them of thei r due compensati on. The 
establishment of at"adt ensures that workers are neither 
underpaid nor overpaid; they have the fairest possible 
chance to receive their fair compensation, that is, the 
value of their marginal productC Hassan, 1983). This will in 
turn safeguard society against the adverse effects of 
1Q8 
industrial strikes and business closure that might follow 
irrationaL payments disputes. It is indeed pertinent to 
ask whether the employers are morally responsible for the 
provision of basic needs for their workers? To many 
writers, notably Afzal-ur-RahmanC11D8O: ), Hassan C1083. ) and 
I 
Ahmed C1986-3, the answer is affirmitive In the had7th, 
"He who willingly, works for us and has no shelter. must be 
given shelter. If he is single. then he must be given a 
wife, if he has no dabah [a means of transport] let 'him 
claim one"CAbu D, ýwud, vol . 2. P. 
831 ). Thus it is the 
responsibility of the state [not the employers3 to ensure 
the provision of the basic needs for any individual. 
Is it, morally acceptable for the state to mak. e it 
obligatory for employers to ensure a minimum wage for 
This assertion is based on the following h. ad7eh, "Your 
slaves lhhawatukuml are your brethren whom God has made 
subservii-n-t to you. So he who has his brother as his 
subordinate should feed him from his own food, clothe him 
as his own dress. Do not put on them such burden as will 
overwhelm them. If you burden them with. such works, then 
you must assist them"CSukhýrT, vol. 3. P. 434). It seems that 
the Arabic word khawatukum [your sl aves I has been 
translated as 'your employeers' in support of the claim 
that the employers are morally responsible for the 
provision of the workers' basic needs. This ýtadTth calls 
for a human and benevolent attitude towrds slaves; a 
positive step for the emancipation and welfare of slaves. 
Yet it also suggests a deeper and structural change in the 
basic economic relation;, the employees are not only 
securing their basic needs but the employees and the 
employers are regarding themselves as each other 
brother. Cal -Marsaf T. 1980, pp. 224-228-, Ahmed, 1988, pp. 35-37; 
Khan, 1999, PP. 63-643. Though this h. adith could be 
generalized in support of workers' welfare. it does not 
necessarily maintain the employers' responsibility for the 
pr ovi si on of workers' basic needs. This is true 
particularly when the average productivity of the worker 
is less than his or her necessary average income. 
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their workers, as HassanCI983, P. 123 asserts? According to 
as-Siba'! CI962) the employers are not obliged to pay the 
workers above fair compensation Cthat is the value of 
their marginal product: ). However, the state is morally 
responsible to pay the difference should the fair wage 
fall short of the worker's basic needs. as-Sibýa-"I's view 
is in acccordance with the ethical norm of at'adt. 
nonetheless, it is hardly attainable in the absence of the 
individual's benevolence initiative. Recall that each 
individual is morally responsible for his and others' 
welfare. The worker's basic needs could be visualized as 
N=W+A; where W and A stand f or the wage payments and 
the unilateral transfers respectively. While the employers 
provide a fair wage W, which reflects the marginal 
productivity of the worker's labour, the state provides A, 
through the unilateral transfers pooling, given the 
predominance of benevolent behaviour. Thus A :5N if W ?: 0. 
5.2.3. Share Contracts 
Share compensation is applied to capital whose physical 
form changes during the production process. Such capital 
includes "those means of production which can not be used 
in the process of production until and unless during this 
process. they are either wholly consumed or completely 
altered in form" CShafi. 1975, P. 123. Accordingly, money 
capital is and should be rewarded through a sharing 
contract. It is worth asking why fixed compensation is not 
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allowed in this particular type of capital. Note that 
money capital is wholly consumed during the production 
process while the borrower is combining his efforts with 
it in order to derive a benefit therefrom. However, the 
possibility of loss can not be overlooked. Under fixed 
contracts. if the capital user incurs a loss, he is still 
liable to both the principal sums and the predetermined 
rewardC interest. ). This asymmetric capital -labour -relation 
is rejected so far as it violates the immutable ethical 
norm of al"adt. Profit-sharing wherein both the capital 
owner and the capital user are risk bearers, is the only 
arrangement whereby liquid assets are invested within the 
rules of atladt. 
Share contracts are the only Islamically-legal forms 
whereby entrepreneurship is compensated. Entrepreneurs are. 
ipso facto. risk bearers; as such, their compensation is 
uncertain inasmuch as it is productivity-related. Is it 
Islamically possible for a worker to be employed under a 
combination of contract forms. as appropriate, for the 
varying tasksthe, or she must, perform? Compensation through 
both fixed and sharing contracts is not. in itself, 
Islamically reprehensible. However, Muslim jurists Ccf. 
al-JazTrT, n. d. vol. 3. P. 47: )' reject a particular type of 
combination of contract -forms: the one wherein a fixed 
payment, say Z100, is predetermined in anticipation of the 
profit. Such contract involves gharar and hence it is 
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rejected inasmuch as it violates the ethical norm of 
at"adt. By and large, sharing contracts are contracts on 
profit - the net business gain, as such they are in 
concordance with at'adt only if no fixed payment is 
demanded by either the capital owner or the ontrepreneur. 
5.3. Profit-sharing: The Philosophical Foundations 
5.3.1. riba, bay" and Profit-sharing 
The rejection of ziba raises the question of saving 
and capital compensation. A fully-fledged Islamic economy 
is ipso facto, riba-free. However, Islam allows for 
private property, imposes zakýxh Cto foster the welfare of 
the needy as well as to stimulate private investment), and 
encourages benevolent behaviour towards others. These 
imperatives illuminate the need for an alternative to the 
x, ib3-based capital compensation. The rejection of riba 
does not mean that Islam negate the productive attribute 
of capital or its reward; it is the predetermination of 
capital reward that Islam emphatically rejects. In their 
diffused explanations for the phenomenon of interest 
Criba) western economists have failed to provide a logical 
justification for its advance fixation. Ironically, the 
fixed Cknown) capital reward Cinterest3 is functionally 
related to the expected Cie. actually unknown3 profit. Ccf. 
Abbas, 1987, ch. 2. :) 
ao; ý 
The Islamic alternative to the riba-based capital 
compensation is elicited from the Qur'anic verse, "God has 
permitted bay" and prohibited ziba" C2: 275. ). Lexically. 
bay' denotes both the act of buying and the act of selling 
Ccf. Qur'an, 62: Q: ); technically, I it refers to "the exchange 
of wealth with mutual consent, or the CpermittedD 
reciprocal transfer of wealth" CS. ýbiq. V985. vol. 3. P. 450: )- 
This concept of bay" is widely used by Muslim jurists; 
nonetheless, its naivity is self-evident; riba thus 
becomes a prohibited ba y". Abu Saud C19683 perceives bay" 
as, "the continuous and endless process of exchanging 
money into goods and vice versa "C P. 24-253. He further 
argues that any transaction wherein the continuity of this 
process is interrupted is not a bay' transaction. The 
latter is in accordance with the Islamic rejection of 
speculative hoarding and the prohibition of exchanging 
money for money and goods for goods of the same kind. Ccf 
3.4.6). The gains generated from' bay" are subject to 
market valuation and business uncertainty; attempts can be 
made to predict them, but the prediction is not at all 
decisive. Riba violates the rules of aPadt inasmuch as it 
compensates capital irrespective of the outcome of the 
bay' process. To ensure the establishment of aPadL, and 
to avoid gho-rar, capital compensation is and should be 
productivity-related. This is the philosophical basis for 
the Islamic concept of profit-sharing. 
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However, it is worth attempting to refute Naqvi's 
allegation that profit-sharing is not the "first best' 
alternative to the institution of riba. Positive time 
preference is the centrepiece of Naqvi'sClID81b) rejection 
of prof it-sharing; "a positive time preference, reflecting 
+-he esasontially myopic natur4ý, of the individual's economic 
calculus, necessitates that the rate of interest be 
positive"CP. 115). But is there scope for a positive time 
preference in an Islamic economy7 Put it this way, will 
people experience a disutility in savings unless the rate 
of interest is positive? Naqvi's answer to these questions 
is affirmative 
2 
positive time preference is morally 
justified on the grounds that individuals are myopic by 
nature CNaqvi, P. 115. ). In order to motivate private 
savings, given the rejection of rtbýa, the positive time 
preference must be turned into a negative time preference. 
Since this is not possible Cgiven individuals' myopia), 
Naqvi's 'first best' alternative is to reduce heavily the 
reliance on private savings and to increase substantially 
the government's role in saving and capital formation. 
2 In an Islamic economy, argues Abu SaudC19139), where 
exchange is complete there would be no scope for time 
preference. However, the assumption of complete exchange 
overlooks liquidity preference and the anticipation of 
profitable investment opportunities whereby some of the 
money obtained from business transactions is unlikely to 
be immediately exchanged for other goods and services. 
Thereby exchange is likely to be incomplete. hence time 
preference cannot be refuted by Abu Saud's theory of 
complete exchange. though the latter minimizes the tendency 
of time preference. 
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Presumably, this is based on an a priozi acceptance of 
Ramsey's C19283 argument that it is not morally right for 
the government to have a positive time preference inasmuch 
as it is not myopic. 
However, the centrepiece of Naqvi's argument is 
philosophically inconsistent with the Islamic ethical 
system. Indeed man is myopic by nature and hence ignorant 
of future happenings. Nonetheless, it is incorrect to 
claim that effectively Muslims pay little attention to 
future happenings and hence prefer present over future 
consumption. The myopia-induced time preference is valid 
only on the assumption of materialistic individualism 
which is not valid in a fully-fledged Islamic society. 
Given the Islamic norm of benevolence, the individual's 
social responsibility towards others Cincluding his kith 
and kin), and his year ni ng f or spiritualýty, the 
presumed myopia is likely to stimulate private savings. 
However, saving is inseparable from investment; the mere 
act of saving in Islam, argues KahfC1978) is an 
economically-negative act and therefore should be 
penalized rather than rewarded. Indeed such savings are 
penalized through the imposition of zakEih and the negation 
of riba. Hence, in a fully-fledged Islamic economy, 
capital reward is neither the raison (2'6tro nor the sine 
qua non of savingCor investment), but it is there inasmuch 
as it is demanded by aPadL. 
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However, NaqviCiggia: ) develops another Cmoro socialist-3 
argument against profit-sharing, viz, its incompatibility 
with social justice: "an economy run on the basis of the 
'mutuality' of interests of the economic agents, who are 
engaged in profitable exchange, will not maximize social 
welfare in an Islamic society"CP. 39. ). Social justice, 
argues Naqvi, depends on a just distribution of wealth 
which has got nothing to do with profit-sharing and the 
agents' mutuality of interests; "if individuals are 
unequally endowed to begin with, exchange may even 
aggravate social injustice"CP. 49. n173- In his rejection of 
profitable exchange, and his emphasis on equality in the 
i ni ti al endowments, Naqvi is methodol ogi cal Iy 
inconsistent. Equality in the initial endowments as a 
prerequisite for a just profitable exchange negates the 
Our , anic verseC16: 713 which emphasizes the differences in 
human riog CsustenanceD. Moreover. it contradicts Naqvi's 
"theory' of limited private property. However, private 
property is essential to the Islamic ethical system; it 
symbolizes man's probation Cboth in its acquisition and 
use) and any attempt to restrain it will hardly fit into 
the Islamic system. By and large, since Naqvi failed to 
question both the. permissibility and the feasibility of 
profit-sharing, his attempts to weaken its philosophical 
propositions is in vain. 
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5.3.2. The Forms of Profit-sharing 
Comprehensive understanding of the Islamic concept 
of profit-sharing is incomplete without an analytical 
coverage of its forms; mudýzrabah and shirkah. These forms 
were quite common even before the revelation of Islam CIbn 
Rushd, 1981). However, Islam has permitted people to retain 
their use, and since then Muslim jurists are unanimous as 
to their permissibility. The distinctive characteristic of 
these arrangements is that both capital and labour are 
supplied entrepreneurially and therefore compensated 
through share contracts. This section explores the modus 
oparendi of muýi; 77rabah and shirkah; an attempt will be made 
therein to examine whether their factor compensation is in 
accordance with the ethical norms of at'adt and 
benevol ence. 
Mud;; rabah 
mudarabah is generally perceived as "an arrangement or 
business contract between two parties wherein one party 
provides capital and the other provides the necessary 
[entrepreneurial] labour provided that the realized profit 
is, shared between them on an agreed upon proportional 
basis"CIbn Rushd, 1981, vol. 2. P. 236). Since the existence of 
different grades of people as far as business ability and 
willingness are concerned is scarcely denied, mudarabah 
would help bring the diversified grades of people 'into 
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a form of busainomr. cooporation and capital pooling. In tho 
words orll)K'ýuddamahCn. d. vol. B. PP. 26-7: ) "Money breeds nothing 
. 10 
in the absence of exchange. But neither are capital owners 
ipso facto, competent entrepreneurs, nor , are the latter 
always capital owners'. In muqarabah, the capital owners 
and the entrepreneurs. the savers and the investors, are 
brought into ýLn arrangement wherein both entrepreneurship 
and capital are utilized to their mutual benefit. 
Capital is the subject-matter of the muqarabah contract; 
whether business sinks or swims Cand hence factor reward) 
depends mainly on capital growth or diminution. Since both 
capital and labour are supplied entrepreneuri ally. they 
are risk bearers so long as their rewards are uncertain. 
CThis does not mean that the entrepreneurs and the capital 
owners are extreme gamblers; they are still risk 
averters to some extent). Capital must satisfy the 
following conditions. CIbn Rushd. 1! 981.2/236-73; al-JazErf, 
n. d. 3. /36-373. Firstly. capital must, be in the form of cash 
or liquid money. CRecall that profit-sharing is applied to 
capital that changes in physical form during the process 
of production). Secondly. capital should be known and 
transferred to the entrepreneur. If it is not physically 
transferred, the entrepreneur should have a complete 
authority regarding its disposition. 7hirdly, capital 
should not be in the form of a debt. The jurists, argument 
is that debt as a form of capital implies an enforcement 
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of the debt payment, though it is paid to the business 
venture instead of being paid to the creditor. Should the 
debtor be short of cash or in a financial difficulty, he 
might resort to borrowing or ask the creditor for a time 
extension against which the creditor might demand ziba 
Cinterest3. However, debt as a muqarabah capital is not 
reprehensible in itself. but it is not allowed because it 
may lead to undesired transactions that cannot be 
monitored. 
Both capital and labour are supplied entrepreneurially 
and compensated through the uncertain business profit. 
However, business is an uncertain game in which both 
capital and labour may_ go unrewarded. To lessen this 
uncertainty, some measures are imposed on the capital 
owner and the entrepreneur Ccf. al-JazTr!, n. d. PP. 40-41; 
Afzal-ur-Rahman, 1980. vol. l. PP. 233-34). Firstly, the 
entrepreneur is simply a trustee who is not liable to the 
diminution of capital unless it is prC)Ved clearly that 
this loss was due to his carelessness or ill-intention. 
[This condition is even required by aL'cxdL3 Secondly, the 
contract is nullified should the entrepreneur violate one 
or more of its terms. The entrepreneur would no longer be 
a trustee, but rather a usurper who is liable to the loss 
incurredCor which would be incurred. ). As to the usurper's 
compensation, two different views have been put forward. 
al-JammalCIG72) alleges that the usurper deserves all the 
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rQal i mod profits but equal 1yi sa 11 abl o to any I or. S; . 
Suffice it to say that, this vi ow is evi dent. 1 y weak 
i nasmuch as it contradicts the ethical norm of at'adt. 
Moreover, it would give the entrepreneur every opportunity 
to violate the contract advantageously whenever the 
probability of profit, is significant. Abdul 6idirCn. d.. ) 
suggests that the usurper is liable to any loss, and the 
realized profit -if any- is to be shared according to the 
already agreed upon profit shares. Abdul Qadir's view is 
logical and fair. The liability of loss is a penalty for 
any intended violation of the contract, whereas profit is 
to be shared. This would safeguard the capitalist's and 
the entrepreneur's reward as well as ruling out any 
possibility of violating the contract advantageously. 
Thirdly, the entrepreneur should be given absolute 
freedom in investing and taking whatever steps that are 
deemed to be profitable provided that he or she works 
within the. Islamic "contracted' social production menu. 
Any condition imposed by the capitalist restricting this 
freedom would invalidate the muqarabah contract. CAbu Saud. 
1980). How does the capitalist choose who to invest with? 
By virtue of condition three, the capitalist is not allowed 
to scrutinize the entrepreneur's business proposals. but 
he can decide on the basis of his trustworthiness and on 
the basis of virtue of his past business success Cif there 
is any. ). Fourthly, according to Ibn Quddýmah Cn. d), the 
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capitalist is not allowed to participate in management. 
The capitalist, "s participat-ion in management, and control 
contradicts the very nature of mud72rabah as well as It 
restrict . 
6the entrepreneur's freedom. 
What would be the entrepreneur's compensation should 
the muSlarabah arrangement be dissolved? Many economists, 
notably al-'AwadEC1974: ), argue that the entrepreneur should 
be given the wage equivalent. However, the principles of 
mudax, abah indicate that an alternative view is appropriate: 
the entrepreneur deserves a share in the realized Cat the 
moment of dissolution) profit in accordance with the 
already agreed upon profit shares. CIbn al-C2ayyim. 1Q73). 
Ibn TaymiyahCI982) suggests that if the mugGxabah contract 
is dissolved, the entrepreneur is entitled to a share in 
t, he realized profit- Cif any. ) determined by the profit, 
share that is valid before the dissolution of the 
contract. The wage equivalent is apparently irrelevant to 
this case. As AbduhCIQBI) puts, it "the entrepreneur is 
entitled to a share in profit due to his labour 
contribution: accordingly he deserves no wage for the 
profit-paid [entrepreneurial] labour"CP. 149). In muqýrabah 
the entrepreneur accepts an uncertain compensation tied to 
the production actualities and not fixed in advance. How 
then can he claim the equivalent of something not in 
existence? I-t is more logical and 'fair' f or the 
entrepreneur to claim a share in the realized profit Cif 
there is any) depending on the agreed upon profit share. 
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Both the capitalist and tho entrepreneur aro ontitled to 
an uncertain compensation, though each of them is entitled 
to know what his compensation is should there be a profit 
or a loss. Abu SaudCI9803 argues that "every party to the 
act [the mularabah act] must know for sure and without 
ambiguity his share in the expected profit and provided 
that this share is a percentage and not an absolute fixed 
amount"CP. 69). Since labour and capital are supplied 
entrepreneurially, a lump sum payment is not allowed. For 
instance, it is not permitted to pay the capitalistCor the 
entrepreneur) say 41000 of the business profit n and then 
to distribute n-41000 according to the agreed upon shares. 
This lump sum is not allowed because it involves eharar, 
i. e. one party is guaranteed part of his reward while the 
other's reward is uncertain. Both the capitalist and the 
entrepreneur would be positively rewarded in the event of 
a positive profit. Should there be a loss it will be the 
sole liability of the capitalist. The governing rule is: 
the profit foLtows the conditions agreed upon and the Loss 
fottows the capitat. In the case of loss the entrepreneur 
would be unrewarded, gaining no profitl for his efforts. 
Since the effort has been wasted, it is regarded as 
Islami cally unfair for the entrepreneur to be fined too. 
At a break even point, with neither profit nor loss, both 
the capitalist and the entrepreneur would be unrewarded, 
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or as Ibn aLl-CjayyimCiQ733 puts it "the capitalist has lost 
his capital return but, equally the entrepreneur has lost 
the fruit of his efforts"CP. B. ). 
The above mentioned mudarabah rules could be summarized 
as follows: Let there be a one capitalist-one entrepreneur 
muqarabah arrangement. Let the entrepreneur's and the 
capitalist's reward be cO and Cl-oOll respectively. where 
0<a<I and n equals the sale proceeds minus [capital 
plus the cost of non-entreproneurial,,, non-capital inputs3. 
Hence, the entrepreneur's reward is txn cif n ;!: o: i, or zero 
if n<0. The capitalist's reward is Ci-d)n Cif n L- 0), 
and r] if n<0. However, it is worth asking what will 
happen if the loss exceeds the mudarabah capital? The 
capitalist's liability is limited by the amount of his 
capital. The entrepreneur should undertake the business 
within the provided capital and be liable to any loss 
exceeding it. 
5.3.2.2. Shirkah 0 
Muslim jurists define shirkah as "a form of business 
organization wherein all partners jointly provide capital 
and jointly bear the risk of the business outcome, profit 
or loss" CIbn Quddamah, n. d. 5/12). Partners might jointly 
manage the business or alternatively appoint one Cor more) 
from among themselves as manager CShafi, 1975). shirkaho, 
as defined, represents a form of capital pooling. The 
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e- ,Ar,. i+%1 ^UMeIr. -re%V- 4 r-., --+ -arw-. m M ,A It r -r' nd it difficult, to ý-J-- -"ý 0. -4 - 44- 0 4. --r 
initiate his own independent business. Moreover, he might 
be interesting in management and hence regard mudaxabah as 
unattracti ve. 
Generally speaking, there are four conditions governing 
the partners' relation in shirhah-CIbn Quddamah. n. d. vol. 5. 
PP. 16-24) Firstly, all partners are, ipso facto, capital 
providers, though they may not contribute equal shares. 
Secondly, each partner is an agent but not a patron; in 
other words, no partnerCs3 is Care) liable to pay the debt 
of the other partnerCsD. Thirdly, the financial liability 
of the partners is limited by their shares in the shirkah 
capital. Fourthly, each partner's share in capital and 
profit should be known at the time of the original 
contract. Capital, as Subject-matter of the contract, is 
governed by the rule that governs all sharing contracts 
viz, it should be in the form of liquid money or cash. 
Since all shirkah partners are. Jpso facto, capital 
providers, they are entitled to a share in the realized 
profit. According to Ibn Rushd CiO81. ) Muslim jurists are 
unanimous that shirkah profit should be distributed in 
accordance with the capital proportions. shirkah however 
is invalid if it is stipulated that one Cor more) partner 
receives a lump sum from the expected profit. Ibn 
CluddamahCn. d.. ) asserts that if the partners agree among 
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themselves to give a partner a percentage of profit 
greater than his capital proportion, that is also 
permissible. This t; -xcoptionaL permissibility has been 
misconceptually related to business management. "The right 
of each partner to claim a greater share of the profit 
might be due to extra labour or better organizational 
ability or managerial skill in handling business or any 
other reason" CAfzal-ur-Rahman. igBO. vol. I. P. 230). The 
Islamic philosophy of factor compensation reveals that in 
the case of shixkah, only capital is to be compensated 
through a share in profit. Any additional managerial task 
would be compensated through wage fixation. "All the 
partners will be entitled to profit in so far as they have 
invested capital, and also entitled to wages in so far as 
they have taken part in the management of the business" 
CShafi", 1975, P. 153. In other words, only capital is to be 
compensated through a sharing contract. and any related 
labour efforts would be compensated through a fixed 
compens ation As such this wage payment is a cost to be 
deducted from the sale proceeds before determining the 
business profit. If the business outcome is a loss, the 
loss will be distributed according to the proportions of 
the invested capital. As in muqarabah. the partners' 
liability is limited by the amount of their contributed 
capital and any loss exceeding the shirkah capital will be 
the liability of the manager. 
als 
The distribution of profit., Iloss in shirhah is summarized 
as follows: Let there be a shiz,, hah arrangement between 
two capitalists, A and B, who provide capital against 
an anticipated profit share (3 and Cl-f? 3 respectively. 
A receives a fixed wage. WA, for his entrepreneurial 
activities. Lot 11 stand for the shiz-kah profit or the 
difference between the sale proceeds and the cost of 
business CWA Plus the purchase of raw materials, the 
unfinished goods, transportation cost .... etc. 3. Then A's 
compensation is (M + WA. D's compensation is Cl-/?: ) 11. 
5.3.2.3. A Digression on Sharecropping 
muzara'ah CsharecroppingD is the most appropriate 
form of compensation whereby a fair landlord-tenant 
relation can be achieved. However, Muslim jurists are not 
unanimous as to the validity of mu2Gra'ah: The HanafF and 
the HanbalT accept the contract of muzara'ah Cexcept Abu 
Hanifah who invalidates it as speculative hire). Both 
the MýlikT and the Shafi'T neject muzýra*ah inasmuch as it 
is simply hiring land against a part of its produce; they 
advocate ijarahCrent-fixation) instead. Cal -Jazrrr, n. d. Vol - 
3-PP. 3-5). The jurists' dispute regarding muzara4ah and 
ijarah stems from a group of conflicting aýadith according 
to which muzara4ah and ijarah are allowed and prohibited 
at the same time. To some jurists like Ibn Quddamah Cn-d- 
vol. 4. P. 424) and Ibn Taymiyah CI! @53, vol. 19. PP. G5-111), 
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the prohibition of muzZxra"ah and ijZiz-ah is not absolute; 
they hold the view that both are Islamically allowed. 
given the establishment of aPadt. After a thorough 
scrutinization of the relevant o, ýtad7th, taking into 
consideration what abrogates what. Ibn Uazm C1965, vol. 8. 
P. 210-225D concludes that muzaza'ah is the only legitimate 
form wheýeby cultivatable land is to be compensated. An 
attempt will be made below to examine muoara"ah and 
Qa. rah in light of the ethical norm of aPadt and its 
twin assumption of benevolence. 
Rent fixation or ijarah involves 8harar and hence 
violates the ethical norm of at"adt; landlords receive a 
fixed and guaranteed reward while the tenants" reward is 
subjected to production actualities. Thus the 
landlord-tenant relation is asymmetric and unfair inasmuch 
as one party is immune from uncertainty while the other 
party is not. This is. why some jurists, notably Ibn 
al-QayyimCIQ7I, vol. 2. P. 7), proclaim the unfairness of rent 
fixation. 
Some jurists like Ibn Taymiyah 
regard muza-ra'ah as a form of mudarabah wherein landlords 
provide the land and the tenants provide the necessary 
physical labour. The produce realized is to be shared 
between them in accordance with an agreed upon proportion 
provided that no stipulated amount is demanded by either 
the landlords or the tenants CPP. 95-97. ). Regarding the 
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poýition of +Lýo operational cosILCincluding +, he soods; 39 the 
majority of Muslim jurists favour their being provided by 
either the tenant or the landlordCIbn Quddamah, n. d. S. /42: 3). 
Notwithstanding this. the landlord-tenant relation would be 
asymmetric and unfair should either of them alone provide 
the necessary capital. If the necessary capital is provided 
by the landlord, in the case of total crop failure. the 
landlord would lose his capital as well as having his 
land unrewarded. while the tenant is only having his 
labour unrewarded. Conversely. if the operational cost is 
provided by the tenant, in the case of total crop failure. 
the tenant would lose his capital as well as having his 
labour unrewarded, while the landlord only loses his 
land's reward. Furthermore, the place of sharecropping 
within the realm of muqarabah makes the status of 
'capital' factor cost unclear. The analysis of mudarabah 
presumes two factors of production; labour and capital, 
while sharecropping adds land as a third factor. However, 
those who regard sharecropping as a form of Muqarabah are 
rewarding labour and capital while completely ignoring the 
reward of land. CNote that Ibn Taymiyah"s C19133) view that 
the position of land in muzara"ah is parallel to that of 
capital in mudarabahCvol. 29. P. 101. ). is unsubstantiated. 
Abu SaudCI968) argues that "fair' sharecropping is 
the one wherein the landlord provides land, the tenant 
provides the necessary labour. provided that the 'capital' 
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factor costs are shared between them in accordance with an 
agreed upon proportion. CThis is one of the three forms of 
muzara'ah allowed by the Hanafi school Cal-Jaziri, n. d. 
Vol. 3. P. 9.3 
3. Abu Saud's view is in conformity with the 
ethical norm of al"adt. This symmetric landlord-tenant 
relation would remove any ehazaz, or injury. However. 
sharecropping could only be formed as a mixture of 
mudarabah and shirkah. We have already explained that 
sharecropping is not in conformity with the rules of 
mudaz, abah. In shizkah only capital is to share the produce. 
while entrepreneurial labour is compensated through a 
fixed reward. Thus, it could be argued that muzara"ah 
(sharecropping) is an autonomous contract independent of 
both mudarabah and shirkah. 
Sharecropping has been criticised by the upholders of 
rent fixation. For instance. Afzal-ur-Rahman C1980) and 
C? jibria and Rashid C1994) assert that sharecropping is 
inappropriate, intolerant and oppressive in the sense that 
landlords exploit the tenants by sharing the fruits of 
their labour and by hiring them for a part of what is 
produced; that is landlords are exploiters and parasites. 
Fixed rents guaranteed in advance, however, imply that 
3 The other two forms are as follow; one party provides 
labour, the other provides land and capital costs,; one 
party provides land, the other provides labour and capital 
cost. 
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tenants alone face business uncertainty. Bearing in mind 
the ethical norms of at'adl and benevolence, exploitation 
is therefore associated with rent fixation rather than 
with sharecroppi ng. C Note that in sharecropping neither the 
landlord nor the tenant is immune from uncertaintyD. The 
statement that landlords are parasites inasmuch as tfýey 
share the fruits of the sharecroppers* labour is an 
allegation void of any logical or moral justification. 
What makes the crop-sharer landlords parasites and the 
rent-receiver landlords non-parasitic? Another related 
question is, why do landlords receive any gain at all? We 
have to differentiate between the fact and the quality of 
the gain Cor compensation: ). So long as landlords are 
property owners, they are entitled to a do juro gain 
therefrom; that is, ' they are not parasitic as far as the 
fact of the gain is concerned. Whether the gain is in the 
form of sharecropping or rent fixation depends on an 
analysis of the quality of the gain which falls within the 
context of fair and unfair compensation. [Note that the 
rulos of al'adL and benovolence advocate prof it-sharing3. 
We may conclude that the arguments raised agai nst 
sharecropping are too superficial to invalidate it, and 
sharecropping remains unequivocally acceptable if the 
Islamic philosophy of factor compensation is to be 
maintained. 
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6.4 Self-Managenvant 
Many Cnon-Islamic: ) models endeavour +Lo analyse ILhe 
replacement, of fixed contract-s by share contracts for 
labour,, Icapital compensation. It, is maintained that labour 
and/, or capital compensation parameters are determined 
endogenously, being tied to the firm's performance, 
instead of being fixed in advance. Regarding factor 
compensat-ion, one could divide the non-Islamic 
profit-sharing firms into. two calLegories: in one category, 
capital is rewarded through 'Lhe scarcit-y-reflecting rent 
CinterestD, while labour compensation is tied to the 
production actualities; in the other, share contracts are 
equally applied to bot-h labour and capital. In the light 
of the Islamic philosophy of profit-sharing, a theoretical 
model of a mudýtrabah and a shirkah firm will be developed 
in an attempt to investigalLe t-heir viability, efficiency 
and their superiority over the non-Islamic ones. 
5.4.1. The Received Theories 
The pioneering theoretical work on' self management 
was that of WardCV958) or what is referred to as the 
"Illyrian Firm'. The firm is a collective partnership 
formed by the workers; workers hire capital, sell the 
product at the highest possible price. bear the risk of 
loss or gain and distribute the resulting profit equally 
among themselves. The firm's production function is 
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X= XCL, K a ), a twice-differentiable concave function, 
satisfying the rules of diminishing returns. L and K0 
stand for the number of workers and the fixed capital 
respectively. Workers are assumed to have identical 
skills, working under the condition of uncertainty and 
never ploughing back their profits. The model has been 
developed further by Meade C1972) and VanekCI9733. In the 
'Ward-Meade-Vanek' model, the workers maximize the 
Px XCL, rk -wL 
average net income per worker, y + W, 
L 
where Px is the parametrically fixed product price, w. the 
wage per worker, W=Ew. and r is the fixed compensation 
per unit of capital. The optimality condition requires 
that workers are employed up to the point where the value 
of the marginal product of labour is equal to the average 
net income per worker. Likewise, capital is employed up to 
the point where the value of its marginal product is equal 
to its scarcity reflecting rentCthe fixed interest). 
Though the Ward-Meade-Vanek model is an attempt to 
analyse a revolutionary type of labour-capital relation, 
the rewards for labour and capital still appear 
inconsistent. While labour compensation is tied to the 
firm's performance, capital receives a fixed compensation 
Cpresumably. exogenously determinedD irrespective of the 
firm's performance. In other words. labour reward is 
uncertain, while capital reward is relatively risk-free. 
Presumably, in this model the workers are liable to the 
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firm's loss. However, if loss is incurred, the workers 
will not only have their physical and entrepreneurial 
labour unrewarded, but also have to share the loss among 
themselves. The model is beset, with what McCainCIO77) 
termed "the law of increasing risk'. Though capital is 
guaranteed a fixed return, there is always some 
probability of default. and the probability of loss to the 
lenders usually increases with the decrease in the 
equity-capital proportion. Thus the lenders are likely to 
demand high amortization and interest rates, hence the 
cost of loan capital rises at the margin. These factors 
would eventually reduce the expected surplus, the expected 
dividend income per worker and consequently discourages 
further external finance. 
In practice, almost all cooperative enterprises share a 
common feature regarding the position of capital; capital 
assets are collectively owned and usually accumulated in 
the form of collective savings and undistributed earnings 
CVanek, 1973). This has generated a shift in theoretical 
4 
analyses towards internal ly-f i nanced self-managed firms 
4 Three reasons account for the emergence of internally 
financed firms. Firstly, financiers may- be mistrustful of 
cooperative firms and regard them as mere eccontric firms. 
Secondly, members of the cooperative are themselves 
sometimes reluctant to depend on the capitalist 
institutions, presumably, for ideological reasons. CVanek, 
1975; Stephen, 19823 Thirdly, external finance in the form of 
shares deserving dividends is beset with two problems; the 
possibility of a lossCor a zero profit), and the fear that 
the shareholders might demand some kind of participation 
in manacement, /control which eventually endangers the very 
nature of self-managementCMcCain, 1977D. 
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The firm is financed through the members contributions and 
their non-refundable retained earnings. The realized 
surplus is allocated to the ' workers' income and the 
investment fund CFurubotn and Pejovich, 19703. In this 
model, no interest is paid on capital and the workers have 
no claim over their principal sums contributed nor do they 
share the profit of the enterprise beyond their period of 
empl oyment 
5. The production function is X= XCL, K 
0 ), a 
twice-differentiable concave function, satisfying the 
rules of diminishing returns. L and KO stand respectively 
for the homogeneous labour input and the given volume of 
capital services. Workers maximize the average income per 
worker, Y. such that y= 
00 P. XCL, K3 - ZC K 
0 where P is 
L 
the parametrically fixed product, price, Z is the firm's 
cost whose magnitude can be taken, for convenience, as a 
function of KO CFurubotn and Pejovich, iQ70: ). The process 
of optimization shows that MPL = APL -Z/L , that is. the 
It is argued that such a model would be inadequate 
inasmuch as it is likely to suffer from an unavoidable 
attenuation and truncation of property rights. The model 
will be beset with two horizon problems: Firstly, the 
'Furubotn-Pejovich'CI970) horizon problem arises from the 
inability of workers to recoup the unexpended principal 
of their retained earnings. Secondly. the general horizon 
problem discussed by Jensen and MecklingCI979), that is, 
since a worker"s claim on future cash flow is contingent 
on wor k in the firm, does a system of internal capital 
accounts solve this general problem? EllermanCI985) 
asserts that such a question requires a number of new 
concepts from property theory, and a number of 
reconceptualizations that differ from the conventional 
point of view. 
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marginal product of labour equals the average product of 
labour minus the average fixed cost per unit of labour. 
Note that if Z=0, the optimum operation position falls 
at the point where the average and the marginal products 
are equal. 
Two problems account for the infeasibility of internal 
finance, thus favouring external finance. These are the 
'Furubotn-Pejovich' and the 'Ward-Vanek' effect. The 
internal finance models presume that workers are free to 
exchange their current consumption for higher future 
income by leaving part of their residuals with the firm 
for investment in additional capital. ' However, if the rate 
of return on retained earnings i, is below the rate of 
return on individual savings r, workers will prefer 
external finance. Conversely, if i>r . the workers will 
prefer internal finance. This was first observed by 
Furubotn and Pejovich C1970). Unless i>r workers will not 
accept ploughing back their profits. CNote that if the 
assumption of positive rate of interest is relaxed. the 
above effect will eventually disappear). 
0 We may turn now to the "Ward-Vanek' effect If an 
internally-financed firm faces a technology which exbibits 
constant returns to scale. dividend maximization implies 
Note that Ward C19583 does not consider internal finance 
explicitly ; however, he does point out. the effect, Of 
raising and lowering overhead costs. 
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that, in the long run, the labour force Cand thus the 
membership: ) will be run downCVanek, 1975). The property 
income per head increases as the membership contracts. 
Thus, "through attrition, retirement or voluntary 
withdrawal, it will always be possible to reduce members 
in the long run'CVanek, P. 448). Given constant returns to 
scal e 
7, this process "would be terminated only at a point 
of a single member adhering to the firm"CVanek. P. 448). 
Moreover, new members will never be hired and capital 
stock will be gradually depreciated as membership 
diminishes. These forces' of self -extinction, argues Vanek, 
are so powerful in explaining the shortcomings and the 
comparative failure of participatory forms in history. 
Weitzman CIQE? 4) proposes a sharo oconomy wherein 
workers payments are tied to an appropriate index of the 
firm's performance, as a robust enemy of stagflation 
9 
Cinflation plus unemployment). In order to conceive the 
modus operandi of the share economy, lot us aSSUMG 2L 
wage-based firm wherein the wage bill is C7 million. If 
7 If the firm faces a technology exhibiting increasing 
followed by decreasing returns to scale. the dramatic 
nature of the Ward-Vanek effect is somewhat reduced. This 
is because in the increasing returns to scale zone, the 
benefits of reducing the size of the membership are 
counteracted by the loss of scale economies. 
The share economy is expected to encourage business to 
expand output rather than raise prices; hence it helps to 
solve the problem of stagflation. This is because unlike 
the wage payment system which is characterized by few or 
no job vacancies, the share economy is characterized by a 
significant number of unfilled Job vacancies. 
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this firm is to bo converted into a share-based firm, each 
worker might claim 70% of the average revenue. The 
remaining 30?,,. would accrue to the capitalists. 
Weitzman alleges that his share economy would 
generate two important results. Firstly, the sharing system 
will diminish the workers' sense of alienation and 
increases their efficiency inasmuch as their own income 
depends on the firm's performance. However, as MeadeCIO85) 
has argued. the elimination of the sense of alienation 
requires the workers' participation in management, and 
control as well as th6ir participation in prof it. Secondly, 
CWei+-zman"s main poin+-: ) in the proposed share system, a 
portion of the average revenue per worker Ca ARL) accrues 
to the workers while CI-oL)ARL accrues to the capitalists. 
As such the firm will empl oy any worker whose 
ARL >0 hence the firm's output increases. ceteris 
paribus, and prices fall. If the share system is adopted 
by all firms, involuntary unemployment disappears, output 
expands and, ceteris paribus, prices fall. As workers as a 
whole spend part of their incomes on the firm's product, a 
new demand is likely to be created, thus increasing 
output, workers' remunerations and thereby encouraging 
further expansion. 
9 Note that in the wage payment system, workers are 
employed to the point where the marginal cost per worker 
is equal to the marginal revenue per worker, provided the 
average revenue per worker is greater than the marginal 
revenue per worker to cover the overhead capital, normal 
profit and the like. 
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MeadeCIG95) argues that in the absence of sufficient 
flexibility in the shares allotted to labour and capital, 
Weitzman's share economy would introduce a direct conflict 
between the workers and the capitalists. His argument runs 
as follows: If the firm is run in the interest of the 
capitalists, a new investment, plan that, yields a net 
addition to the value of the firm's output. assuming a 
fixed number of workers, would raise the earnings of the 
exi sti ng workers, and this would be a serious 
dis-incentive for the capital development. Therefore, 
unless there is flexibility in the shares allotted to 
labour and capital, the firm will tend to be expansionary 
in its employment decisions and contractionary in its 
investment decisions. Conversely, if the firm is run in 
the, interest of the existing workers, it will be 
expansionary in its investment decisions Cprovided new 
investment adds to the value of the firm's not product of 
whi ch a share is enjoyed by the workers), and 
contractionary in its employment decisionsC if it cause a 
reduction in the return per worker share). 
An alternative model is suggested by Meade CIG85). 
namely, the tabour-capital partnershtp. wherein both the 
workers and the capitalists bear the risks and enjoy the 
fruits of success. In Meade' s model, shares are allotted 
to both the capitalists and the workers, provided the 
dividend per capital share certificate is the same as the 
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dividend per worker share cortificato. According to Meade, 
the major advantage of the share principle might, be that 
making the workers' income depends upon the success of the 
firm's operations might, help to remove the sense of 
alienation between the workers and the capitalists. 
provided each share certificate carries the same right to 
a dividend and exactly the same right of shareholders' 
votes in the shareholders' general meeting, so that, all 
shareholders woul d have the opportunity of full 
participation in decision-making. 
5.4.2. The Islamic Profit-sharing Firms 
5.4.2.1. A Mud3rabah-based Firm 
The theoretical mudarabah-based firm is here defined as 
a firm satisfying the following conditions. Firstly, the 
firm is externally financed; capital is onty supplied by 
the capitalists, while the workers Centrepreneurs) possess 
a complete freedom as to the management and the investment 
de6isions of the firm. Secondly, the firm's profit 11 is 
distributed between the capitalists and the entrepreneurs 
in accordance with an agreed upon profit share (x, such that 
a rl and CI-oDrI represent respectively the entrepreneurs' 
and the capitalists' compensation. Thirdly, neither the 
capitalists nor the entrepreneurs are entitled to fixed 
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rewards. Lastly, loss Ccapital diminution) is the liability 
of the capitalists. CThus it is assumed that the amount of 
loss does not exceed the value of the invested capitalD. 
The following assumptions are made. Firstly, Q=QCL. K 0, C. ) 
is the firm's production function, a twice-differentiable 
concave function satisfying the conditions of diminishing 
returns. L is the number of the firm's workers whose 
labour is supplied entrepreneurially. K0 represents fixed 
capital, and the capitalists are allowed to withdraw their 
capital only at the termination of their contract. The 
total non-capital cost C, is equal to Pc c, where c is 
raw materials, and Pc is the parametrically fixed 
0 materials price. Since K is fixed, the production 
0 function could be rewritten as QC L. K, C) QC L, C) with 
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>0, and :50>0. and Note that 
OL OL 2 OC OC 2 
L and C are the entrepreneurs' choice variables. Secondly, 
n= PQQ -K0-C. where P(: k is the parametrically fixed 
product price. Thirdly, the workers., Ientreproneurs maximize 
Otrl 
the dividend income per worker, Y-, where an is the 
L 
total workers' share in profit, 0<a<1 and Y ?: Y0 
where Y0 is what the workers can gain elsewhere. 
10 
io The principle of maximization is here used to ease the 
comparison between the Islamic and the non-Islamic models. 
Moreover, in this particular case the maximization of the 
divident income per worker implicitly maximizes group 
utility. 
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0( rl 
Now maxi mi ze Y-= 
L 
aC Pa Ko - Pc 
L 
Setting the partial derivative OY,, IOL equals zero we have; 
ay 0( aQ Pa -L-C PQ K Pec 
aL C1 aL 
1 
or, PQ 
OL L 
That is to say, workers are employed up to the point where 
their marginal revenue product is equal to their dividend 
11 i ncome This condition guarantees the optimal allocation 
of labour and the equitable distribution of income. Hence. 
the optimality condition satisfies the technical economic 
efficiency and the ethical value consideration as required 
by at'adt and benevolence. 
OY Ot 
In addition, -=- PQ PC 0 
Oc LI ac 
Or Pa Pc the raw materials are employed to the 
Oc point where their marginal revenue 
product equals their price. 
11 The reader should bear in mind Horvat'sCI985) criticism 
of the neo-classical rules of maximization. The value of 
the marginal product of labour equals the dividend income 
per worker. The latter is not externally given, but is a 
result of the maximization process, and this is the source 
of all troubles. Moreover, fixed wages Cif any) have no 
effect on the allocation of resources since they do not 
appear in the first-order condition of optimization. 
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We may chock that the socond-ordýý; Pr condition is satisfied. 
2 2- 
0Y Ot a 0- OQ 
LPcx --C PQ -L- n) 2L 
OL 2L41 OL 2 aL 
I 
OQ rl 
substituting -=- Cfrom the first order condition) 
aL Pa L 
22 2- 
ay OLPC; t a 0, 
-=--<0, if - 
49L 
2L OL 2 OL 2 
222 1) cy 
Furthermore. - Pcx < 0, if <0 
ac 
2L 
ac 
2 
CqC 
2 
a o( aQ 9Q 
Also aü LY 2 
LPa c Po. PC: ) 
L1 aL c9c C9C 
1 
A 
. since CPQ PC) 
L aLQac 
I 
Oc 
22 
Besides the negativity of and the second 
OL 2 CIC 
2 
ya2y C92 y2 
aL 22 ac 
order condition requires that 
ac aL - 
a 2ý PI azý 
2ý 2 
that is, 
49L 
2 L- ac 
2' 
1> 
OL ac 
Or, 
a2ý a26 )2 26 a CThis is true Ceg, if 0. ) 
ac 2 aL aC c9L ac 
Thus the solution is a maximum. 
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Tho dividond maximization indicatos that ontroprenours 
whose marginal revenue product is less than their dividend 
income would not be employed, for this would adversely 
reduce the dividend income of those who are already 
employed. Though this might appear technically elegant, it 
is not necessarily ethically desirable Ccf- the paragraph 
infra). By reaching that point of maximization, the 
entrepreneurs are thus determining the optimum level L* 
CFig. 1), the optimum level of production CL, C) and 
0 the corresponding capitalists' income CI-ct) CPQ. Q -K- CD 
which is optimum onLy from the entrepreneurs" viewpoint. 
rT.,, L 
PQ 
aL L 
L 
Figure 1, the rnaxtrntzation of the dividend income 
per worker (entrepreneur) in a mudarabah firm 
The analysis of the muqarabah firm presumes the single 
skill type of entrepreneurs Cin line with Ward MD58) who 
equally share the firm's profit. It seems pertinent to ask 
whether Islam accepts workers Cin a muqaxabah firm) being 
fired. It might appear, pzima facie. that workers whose 
contribution to the firm"s production is less than their 
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received income are sharing the fruits of others' efforts, 
hence, according to at'adt, it is not reprehensible 
if those workers are fired. The analysis ts therefore 
virtually the same as that of the non-Islamic models Cas 
appeared in Ireland and LawCI982: ) who discuss membership 
contraction by random selection and by compensation). 
However, given benevolence as a paramount ethical axiom, 
membership contraction is Islamically acceptable if and 
only if it is in the form of voluntary withdrawal. Note 
that if the members are perfect altruists, the firm is 
likely to face what might be called the before you 
problem; each worker attempts to be the first-leaving, 
thus the firm is likely to face self-extinction depending 
on the strength of the before you problem. It is only 
through rational altruism C which does not undermines 
aPadL, or jeopardizes the social good) that voluntary 
withdrawal is viable and efficient on both economic and 
ethical grounds. 
The capitalists, in the mudarabah firm, would like to 
adjust L to maximize their profit portion ci-oo n such 
arl 010 
that, -= PQ- = 0. That is, the capitalists desire 
aL OL 
the employment of any worker so far as the latter adds 
to the total profit, out of which a share would accrue 
to the capitalists. This apparently shows the inconsistency 
between the workers' and the capitalists' desires. As 
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sahown in Figure 1, while point A Ynaximizos the dividend 
income per worker and hence determines the optimum L Cfrom 
the workiers' viewpoint), the capitalists would desire the 
employment of workers up to point B. However, since the 
capitalists are not participating in the management of the 
firm, they would only matter for the long term problem of 
0 the appropriate size of capital K 
Unlike the Ward -Meade -Vanek CW-M-VDmodel which exhibits 
the 'supremacy of labour', there is no supremacy to either 
labour or capital in the muqlaxabah firm. In the W-M-V 
model the labour-capital relation is asymmetric; capital 
compensation is fixed and relatively risk-free. while 
labour is supplied entrepreneurially and hence receive an 
uncertain reward. In the mudax-abah firm, the labour-capital 
relation is symmetric; both labour and capital are supplied 
entrepreneuri ally and receive an uncertain reward. In the 
W-M-V model, though capital is relatively risk-free and 
labour reward is uncertain, workers are still liable to 
capital diminution Closs). CNote that in the case of loss, 
the workers will not only have their entrepreneurial and 
physical labour unrewarded, but they are fined too). Again 
the muqarabah model is superior to the W-M-V model 
inasmuch as, according to at'adt, capital is the liability 
of the capitalists. The latter is one of the main 
differences between the mudarabah and the Weitzman-Meade 
model. In contrast to the mudiarabah model where the 
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workers alone? manage the firm, in Weitzman's share economy 
the capitalists alone manage the firm, while in Meade's 
capitat-labour partnership both the workers and the 
capitalists manage the firm. CNotice, the violation of the 
very nature of self-management). 
5.4.2.2. The shirkah-based Firm 
The abstract shirkah firm satisfies the following 
conditions. Firstly, all workers are necessarily capital 
providers. For simplicity, they are assumed to provide 
equal amounts of capital. Secondly, each worker receives a 
fixed compensation w, as a labour reward, and a share in 
profit as a capital reward. Thirdly, workers share the 
firm's profit Cor loss) in accordance with their capital 
shares in the firm's assets. 
Let us consider the general case using the firm's 
production function Q=QCL. K, M), a twice-differentiable 
concave function, satisfying the conditions of diminishing 
returns. As before, L denotes the number of workers. Also 
K again denotes the firm's capital, but. now we assume it 
is variable, equaling kL, where k is the amount of capital 
contributed by each worker. and it is constant, due to 
condition one. M denotes material costs. Note that if L is 
altered, K changes too. Workers maximize the average 
Pct QC L. K. ýD -K -Pm M -wL 
income per worker y=+W 
L 
where PQ and Pm denote respectively the product and the 
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material prices. Since K=kL, y can be written as follows: 
Pc, O-CL. M) - kL -Pm - wL 
y= + W, where Or-L, M-) -= QCL, K, M3. L 
Now maximize y with respect to L. 
ay I 
aL 
= 
Lý 
LPct 
aL 
- CPQ QCL, MD - Pml 
OPQ K 
where, +-- 
OL aL OK -OL 
From [I], Pct -=-CPQ Pm M3 [21 <see fn. 10 supra. ) 
OL L 
ay Pct OQ Pm 
Al so, -=----=0 
am L OM L 
C 33 
Pm 
Or, 143 
49M Pct 
Equation 141 can of course be disregarded in the special 
case of a technically fixed M. We may check that the 
second-order condition is satisfied 
2 2- ay Pct 49 QaI 0-*Q 
-=--- LPcx -- CPQQ + Pm M) 
OL 2L aL 2L2 aL 
Substituting CPctQ - Pm ND from equation 123 
OL LPQ 
2 2- 2 ay Pct a 
< 01 if <0 
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In addition to the negativity of and the second 
49L 
22 
order condition requires that 
a2ya2y 02YOM 12 [ 
OL 2 am 2 aL 
Pct a Pck O'ý Pct a 2a 
2 
L OL 2L3 am 2L OL am 
2a 02a 2a Q 
Or. > -f-- This is assumed true-for 
L2 01ý2 am 2][ 49L am 
a la 
example it would be satisfied if 
( 
OL OM 
0. This would 
guarantee that the solution given by equation [I] and 123 
is a maximum. 
r to 0 
Let us denote PQ Pct + by TMPL, total 
aK aL aL 
PCX 
marginal product of labour; also denote - by APL# the 
L 
average product of labour. We introduce TMPL because 
additional labour has two positive effects an production; 
OQ 
the direct effect -, and the effect an production via 
aL 
the additional capital that the labour brings with it, 
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0'3ýQ aK that is, --- Now equation 121 can be rewritten as: 
al< aL 
PM M 
TMPL ý-- APL - This means Li [Figure 21 represents 
L 
the solution for the M chosen. With M >0 , only taking 
into account material cost, the maximization of L is 
required to spread the material cost; and with M =0 then 
L= L2 (Figure 21. The combination of these two arguments 
is to take the solution L to the right of L2 i. e. L=U. 
If M =0 [in equation 21, L2 will be the solution. This 
Cthat is L23 is the usual Vanek-Meade type of solution. 
TMPL 
APL 
L2 Li 
L 
Ftgure 2 1. the maxtrntzation of the average 
tncorne per worker Ln a shirkah firm. 
Let us now consider the special cases wherein M is in 
fixed proportion to either K or L. Since K=kL. and 
assumi ng - that some Kis never 1 ef t redundant, it is 
effectively the same whether M is in fixed proportion to L 
or K. If M= mL, the'n the average income per worker will be 
PQ 0- CL. kL, mLD - Pm mL -wL 
y+W 
L 
23! @ 
PQ O-C L. ) - Pm mL - wL 
Or, y -4- W. wher 9 QC LD -= QC L, K. mLD 
L 
Maxi mi zi ng y. we have: 
Oy 1 
-=- LPcx Pm m-wC PQ 0- - Pm mL - wLD 0 
OL Lý OL 
OQ Pct Q aQ dQ OQ OK aQ am 
Or, Pct -=- wher e-=-+--+-- 
aL L aL aL aK aL am OL 
Checking the second order condition, we have 
2 a2- a^ QQ 
Pcý LL Pcx -- PQ 2L 
OL 2 OL 2 aL 
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L 
aL 
2L 
c9L 
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Substi tuti ng C from the first order condition], 
aL L 
222 
ya 
- PQ -<0, if < 0. This condition guarantees 
aL 
2 
OL 2 aL 
2 
that the solution given by the first-order condition is a 
maximum: or, TMPL = APL. Apparently, L Q. [Figure 23 aL L 
is again the solution. Hence, the usual Vanek-Meade type 
of solution is also applied to the shirkah model if M is 
in fixed proportion to either L or K. Thus the nature of M 
Cwhether it is variable, constant, or in fixed proportion 
to either K or L) affects the solution L. But the 
potential inconsistency between the capitalists' and the 
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workers' desires Cregarding the solution L) that arises in 
the Hudarabah model, does not arise in the shirkah model, 
because in the latter there is no demarcation at all 
between the capitalists and the workers. 
The shirkah model is intrinsically free from both 
the "Furubotn-Pejovich' and the 'Ward-Vanek' effect that 
account for the infeasibility of the internally-financed 
models. For two reasons there is no scope for the 
'Furubotn- Pejovich' effect to appear in the shirkah 
model. Firstly, members of the shtx-lqah firm are unlikely 
to be affected by comparing the internal rate of return 
for their capital with its opportunity cost Cthe highest 
possible return which would have been obtained from 
profit-sharing elsewhere) inasmuch as neither is known 
before hand. Secondly, members of the shirkah firm are not 
deprived of their capital contributionsCor their rewards); 
members can leave employment in the firm and continue 
enjoying a return on their capital as well as a claim on 
their principal sum, if their capital share remains 
invested in the firm Ci. e. by becoming sleeping partners). 
This is derived from the assumption that profit, in 
shirkah, is a reward on capital rather than on physical or 
entrepreneurial labour. The "Ward-Vanek' effect is not 
easily generalised to all internally-financed firms. Note 
that the W-M-V model is based on two assumptions: 
individuals have no claim on their assets, and the 
collective consumption of the assets. The under-investment 
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forco ira unlikoly to xppcpixr in tho g. -hixkah firm rao long aLsa 
individual titles to assets are maintained. Furthermore, 
collective consumption of assets is rejected on ethical 
grounds since it contradicts Islamic property rights. thus 
reduction in capital cannot be present. Hence the shirkah 
firm is free from the forces of self -extinction. 
S. S Concluding Remarks 
Three main concluding remarks may be elicited from 
the above analysis. Firstly, both "fixed' and "sharing' 
contracts are appropriate forms of factor compensation in 
an Islamic economy. Each form is applied under those 
circumstances in which it satisfies the Cethical) 
allowability conditions as well as the economic viability 
and efficiency. Any attempt- to reject, profit-sharing on 
Islamic ethical grounds is indeed the grossest failure to 
conceive the concepts of riba' and bay". Secondly, the 
establishment of the ethical norms of at'adt and 
benevolence ensures a congenial 'labour-capital" and 
qemployer-employee" relation. This is true whether factor 
compensation is based on 'fixed' or 'sharing' contracts. 
Thirdly, the proposed self-managed muqýzabah, /shirkah firms 
are superior to the non-Islamic ones inasmuch as theY 
satisfy the Ctechnical) efficiency and theCethico-Islamic) 
allowability conditions, as well as being immune from the 
inherent shortcomings Cand self-extinction forces) of the 
non-Islamic prof it-sharing models. 
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CONCLUSION 
An attempt has been made in this study to elucidate 
an Islamic paradigm of the economics of benevolence. It is 
shown that though altruism is recognized even in western 
liberalistic thought, yet, egoism has been idealized as an 
ubiquitous human motivation. Ironically, altruism is 
perceived as a philosophical principle whose very presence 
entails self-interest - self interest thus becomes the 
raison d'6tre of altruistic motivation. Presumably, due to 
the rigorous Chedonistic) belief in the laws of 
reinforcement Cmaterial and psychic rewards: ) people are 
assumed to experience altruistic impulses ont_y towards 
those whose welfare is relevant to their own internalized 
values. Albeit, genuine altruism is not only scarce but it 
might also imply an irrational behaviour. In the Islamic 
perspective, other-directed Cbenevolent) behaviour is an 
essential human trait, and a, jure divino, imperative norm 
whose presence 'does not necessarily entail the 
denouncement of self interest. This subtle conception of 
benevolence is perceptible onLy in conjunction with a 
holistic view of human life. 
Man's raison d'6tre, according to the Islamic 
teleology, connotes the actualization of value - in time 
and space - through the establishment of hhilýfah 
Ctrusteeship. ). Presumably, it is for this very reason that 
man is endowed with an ontological commitment to material 
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satisfaction and spiritual development. Teleologically 
speaking, man is imbued with a somewhat selfish state of 
mind necessary for him or her - as khatifcxh Ctrustee) - to 
husband the earth. However. man's raison d6'tre and 
his. /her ontological commitment to material and spiritual 
concerns necessitate the establishment of at-wasaýfyah 
Cthe balance doctrine: ) as a pervasive behavioural norm. 
Implied in at-u), asatiyah is the consummation of a middle 0 
course between asceticism Cor monasticism) which denounces 
worldly pleasure, and materialism whi ch warrants 
unstructured sensuous cardinal pleasure. The 'balance 
doctrine' ensures a balance between two undesired 
extr emes; self -absorption and self-abnegation. Thus 
neither self interest- nor benevolence should undermine 
each other. Perfect altruism Cwhich implies 
self-abnegation) brings about the after you and the before 
you problems; ultimately, altruism will undermine 
altruism. To attain a 'balance' between self interest and 
benevolence, man's acquisitive instinct must not be 
allowed to degenerate into greed inasmuch as spiritual 
falaý C felicity) is for those who attain tazktyah Cself 
purification and self-discipline). It is essential for the 
attainment of tcLzhiyah that man should develop a sense of 
taqwa CGod consciousness: ) which entails knowledge about 
God, His attributes, man's raison d'6tre. his destiny and 
accountability in ýxkhiralý CthG HereafterD. The higher the 
degree of taokiyah. the more benevolent man will be. 
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However, since spirituality is assigned priority over 
mandane pursuit Crecall man's raison d'6tre), the regard 
for others gets priority over personal interest. This does 
not mean that the regard for the self is spiritually 
subordinate to the regard for others. The truism is that 
Islamic benevolence connotes responsibility, for, and 
commitment to, one's own and others" welfare as a divine 
imperative. This unification of material and spiritual 
concerns is in consistency with the Islamic holistic view 
as expounded by the paradigm of tawhTd which connotes, 
inter atia, that man's motives and actions must be 
directed towards the approval of God - the approval of God 
thus becomes the summum bonum of all human activities. 
Therefore, benevolence springs from the highest motive and 
without the tinge of worldliness; benevolence thus becomes 
highly spiritualized. It is through this conception that 
self-interested Cegoistic) and other-directed Cbenevolent) 
behaviour becomes complementary rather than antagonistic. 
It is worth-while to exonerate the homo Zstamicus from 
utilitarianism. Acts are Islamically determined by their 
underlying intentions and motives, not onty by their 
consequences as the utilitarians maintain. Furthermore, 
the rightness of an act is Islamically determined by its 
conformity with the summum bonum of human activities - the 
approval of God. For the homo Islamicus, unlike the 
utilitarian, furthering oth ers' welfare is not motivated 
by psychological or egoistic hedonism; such an act is not 
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a means to further one's own welfare. Nor the homo 
Islamicus is motivated by disguised or enlightened 
self-interest where he or she associates his or her 
welfare with that of others; that is, the welfare of 
others is not a variable in the homo Istamicus' welfare 
function. Ultimately, furthering others' welfare denotes 
uplifting them materially and spiritually to gain the 
A 
approval of God. This subtle objective is neither the 
usual means-to-ends relation nor does it involve the 
traditional laws of r ei nf or c ement. In the Islamic 
perspective, any act exhibits a unilateral relation 
between the object and the? subject, though it might also 
involve a unilateral God-Object and. /or God-Subject reward 
-a reward that is, but an epiphenomenon. Thus 
utilitarianism and egoistic motivation are 
methodologically inconsistent with the personality of the 
homo Istamicus. 
The conventional, liberalistic economic theory axi0mizes 
the commitment to individualism and, axi ol ogi cal I y, 
epitomizes economic solipsism. Economic solipsism becomes 
the foundation of an individualistic, market society -a 
society perceived as an agglomeration of individual atoms 
where, given the market-oriented psychology, each strives 
to maximize his lot in a devi L- takes- tho-hindmos t world. 
Since altruism is priceless, so to speak, economists could 
but hardly incorporate it in a form of economic theory. 
Moreover, the mere perception of altruism in contravention 
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of self -interest is in itself a built-in obstacle towards 
itS incorporation as a normative behaviour. In the Islamic 
perspective, the ontological commitment to material and 
spiritual fatah Cfelici+-y: ) imbues the mind of the muslim 
with benevolence as an all-pervasive behavioural norm. 
Economic solipsism is thus antithetical to the Islamic 
ethical value system. This fact generates a unique 
psycho-ethical orientation whereby benevolent human 
motivation permeates the whole edifice of economic 
activity. Unlike the solipsist homo -economicus, the 
social-minded homo Islamicus Cthe representative muslim 
economic agentD is benevolent, cooperative and non-rivalry. 
This is the nucleus of a new economic paradigm; an Islamic 
economics whose hard core or basic theorem is benevotent 
human mo ti -oa ti on. 
The psycho-othical concepts of al'adt CoquilibriumD. 
amanah Ctrusteeship), and taktif CresponsibilityD are of a 
vital axiological significance for benevolent motivation. 
The norm of at"adt connotes that individuals are morally 
committed to uphold a normative equilibrium in their 
over-all life spectrum. This is the pivot of what might be 
called the justice-induced benevolence wherefrom two basic 
economic implications could be elicited; the necessity of 
alleviating the least privileged, and the priority of 
justice over efficiency. Implied therein is the Islamic 
emphasis on both the fact and the quatity of the 
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equilibrium Cunlike the conventional theory which 
emphasizes only its factD. The concept of amanah indicates 
that the property rights of all resources are "delegated' 
to mankind under specified terms. It connotes that each 
individual is held a trustee for others-in-need, and is 
bound to have regard for them in whatever he or she earns. 
Since the allocation of resources is guided. primarily, by 
the summum bonum of human activities - the approval of 
God, the true adherence to amanah would invigorate 
benevolent motivation; egoistic motivation is, ipso facto, 
out of tune with amanah and hence restrained. The 
principle of talottif shows that individual freedom is 
directly linked to the conscious act of discharging one's 
responsibility to further others' welfare. Responsibility 
is neither enlightened self-interest or sympathy nor the 
mere interdependence of individual welfare functions; 
rather it is a commitment. Egoism, though not died away, 
is overcompensated by the sense of commitment. It is only 
through commitment Cgiven the yearning for fatah) that an 
individual would choose an act which is less conducive to 
his or her personal welfare thart other Cavailable) 
alternativeCsD. Each individual is Islamically committed 
to identify his or her interest with the interest of 
others. It is through the inculcation of this 
spirituaiity-induced commitment that the individual 
identifies his/her welfare with that of the society at 
1 ar ge. 
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The Islamic, all-pervasive, norm of benevolence has been 
ea-pitomized in proposing a paradigm of benevolence market; 
-: -a market functions through the interaction of two ethico- 
eaconomic imperatives; iinitateral transfers and at'adt. The 
fact that no individual is exempted from contributing to 
: -this market exhibits its efficiency and superiority over 
-the western "charity market'. Unilateral transfers are 
primarily meant to ensure a perpetual flow of wealth to 
-foster the welfare of the needy, though they also 
substantially contribute to the spiritual development of 
both the givers and the recipients Crecall man's raison 
d*6trG and the summum bonum, of human activities). The 
profound scrutiny of such institutions as zakah, sadagah. 
hibah and waqf*explicate5the Islamic emphasis on need 
futfitmý-_nt. The study espouses the view that need should 
be fulfilled to the adequacy level. Thoughtheroleof tho 
state herein cannot be undermined. it will prove 
ineffective C due to free-riding, tax evasion and tax 
avoi dance) unless the individual's benevolent initiative 
is genuine. 
The liberal economists espouse money transfers on tho 
grounds that they maximize the recipientsý freedom of 
choice and constrain the dictatorship of the givers. Tho 
functionalists propose that any allocation is efficient 
should it most effectively enable the giver to reveal his 
or her altruistic impulses. Since, Islamically speaking, 
unilateral transfers are allocated on the grounds of need 
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futfitment, it follows that the utility of the result Cnot 
the utility of the act) is to be maximized. This is the 
essence of the Islamic phi 1 osophy of basic needs 
futfiLms-nt whose objective is to provide opportunities for 
the full physical, mental and social development of the 
needy. The giver might evaluate the alternative forms of 
allocation and choose that. which yields a maximum 
result-utility. The givers' and the recipients' evaluation 
are equal ceteris paribus; thus the giver's evaluation 
would not violate the recipient's freedom of choice. On 
mutatis mutandis assumption, given the irrationality of 
the recipient, then according to the rules of at"adt, his 
or her freedom of choice should be circumscribed for the 
sake of his or her own interest. 
Ostensibly, unilateral transfers in the 'benevolence 
market" are uninhibited by the traditional problems facing 
the western 'charity market; 'the "free-rider' problem and 
the so-called inefficiency of non-compensated transfers. 
There would be no temptation to avoid unilateral transfers 
so long as the latter are bonds to the summum bonum of 
human activities - the approval of God. Free riding is 
associated with egoistic motivation; negatively related to 
taqwa and commitment and. therefore, antithetical to the 
Islamic ethical system. In principle. the muslim is not 
unaware that failure to meet the divine imperative of 
benevolence would have a negative effect an his or her 
spiritual fala; ý Cfelicity: k. Thus the principle of 
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self-interest and the principle of collective optimization 
are inseparable and, therefore, the free-rider problem is 
unlikely to exi S t. Li ber al economists claim that 
non-compensated transfers are rents to the recipients, and 
are likely to motivate the rent-seeking behaviour which 
would eventually dissipate economic value. Such a thesis 
is presumably based on three invalid suppositions viz. 
onty compensated transfers are economically and socially 
effective, all recipients are ipso facto gamblers, and 
donors usually launch a pre-gift publicity. These liberal 
suppositions are incompatible with the Islamic norm of 
benevolence; thus Islamic non-compensated transfers are 
unlikely to motivate the rent-seeking behaviour, nor are 
they socio-economically ineffective. 
I 
// 
Ordinary market 'exchange' is subjected to the norm of 
benevolence through the interaction of the latter with the 
the all-pervasive norm of at"adt. In addition to its 
ontological and cosmological denotation Cbalance and 
harmonyD, al'adt implies rendering to each what is his or 
her due; it is the non-injury state. . 1t"adt, is a three 
dimensional concept; it encompasses the relation between 
the parties involved Cindividuals enjoy equal power when 
the contract is determined), the parties-society relation 
Cindividual versus social interest) and the parties-God 
relation Cthe immutability of the ethical imperatives). An 
injury-free act must necessarily satisfy the following 
conditions: the Islamic permissibility Cto avoid its being 
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void), the absence of eharar Cindeterminacy and hazard), 
and the mutual consent -of the parties Cprovided they have 
equal power when the contract is determined). The 
all-encompassing, non-injurious behaviour ensures the 
establishment of fair market valuation. Presumably, 
without fair market valuation the society is likely to 
experience moral anarchy where each individual deceives in 
anticipation of being deceived. Thus each individual will 
act fraudulently in an attempt to compensate the loss 
incurred; ultimately, greed will be the creed. However, 
the needy would be victimized inasmuch as they can hardly 
find equal opportunities to compensate. The social cost of 
this moral anarchy is indeed deleterious; wealth will be 
pathetically redistributed from bottom to top, from the 
poor to the rich. The concentration of wealth in the hands 
of a few would be inevitable -a concentration whose 
adverse socio-political consequences can not be monitored 
The non-injurious market relation necessitates the 
removal of all possible? impediments to the establishment 
of at'a(It. Presumably, this will explain the rejection and 
prohibition of the following practices: riba Cinterest) 
maysir Cgambling and hazardous business dealings), rushua 
CbriberyD, ihtinaz and thttkaz- Cspeculative hording of 
money and goods), and all forms of market imperfection and 
artificial manipulation of the market ;. - 
In addition to 
their drastic infringement upon at"adt, these practices 
share a common feature; they exhibit an egoistic 
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motivation, leading to rent seeking behaviour where 
individuals fraudulently accrue parasitic gains without 
creating or adding economic value. In contrast to the norm 
of egoi sti c motivation whi ch generates the 
devil-tcJýzes-the-hindmost type of economy, the Islamic 
ethico-economic concept of benevolence is likely to create 
a 'chivalry" economy. Exchange, or reciprocal transfers, 
will be determined and completed under the umbrella of 
lawfulness, truthfulness, trustingness, brotherhood and 
cooperation. Ultimately such deleterious acts as 
profiteering, deception, chicanery and fraudulent 
practices, rent-seeking behaviour, and misallocation of 
resources are likely to disappear. 
Having placed the norm of benevolence at the heart of 
economic inquiry, both consumer and entrepreneurial 
behaviour have to be reconstructed. The concept of 
rationality - the maximization in pursuit, of self 
interest, becomes vacuous in the Islamic ethical value 
system. Maximization is technically unattainable due to 
the unrealistic assumptions of omniscience and perfect 
competition; it is also Islamically undesirable inasmuch 
as it exhibits economic solipsism where the 
egoistically-motivated individual is the best judge upon 
his action. In the Islamic perspective, both the means and 
the objectives of any economic choice are subjected to the 
constraint of convictional rationatity; they are neither 
logically distinct nor morally-neutral. 'Rationality is. by 
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and large, determined by its conformity with the pursuit 
of fatih. The fatiýxih-determined rationality advocates the 
concept of mastahah as a basis for the consumer theory; -it- 
also suggests satisficine as a basis for the Islamic 
theory of the firm. The the determination of maqýla. ýah, 
unlike tha t of utility, is not left for the individual's 
subjective whims; it is determined by the interaction of 
the individualistic and non-individualistic C di vi ne) 
judgments. The spirituality-laden concept of mastahah 
together with the ubiquity of benevolent motivation 
exhibit the interdependence of social welfare functions; 
they also determine the preference structure of the homo 
Istamicus, both as a consumer and a producer. 
The homo Istamicua-' consumption is not structureless; 
he or she faces an ethical allowability constraint besides 
the traditional feasibility constraint. At the core of the 
ethically-oriented consumer behaviour Ii es at -wcxscx ti yah 
Cthe balance doctrine); that is the middle course between 
asceticism and hedonistic materialism; between 
niggardliness and spendthrift. All possible impediments 
which might dGflGct the consumer's behaviour from the 
batance doctrine are? declared void; the consumption of 
khabaith. israf Cextravagance), tabzir Csquander), greed, 
envy and conspicuous consumption are frowned upon by 
Islam. Ultimately the homo Istamicus is facing a 
contracted commodity sub-space. 
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The assumption of benevolence affects the consumer 
choice. Firstly, the allocation of income between worldly 
needs and the spending in the way of God is no longer a 
bizarre choice. Since the homo Istamicus can not trade off 
after-life reward for worldly pleasure, the equi-marginal 
Cindifference curve: ) analysis would be vacuous; the 
consumer choice exhibits a lexicographic ordering. 
Secondly, since neither present nor future consumption is 
spiritually-neutral, and both are subjected to the balance 
doctrtno, it follows that. their choice is also 
lexicographically ordered; each combination of saving and 
present consumption is indifferent only to itself. Given 
the contracted commodity sub-space. the choice of possible 
bundles of commodities is governed by the needs fuLfitment 
rather than wants satisfaction. Needs can be satisfied at 
three levels; the essentials, followed by the 
complementaries and the amelioratories. The homo Istamicus 
woul d not move to the complementaries unless the 
essentials of others are satisfied. The ethico-economic 
implication of this constraint is that the society as a 
whole moves from one standard of living to a better one in 
a semi -egalitarian norm. Social division, greed, envy, 
vast income inequality, socio-political exploitation. 
poverty trap and hunger in the midst of affluence - the 
maladies of an individualistic society would cease to 
appear in an Islamic society. 
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The application of the norm of benevolence to the 
producer theory reveals the following point. Unlike the 
sotipsist Cegoistic) homo economicus who might. 
ironically, occasionally reveal some philanthropic 
impulses towards his victims Cconsumers and/or workers); 
the behaviour of the benevoLont homo Islamicus is 
all-pervasive and consistent from within and without. He 
or she would forgo profitable alternatives which are less 
conducive to social good. This behaviour of the bonovotent 
homo Islamicus exhibits the following vital implication. 
Firstly, due to the ethical allowability constraint, the 
social production menu is 'contracted' Cbounded). 
Secondly, all forms of selfishness and unfair practices 
are effectively eliminated. Given the interrelationship of 
social welfare functions, production activities which 
involve deleterious third-party effects are curbed. It is 
shown that unless the i ndi vi dual 's Centrepreneur's) 
initiative is efficacious, all measures of controlling the 
deleterious third-party effects will prove to be abortive 
Fourthly, production is symmetrical to the basic needs 
fulfilment. There is no sovereignty for either consumers 
or producers; sovereignty is for the social good as 
expounded by the concept of fataýt. 
Muslim economists must be warned that the emphasis on 
the othicatly-n-gutrat ontities Cfirms) will obscure the 
Islamic imperatives and thereby lead to some catastrophic 
conclusions. Instead, the study uses the bonouotent homo 
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Islamicus entrepreneur as the nucleus for the Islamic 
theory of the firm. Profit maximization - the standard 
textbook assumption of the theory of the firm - is 
incompatible with the all-pervasive norm of benevolence. 
However, profit is not repugnant to the Islamic ethical 
system nor production is devoid of profit. Profit is 
essential for the material and spiritual progress of the 
homo Islamicus entrepreneur, besides its traditional, 
Ctechnical) function of maintaining business growth and 
stability. Being guided by the over-riding concern for 
social good, the entrepreneur is assumed to satisfice 
Crather than maximize) profit. The satisfactory profit, is 
presumed downright fair Cnon-injurious); thus it demands 
fair factor compensation and fair commodity pricing, 
besides the absence of artificial manipulation of the 
market and all forms of market imperfection and 
improprieties. Since Production is socially oriented and 
profit is nIo longer the only guidance for resource 
allocation, the role of the government is vital in 
coordinating and initiating the multiple objectives of the 
firm and thus ensuring a satisfactory level of social 
production. However, this governmental role is limited and 
ineffective unless the entrepreneurs are benevolent and 
cooperative. Eventually, the Islamic rationality and the 
entrepreneurs' psycho-ethi cal orientation weaken the 
competitive process and, therefore, the model of 
competitive equilibrium might -not, be of much use in 
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simulating market behaviour in an Islamic economy. 
The ubiquity of aPadL and benevolence effectively 
moulds the Islamic perspective of factor compensation. 
This perspective epitomizes the supremacy of justice and 
fairness, not the supremacy of any factorCs3 of production. 
Two appropriate, though distinct, forms of compensation 
are assumed to co-exist in the Islamic economy; 'fixed' and 
"sharing' contracts. Each is applied under those 
circumstance where it conforms to the rules of aPadt and 
benevolence; that is ensuring the avoidance of eharar and 
egoistic, rent-seeking behaviour. Factor indivisibility 
or inseparabili-ty is maintained; no factorCs) of 
production is simultaneously rewarded through a mixture of 
contracts. In the Islamic perspective of fi xed' 
compensation, the Gmployer-employee relation is fair, 
symmetric and cooperative. Recall that the benevolent, 
social-minded, homo Istamicus strives to promote his and 
others' welfare. Thus the employer's welfare function 
exhibits a positive weight for both the employees' and the 
society's welfare. Likewise, the empl oyee's welfare 
function carries a positive weight for the employer's and 
the society's welfare. In the conventional, solipsist, 
economic theory, the employer-employee relationship is 
ipso facto asymmetric, competitive and hostile inasmuch as 
the supremacy of capital is epitomized. This relation is 
socially wasteful; it jeopardizes the employers' and the 
employees' interest as well as impairing the social good 
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through the substantial waste in capital and labour due to 
strikes, arbitrary firing of workers and business closure. 
It is the moral responsibility of the state, and not the 
employers, to bridge the gap between the employees' basic 
needs and their fair compensation. This collective 
responsibility is unattainable without individuals' 
commitment . and their benevolent initiative which is 
manifested in unilateral transfers. 
In the Islamic perspective of 4share' contracts. the 
entrepreneurial inputs are, ipso facto, risk-bearers; thus 
due to uncertainty, factor compensation must be tied to 
the actuality of production - that is, the outcome of the 
process off bay'. Though the latter might be predicted, it 
cannot be guaranteed. Thus, the inadequacy of prediction, 
as a basis for factor compensation, is self-evident. A 
known, guaranteed, reward cannot be logically drawn from 
an unknown, anticipated, earning. Islamically, the advance 
fixation of factor compensation, in anticipation of the 
outcome of the process of bay4, implies a rent-seeking, 
egoistic, behaviour -a behaviour exhibiting a drastic 
violation of the ethical rules of at"adt and benevolence. 
This is, presumably, the rationale behind the rejection of 
riba and the advocacy of profit-sharing. Only those who 
failed to conceive the Islamic concepts of bay" and riba 
are attempting to reject profit-sharing or question its 
validity as the first best alternative to the institution 
of riba. In profit-sharing, the entrepreneurial inputs. 
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Capi tal and entrepreneurship, are co-partners with a 
uniform basis of reward; there is no supremacy for any 
factorCsD of production. 
The analysis of mudarabah and shirkah shows the 
feasibility, efficiency and fairness of profit-sharing; it 
also demonstrates that, loss, capital diminution, is the 
sole liability of the capital owners -a view conforms to 
the rules of aPadt and benevolence; the capital users 
whose efforts have not been rewarded should not be fined 
too. The study emphatically maintains that muzara"ah 
Csharecropping) is the most appropriate form of 
compensation whereby a fair landlord-tenant, relationship 
can be achieved. The arguments raised against 
sharecropping are too superficial to invalidate it. 
However, the analysis of muzara'ah as a form of muqarabah 
makes the position of "capital' factor cost undefined. 
Alternatively, muzara'ah is regarded as an autonomous 
contracts independent of both mudarabah and shtrhah; it, 
satisfies the rules of aPadt and benevolence onty when 
the "capital' cost is provided jointly by the landlords 
and the tenants. 
The Islamic perspective of 'share' contracts has been 
epitomized in the proposition of two theoretical models of 
participatory, cooperative. or profit-sharing firms; 
mudarabah and shirkah firms. These firms have been 
abstracted vis A vis the Islamic perception of factor 
compensation, the rejection of riba. the supremacy of 
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aPadL, and the protection of property and property 
rights. Such firms portray the nucleus of the Islamic 
perspective of self-management where factor compensation 
parameters are determined endogenously. The proposed 
mudarabah and shirRah firms are superior to their western 
counterparts; they satisfy the ethico-Islamic allowability 
constraint besides the traditional Ctechnical) efficiency 
constraints. Moreover, the Islamic self-managed firms are 
intrinsically immune from the inherent shortcomings that 
aci; ount for the comparative failure of participatory firms 
in history; the asymmetric capital-labour relation and 
thus the dispute about the management and control of the 
firm, the 'Furubotn-Pejovich' horizon problem and the 
'Ward-Vanek' self extinction forces. 
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